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I.

THE MAKING OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION.

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In the theological world the appearance of a great book upon a great subject is an event perhaps as rare as it is important. When it does occur, it should seem to deserve more applause than is given to a new mechanical invention, and create more wide-spread interest than any scientific discovery. That such a rare and noteworthy event has recently taken place in the publication of Fairbairn's "Philosophy of the Christian Religion," but few of its readers, one ventures to think, would hesitate to affirm. No apology therefore need be offered for one's being somewhat enthusiastic in directing attention to this volume,* the last three hundred pages of which treat of the Person of Jesus Christ and the making of the Christian religion.

Already widely known through his books on "Religion in History and Modern Life," "Studies in the Life of Christ," and "The Place of Christ in Modern Theology," as a profound theological scholar and penetrating philosophical

* *The Philosophy of the Christian Religion.* By Andrew Martin Fairbairn, M.A., D.D., LL.D., Principal of Mansfield College, Oxford. Pages xxviii + 583. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1902. Price, \$3.50 net.

thinker, the author in discussing his greater and more comprehensive theme, makes successful use of the opportunity afforded him, not only to confirm and establish his previous reputation, but to surpass the brilliance of his earlier intellectual achievements. The fulness of his thoroughly assimilated knowledge, whether historical, critical, scientific, philosophical or theological, is constantly in evidence in these pages. Commensurate with the greatness of the subjects treated in the several chapters of the book is his largeness of mind, his calm and confident mental grasp, his courageous setting forth of the truth as he sees it. One may not at all points agree with him, but in following the course of his argument, the thrill of his personal conviction, the glow of moral passion with which he writes, make themselves clearly felt. In a time of religious unrest and distress of faith, as that now upon us, it is positively refreshing and reassuring to come in vital touch with an intellect like his. He sounds no note of despair in the hearing of God's rational children. He believes, as the title of his book implies, that the deep and transcendent claims of Christianity can be philosophically vindicated, that the connection of our religion with reason can be triumphantly maintained.

Upon opening the book, even before reaching the title page of it, one finds a quotation given from Glanville, "which is significant of much," as Carlisle would have said, of what is to be expected in the pages following: "There is not anything I know which has done more mischief to religion than the disparaging of reason under pretense of respect and favor to it: for hereby the very foundations of the Christian faith have been undermined, and the world prepared for atheism. And if reason must not be heard, the being of God and the authority of Scripture can be neither proved nor defended, and so faith drops to the ground like a house that hath no foundations." Accepting these claims for reason as valid Principal Fairbairn sets out to do two things: first, "to explain religion through nature and man," and second, "to construe Christi-

anity through religion." From several delightful autobiographical references we learn that certain problems met with in the course of his own professorial duties compelled him to make this two-fold attempt.

In his view Christianity stands among other religions that must be historically investigated and philosophically construed. Only to its own injury, therefore, can exceptional consideration be claimed for it at the hands of the historical student or philosophical thinker. The advancing of such a claim means practically the surrender either of the truth and equity of our religion, or the integrity of the reason which is one of God's own gifts to us. But whilst believing that Christianity belongs to the cycle of historical religions, our author looks upon the Son of God as holding in His pierced hands the key of them all, as explaining all the factors of their being, and all the persons through whom they have been realized. If religious thought in the past has failed to give due recognition to these facts, the theologian of the future will properly weigh them. In man's religions he will seek to discover the truth of his quest after God, but no less also God's quest after him. He will discover in this search that the system "whose crown and center is the Divine Man, is one which does justice to everything positive in humanity by penetrating it everywhere with Deity," thus showing the fact of the incarnation to be the very truth which turns nature and man, history and religion, into the luminous dwelling-place of God.

In germ at least this philosophic conception of the comprehensive meaning, the all-determining function of the incarnation, is clearly present in the early apostolic writings. Whether the inspired authors of those writings "buildest better than they knew," or not, the fact remains—and for apologetic purposes it is a deeply significant one—that much of the recent independent thought on the mystery of the incarnation trenches in the direction of that of the men of the New Testament. The latter in contact with Jesus Christ were conscious of being in contact with final truth, with the ulti-

mate reality of all things. Their "Weltanschauung" made the Incarnate Word, therefore, the source, the sovereign, the goal of the universe. Hence they wrote for instance: "In Him was life and the life was the light of men"; He "was the true light which lighteth every man that cometh into the world"; "In Him were all things created;" "In Him all things consist." Properly interpreted utterances like these involve, like bud the flower, those truths which from a philosophical view-point the Principal of Mansfield College has elaborated in his pages—elaborated, one of his sympathetic critics thinks, "with a comprehensiveness, a thoroughness and a trenchancy of criticism, as well as a wealth of ideas and originality of insight, which have never been equalled."

The argument with reference to the making of the Christian religion, which from the beginning of the book it is proposed to follow, and which in the result is so thoroughly convincing and satisfying, is to go on the assumption that Christianity as rationally construed rests on the recognition of a supernatural Person. To the recognition of the supernatural, the modern mind is intensely averse, if not bitterly hostile; and so far as possible, therefore, the ground must be cleared of naturalistic tendencies before the expansion of the truths to be dealt with, and their philosophic application, can be attempted. Unless removed, or the unreasonableness of it shown, such aversion from or hatred of the supernatural as that generated by one-sided and unreliable scientific hypotheses, would *a priori* invalidate a philosophy of Christianity like that proposed. Accordingly, it is first shown that all merely naturalistic philosophies fail to justify themselves before the bar of our rational being. They always have, they ever must fail, so far as their attempt to give a rational account of man, with his intellectual, ethical, and religious history is concerned. And they oblige the earnest searcher after truth to turn, therefore, into another direction for the satisfying of his quest.

Modern idealism, at this point, offers its well-known con-

ception of nature, over against the notions of the naturalistic schools, as guide for thinking. According to it, nature is really veiled spirit and capable of being correctly understood and interpreted only when so regarded. Following its suggestions one discovers that thought itself, without which there could be no science, transcends nature, that the supreme problem of evolutionary science is not organism, but the reason which organizes, and that man therefore is the key of all nature's mysteries. Correlated as the intellect and the intelligible are, it is evident "they must have had as their common ground a creative Intelligence, who had used the visual language we call nature to speak to the incarnate reason we call man." Pursuing the suggestion beyond the intellectual into the ethical realm of man's history the discovery is made that here even in a higher sense than that of thought, will transcends nature, that it cannot be measured by it, and that immanent in man is the moral law realized by his will. But as intellect implies the intelligible, so the ethical in man involves a moral universe, and justifies belief in a moral order over which God presides. Between Him and man there is a living active relationship, in which by enforcing His law God is ever shaping the life of humanity to its diviner issues. In perfect consonance with this conception of man's moral nature and God's method of forming or re-forming it, a supreme Personality sent by Him as the vehicle of the highest good to the race, might be expected. Is it not a warranted inference, that "without such a personality the moral forces of time would lack unity and would be without organization, purpose or efficiency," and that appearing in history He could not be more fitly described than as "the Son of God and the Saviour of men."

The deeper and more important bearings of man's moral life as implying and justifying the incarnation, are not to be reached, however, by abstract or metaphysical discussions. When brought face to face with the concrete facts of the moral life as presented by "the problem of evil," is it logically pos-

sible to escape what on account of its being integral alike to its history and thought may be called the organizing idea of the New Testament, namely, incarnation with a view to the atonement? Of course the terminology of the philosopher is different. He speaks of mysterious "forces that make for evolution, producing the moral, the social and the religious forms of the present, and destined to continue their re-creative processes until the Divine purpose is accomplished." That purpose is practically defined by the New Testament in words familiar to all: "The Son of man came to seek and to save that which was lost"; "God so loved the world that He gave His only begotten Son" to save it from perishing; "This is a faithful saying—Jesus Christ came into the world to save sinners."

Contrasted with this Christian view as supported by what may be called an idealistic philosophy, how forbidding the ideas of a blank naturalism! Before it, as, alas, we have evidence in these days all around us, the mind of men is left bewildered and dismayed, as it beholds, according to Mills' indictment, "nature with the most supercilious disregard of mercy, by injustice, ruin and death, by hurricane and pestilence, overmatching anarchy and the Reign of Terror." Our philosopher knows that nature has not spoken the final word for the solution of this problem. Within the lines of a natural and rational theology there is to be found standing room for the man,

"Who trusted God was love indeed,
And love, creation's final law,—
Tho' Nature, red in tooth and claw
With ravine, shrieked against his creed."

The problem of evil and the suffering consequent upon it, has for that man as its most remarkable thing, not extent or duration, not intensity or immensity, but rather educative and propulsive force—force to make man conscious of his enormous responsibilities, and to awaken in him desire to fulfil them. Would it be wrong when thus conceived to describe evil as a

divine energy for moralizing man and nature? If not, then the goodness of God, although evil is not hindered from continuing, is vindicated. It continues to exist not as a rightful or permanent inhabitant of the universe, but as one whose right to be is denied, and for whose expulsion all the energies under Divine control have been marshalled and trained to fight. To allow evil to become and to continue without any purpose of redemption were to us an absolutely inconceivable act in a good and holy and gracious God." Who therefore should doubt that the existence of evil explains and justifies the event which the Scriptures record in these words: "And the Word became flesh, and dwelt among us, * * * full of grace and truth"? How could the justice and goodness of God in relation to evil be conceived if His continued and final action through "the Incarnate Word" toward it were excluded from consideration and from our confident and abiding faith?

Conclusions similar to those just indicated as obtained from the study of intellectual and moral questions are pressed upon us also by an examination of the problems of history and religion. In history order and progress are the primarily essential elements that enter into it. How are these brought about? No blind, unconscious, "cosmic process" can adequately account for them. They are secured largely, if not wholly, through religion, the ideal authority and power in human life. Through the action of God in him, and his response to that action, man is the divinely guided vehicle of the religious ideas underlying both the "spontaneous" and the "founded" systems of faith. The former are products of the common or collective reason; the latter run back into certain historical personalities and are the clear outcomes of personal reasons and conscious wills. Spontaneous religions may be called apotheoses of nature, or the interpretation of spirit and the expression of its ideas in sensuous forms. Founded religions may be described as apotheoses of personality, or the interpretation of man and the expression of his ideas in the terms of mind and spirit. Whilst constituting distinct classes such

spontaneous and founded religions stand nevertheless in historical relations, the second needing the first as a substructure on which to build. Thus without pausing to instance other illustrations, Christianity presupposes the Jewish faith. They have much in common, so that it has been truthfully said that "Hebraism is Christianity, and Christianity is Hebraism in every respect save one." But that one is all important and differentiates the Christian religion not only from that of the Jews, but from those also of Buddha and Mohammed. The one thing referred to is "the interpreted person of Jesus Christ—not the historical Jesus, the man who was a son of Israel and lived in time, but the theological Christ, the person who has been construed into the Son of God, whose Deity is equal to the Father's." It is the eternal Word, "who for us men and for our salvation came down from heaven, and was incarnate by the Holy Ghost of the Virgin Mary and was made man."

This contention, namely that it is the interpreted Christ, the "apotheosized" Jesus, as recognized in the historic creeds, that has so powerfully entered into the religious history of our race as to create Christianity, at once raises numerous questions upon which thought is divided. Who was responsible for this "apotheosis"? Does the portraiture of Jesus in the simple and beautiful lines of the Synoptists warrant it? Does the undisputed teaching of Jesus Himself, back to which it is insisted we must go for our standing-ground, support it? Is it not the speculation of John or Paul or both that has brought it about? Can the remarkable contrast, with which all readers of recent theological literature are familiar, between the gospel image of Jesus and the conception of Christ in the ecumenical creeds be reconciled and justified? Was there an inherent necessity in Jesus and His purposes for such a theological interpretation of His Person? In other words, is the mystery of Christ's Person as construed by Christian theology one of nature and fact, or is it simply "a myth which the logical intellect has woven" out of the material offered by

the exceptionally simple and beautiful history of the Galilean peasant?

These and similar questions receive illuminating and richly instructive and rewarding discussion in the pages of the great contribution to philosophical theology now under consideration. Within the limits of this article that discussion cannot be followed in detail. All that can be attempted is in a most general and inadequate way to indicate the scope and trend of the argument.

The labored efforts of skeptical thought and carping, analytical criticism, when brought face to face with the historical Person and the theological construction of Him, have always sought to conceive Jesus as real and the "deified" Christ as the product of idealization. For such *thought* "God manifest in the flesh," that is, Divine and human nature so united in Christ as to form a single and indivisible personality, has ever been synonymous with the inconceivable. "God transcends," it says, "our experience—man is a familiar object—the union of them is beyond the power of rational conception." That is its easy off-handed method of settling it, that the incarnation is a mere fictitious or artificial mystery due to the extravagances of the ecstatic or dogmatic mind and without significance for the saner reason. For such *criticism*, literary analysis, discovering a primary and a secondary stratum in the gospel narratives, insists that the first affords an easy and complete historical explanation of Jesus, and that the second accounts for His identification with Deity. "He was the last of the prophets of Israel," it says, "superlative in genius, supernal in goodness, ineffable in personal charm; and these characteristics, the imagination of a metaphysical but unscientific age, touched by the enthusiasm of an all-believing love, translated as the manifest tokens of God's personal or incarnate presence in the carpenter of Nazareth."

To the first of these superficial and hasty inferences drawn from premises that are unsound and wholly unreliable and untrustworthy, it may be replied that the miracle of the incar-

nation is confessedly one of stupendous proportions, but not more so than that of creation. The incarnation raises no problem which is not raised in an acuter and less soluble form by creation. In a perfectly real sense creation is incarnation; nature is the body of the infinite Spirit, the organism which the divine thought has articulated and filled with the breath of life. Is this less beyond the power of rational conception than that in Christ "dwelt all the fulness of the Godhead bodily"? Quite the contrary. For while the problems are analogous, the factors which promise solution are more potent in the case of the incarnation than of creation. In nature the idea of God demands for its expression no more than physical and logical categories, but in Christ the categories become rational, ethical, emotional—that is, they involve personal qualities and relations, rather than mere cosmical modes and energies. And so by investing God with a higher degree of reality and higher qualities of being, it makes all His attributes and relations more actual, all His actions and ways more intelligible and real. To the second of these unwarranted inferences it may be said that to place a just estimate upon the Person of Christ, criticism must be willing to look beyond the horizon marked by the Gospels. The Gospels do not stand alone. They live, as it were, embosomed in universal history, and in that history Christ plays a part much more remarkable and much less compatible with common manhood than the part Jesus plays in the history of His own age and people. Is there any person, or any number of persons, necessary in the same sense as Jesus to the higher history of the race? Only one answer is possible. Accordingly, to understand Him, He must be studied not only in relation to His environment and historical antecedents as disclosed by the Gospels, but also in relation to all that has issued from Him.

On this point Dr. Fairbairn's words are so sane and weighty as to make them specially deserving of study by those to whose minds a first reading of them does not bring conviction as to the soundness of his position. He says: "Whether there is

anything supernatural in a history is not a matter to be decided by the play of critical formulæ on a literature, nor by the study of periods or events in isolation. It belongs to the whole, and is to be determined as regards any special person by his worth for the whole and by the degree in which he is a factor for its good. Applied to Jesus Christ this means that He is not a problem in local but general history, not in a special but in all literature, not in one but in universal religion; and that if He is to be interpreted it must be in terms of humanity and not merely in those of Judea or Jewish Hellenism. He is a natural being or He could not be historical; but He is also supernatural, otherwise He could not hold His sovereign position or exercise His universal functions. And these as matters of experience, and not merely as speculations, must be inquired into as real things."

Granted then that this common and creative idea of the New Testament, this constitutive and regulative idea of the Church to which the genesis of the Christian religion is ascribed, namely, the union of God and man in the Person of Christ, is not the invention of unreasoning fancy or of blind and unrestrained devotion to a merely human hero, whence did it come to the authors of the apostolic literature? Without hesitation, it must be replied, from the mind of Christ. "His teaching can explain the rise, the forms and the contents of the apostolic writings, but those writings could never explain how His teaching came to be. Postulate His mind, and we may derive from it the apostolic thought; but postulate this thought, and we could never deduce from it His mind and history. In other words He is the historical antecedent and the logical premise of the Epistles, and it is open to no intellectual strategy to invert or change their relations." That is putting the fact before us positively but not with undue emphasis, and those who point to alleged differences between Christ's ideas and those of the apostles are reminded that they are notes more of continuity and independence than of contradiction and isolation. The conception of the personal and

heavenly preëxistence of Christ, we are constantly made to hear from a certain school of thought, distinguishes the Pauline idea from that of the Gospels, but it may be easily shown that this can be maintained only by excluding all reference to the discourses of John and placing the most prosaic interpretation on some of the most characteristic sayings of the Synoptists. By viewing the idea of the incarnation as the expression of Christ's own consciousness touching His own being the apostolic literature, thought and life may be explained. If the source of the idea is placed elsewhere, error and bewilderment are sure to result.

We should be carried too far afield by attempting to trace in a particular way the methods by which the idea of Jesus as the Christ is conceived to have been pressed upon the apostles, or the psychological process by which they came to accept Him not simply as the Messiah, but as the Son of God. The telling of two things must here content us, namely, how in a general way this revelation was made and accepted, and how surprisingly early it led to a literature portraying and defining the Person, and articulating a system of thought in which the Person was the center. Of the revelation, in the first place, it may be said that it came not so much by word of mouth, which embraces what is usually meant by "the teaching of Jesus," as by the disclosure of His inherent nature and life, His holy and righteous character. It has often been noticed and pointed out with sort of glee as militating against the view of those who affirm the program of Christianity to lie in the Person of its Founder rather than in His words, in what He was more than in what He said, that in His earlier teaching especially, there is a great reserve or even reticence concerning Himself. But was not this done with a wise design? Discipleship formed on the basis of an outwardly declared Divine preëminence would have lacked reality and enduring quality. A religion founded on external authoritative instruction simply would soon have come to an inglorious end. It is not a spoken word, but an idea, appealing to the

reason and satisfying the reason appealed to, that has the requisite power to rule the mind and conscience. Hence as a wise teacher Jesus by spoken word forced nothing, but by close association with chosen disciples, by intimate, daily intercourse with, by the gift of Himself to, them, by the self-sacrificing obedience which culminated in death upon the cross, by His resurrection demonstrated "by many infallible proofs," He stimulated without superseding the action of their own minds. When the proper time came those disciples as reasonable men could be asked, "Whom say ye that I am?" and the answer they gave then meant something, and justified the apparent delay or self-restraint He had practiced.

In the same way the lateness of its appearance and the paucity of reference in the Synoptists to His passion and sacrificial death may be rationally accounted for. We have not room here for more than the passing observation that this new development in His teaching occurs just when we should have expected it—at the very moment in which the disciples have come to conceive Him as the Christ, the Son of God. And whilst there is a relative lateness in making the revelation of His Person effective in the disciples, and a necessary relative lateness therefore also of the revelation of the sacrificial idea as marking the culminating conception of His Person and work, it is deserving of special emphasis that, according to authentic and characteristic texts from Matthew and Mark, Jesus from the beginning of His public ministry made the very highest claims in behalf of Himself and His work. Schmiedel and other destructive critical writers of the same negative school affirm the contrary, but it is only by doing violence to the plain meaning and intent of such scriptural passages that they succeed in giving anything like a reasonable appearance to their views. Is it not at the very commencement of His work that Jesus claims in His own Person and life to fulfil and supersede the law and the prophets? How early in His public career, conscious of His personal ability and sufficiency to save the lost, He calls the weary

and heavy-laden to come for rest to Him! It is not at the close, but near the beginning of His ministry, that we hear Him command with imperative accent, "Follow me," self-persuaded, it is evident, of the absolute authority with which He is clothed. All through His teachings, from end to end, runs a tone affirming His personal sovereignty by which He calls, commands and binds to Himself by an affection which grudges no sacrifice and is equal to any service. The crowning glory of all this, the supremely commanding power of it, was to be reached however, not by self-assertion but by self-immolation. To Himself it had become more and more manifest that the opposition which had long been confronting Him on every side, and which had grown to open hostility afterwards, must end in the surrender of either His mission or His life. Which of these it was to be was already decided. Seeing the function which His death was to accomplish, knowing its issues, He rejoiced "to give His life as a ransom for many." He conceives His death in form to be a sacrifice, a means for the reconciliation of man to God, and although it may be present only in a rudimentary form, it was there so clearly that the disciples could not but recognize it, and feel the significance and attractiveness of it. Students of the Gospel history may ignore this fact, they may reject it as is done by many that patronizingly philosophize about "the teachings of Jesus," but the very heart of the Gospel is torn out by so doing. In the course of his magnificent chapters on the significance of Christ's death Dr. Fairbairn says: "We may be too fastidious to use the terms 'vicarious' and 'substitutionary,' but it is easier to object to the terms than to escape the ideas they express." That is exactly it, and what shall we say then of these claims made and made repeatedly by Jesus, in His own behalf and that of the work He had come to do? Either they are the vaporings of a most sinful and presumptuous arrogance, or the One who made them must stand in the unique and singularly privileged relationship which is ascribed to Him as Son of God, the only begotten of the Father.

With reference to the early date in which apostolic literature interpreted the Person of Christ and formulated a doctrinal system which centered around that interpretation, it must be said, in the second place, that this appeared earlier than the literature which is concerned with the personal history of Jesus. Under a chronological arrangement the synoptic Gospels would not come first among the books of the New Testament. Instead of being an inversion of the natural order, this is strictly according to the order of exact thought. The facts as to the history of Jesus, His birth, life, doctrine, sufferings, death, were known and acknowledged by every one in the days of the apostles, and there was no need for historical narratives. But from the first the construction put by the apostles on Jesus met with opposition, and this led to the attempt which the apostolic writings record, of giving in correct form the interpretation of His Person. If the religion as accepted by the apostles was to reach out toward the accomplishment of its universal design, this was essential. If the place Jesus holds and the functions He fulfills in the life of man, collective and individual, was to command general acknowledgment, then this could not be omitted. This gives valid explanation for the early appearance of the Pauline letters, the book of Hebrews, the first epistle of Peter, the Apocalypse and afterwards that also of the fourth Gospel. In all these writings human reason, accepting the challenge made by what Jesus claimed, and was believed to be, essays to give rational account of this faith, and to formulate a necessary system of Christian doctrine. Had the Apostles not done this, and the course of things taken under the influence of Jesus been seen afterwards, would not a subsequent generation of believers, in order to give reasonable account of it, have been forced to produce such a system, or to all intents and purposes, one similar to it? There can be no doubt of this. Reason must enter the domain of faith in every age. The deepest mysteries of religious belief require rational explanation. They may transcend reason, as it has often been urged they do, but they may not contradict it; and "the only condition on which reason

could have nothing to do with religion, is that religion should have nothing to do with truth." If this is so one can't but believe also that "the man who despises or distrusts reason, despises the God who gave it, and the most efficient of all the servants He has bidden work within and upon man in behalf of truth."

With mental equipment and from view-points that differed widely, under circumstances that were varied, and to persons that were unlike socially, morally, and otherwise, the several apostolic writers endeavor to explain Jesus for human belief and to apply their explanation of Him to the universal need and experience of mankind. In literary style, in matters of instruction which may be regarded as non-essential, a great contrast between them is discoverable, but in regard to the essential and transcendental nature of Christ's Person and His universal significance for the race, they are one. In the letters of Paul, Christ is so conceived that the race by His living and life-giving Presence in it becomes a stupendous organism whose life is derived from Him, whose history is directed by Him and whose destiny is determined by relation to Him. Over against the first Adam, with his sinful posterity, He stands the second Adam, a life-giving Spirit, with His household of faith. To be joined to Him is to be "one spirit" with Him; to be "in Him" is to be "a new creature." "With Him," one can do all things, "severed from Him," one can do nothing, is alienated from God, sinful and dying. But in His God-ward relation this interpreted Christ to Paul is an absolutely, supernatural and creative Personality, which is far more wonderful. He is the Son of God, "the first-born, begotten before all creation." He is "the image of the invisible God." He "upholds all things by the word of His power." The very dignity and prerogatives of Deity are claimed for Him; "in Him are hid all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge;" "in Him dwelleth all the fulness of the Godhead bodily." In no prior philosophy or scheme of thought has any person ever been conceived as sustaining such relations to man, to history and to God.

Without waiting to examine the practically corresponding interpretation of Christ's Person as given in Peter, in Hebrews and the Apocalypse, we pass to the fourth Gospel, which contains the most significant and picturesque portrayal of Jesus as the Christ to be found in all literature. It is "the most audacious book in the New Testament." The prologue gives us the idea and purpose of the writer, which is to connect the Person and history of Jesus, on the one hand, with the inmost being of God, and on the other with the course and end of the universe. Not like the ancient seer who saw God "in the beginning" create the world, does this writer start out; he soars to a higher altitude and attempts to define the God who created—a God who is not alone, but with whom the Word that was God dwelt from all eternity. That Word was not like the Baptist, an ephemeral witness-bearer, He was the true light which shines everywhere, always, and illuminates all men, even though they be held to be heathen. But more remarkable than the prologue is the history which it introduces and by which it is explicated. Analytical criticism has been saying much as to the Hellenic and Hellenistic sources of the terms and ideas which the Evangelist employs. Let it be granted that John invented neither his transcendental terms nor the ideas they express, the fact still remains to which Fairbairn directs attention, namely, that "he did a more daring and original thing—he brought them out of the clouds into the market-place, incorporated, personalized, individuated them. Logos he translated by Son and in so doing did two things—revolutionized the conception of God, and changed an abstract and purely metaphysical idea into a concrete and intensely ethical personality, in whom God came to men and men met God," the glory they beheld in Him being the very presence of Deity visible among them.

These sublime apostolical interpretations, it is plain, rest the content of their central thought upon the mind of Christ, and are justified by the inherent requirements of the human reason. Having their source in the self-consciousness of

Christ's own being as revealed to the apostles, their interpretations resulted in and adequately account for the making of the Christian religion. For its beginning, we can readily see, there was indispensable necessity for the reasoned and philosophical theology which the apostles produced. Had the truth of the incarnation overwhelmed the human mind and superseded reason, instead of addressing and exercising it, the spiritual kingdom bearing the name of Christ, it is sure, would never have been founded. The article of faith, which gives philosophical interpretation and theological construction to the mystery of Christ's Person—admittedly the most difficult problem for the intellect to solve—was, nevertheless, paradoxical as it may appear, the most necessary to the life of Christianity.

But what is true in this regard of the apostolic age is equally true also of ours, or, for that matter, of any other age. The thought of one age upon so vital and important a question as religion cannot be transmitted or made available for all subsequent ones. Every generation must do its own thinking. To maintain its vigor and exercise its power the Christian religion must unceasingly challenge and receive the thoughtful attention of men. This means that reasoned theology is always necessary. It means that "they know not what they do" who speak scornfully of theological speculations and disparagingly of philosophical theology—either as embodied in New Testament writings or earnest present-day systems—as a hindrance rather than a help to practical religion. Without them, religion itself would "drop to the ground as a house that hath no foundations." Hence our interest in such books as this of Dr. Fairbairn is due not to a concern for the recovery of a world of dead ideas belonging to a period of history in the distant past, or a chapter of biblical theology simply. It is due rather to a concern for a world of present, living actualities representing all that is most vital and characteristic in the thought of to-day. The higher life of the latter world depends upon such rational religious thought, and the interests of Christianity are most powerfully promoted by it.

II.

THE EUPHEMISTIC PRINCIPLE AS APPLIED TO THE OLD TESTAMENT.

BY PROF. F. A. GAST, D.D.

During the last century, especially the second half of the century, the Old Testament has become to us almost a new book. The book itself is indeed the same, but our attitude towards it has completely changed and old views have undergone a marvelous transformation. To this many causes have contributed; such as, the application to the Old Testament of the historicocritical method of investigation; the new science of comparative religion; the fresh helps furnished by the long buried but now recovered records of the past; and the modern scientific idea of evolution as ruling in history as well as in nature. Scholars are in a better position to-day to understand the Old Testament than at any earlier time. Our knowledge of it has made rapid and surprising strides. To say nothing of Semitic philology and textual criticism, which have advanced with the forward movement of the age, the wonderful discoveries of archaeology, especially in the valleys of the Euphrates and the Nile, and the bright light they cast on the pages of the Old Testament, are well known. The literary history of the books of the Old Testament has had to be re-written from the new point of view necessarily assumed by modern Biblical science. The interpretation of the Old Testament is no longer ruled and determined as to its results by dogmatic tradition, but now rests on a solid philological and historical foundation. The development of religious thought and life in the Old Testament has been traced out anew from its earliest crude beginnings through its successive stages.

Yet however much has already been accomplished, much still remains to be done. New problems are constantly arising and new lines of inquiry opening up. The diligent student of the Old Testament may still hope to be rewarded by some interesting and important discovery. Of the truth of this remark we have sufficient proof in a dissertation presented to the Board of University Studies of the Johns Hopkins University for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy by Karl J. Grimm, a German by birth, who, after completing his collegiate education in his native land, and pursuing for a number of years afterward a course of study in language, philosophy and theology both in Europe and America, entered Johns Hopkins University with the purpose of devoting himself to the study of the Semitic languages; and such has been his success that since 1899 he has held the William S. Rayner fellowship in Semitic languages.

This dissertation is the first fruits of the author's literary activity in his chosen field of labor. It belongs to the department of Biblical criticism. Dealing as he does with the single question of additions in the Old Testament made for a special purpose, it discusses critically a large number of passages in the Psalms and the Prophets, with the view of ascertaining whether they belonged to the original text, or were appended by later scribes in accordance with a definite principle, though, of course, before the final settlement of the Old Testament Canon. A work of such a character, if it is to be rightly estimated, demands a detailed examination. This, however, is out of the question within a moderate space.

We simply propose to explain, as clearly as possible, the euphemistic principle underlying the author's work, and to characterize his book in a general way, without entering into particulars which would possess little interest for many readers of this REVIEW.

Perhaps a word may not be out of place in explanation of the title—"Euphemistic Liturgical Appendixes in the Old Testament"—which may to some appear strange and mys-

terious, though it exactly sets forth what the author had in mind in writing this dissertation. The term *appendix* is employed in its usual sense to signify any literary matter added to a book or section of a book, but not essentially necessary to its completeness. According to our author, such additions to the original text of a Psalm or Prophecy were thought at a later time to be required to make them suitable for reading in the services of a synagogue. They are, therefore, defined as *liturgical*, "not in the sense of actually forming a fixed part in a prescribed liturgy, but rather in the broader signification of *being prepared for, or pertaining to, worship or religious ceremonies in general.*"*

"But," it may be asked, "what need could be felt for such appendixes? Are they supplements, intended to make good some deficiency, or to correct some error?" Nothing of the kind. Much less are they arbitrary additions. They were intended to serve a good purpose, that justified the scribes in their own eyes in making such additions to an otherwise complete text. They are based on a clear and definite principle that exerted a controlling influence on the later Jewish mind. The principle is this: not to close the reading of the Scripture in public worship with words ominous of evil, but rather with an expression comforting to the hearts of the hearers. The Talmud lays down the rule that, in reading the Law, each reader shall begin and end his portion with propitious words. And the same rule applied as well to the reading of the Prophets.†

Accordingly Dr. Grimm characterizes these *liturgical appendixes* more closely as *euphemistic*. A euphemism, as the term is now employed in rhetoric, is defined by the Century dictionary as "the use of a mild, delicate, or indirect word or expression in place of a plainer or more accurate one, which by reason of its meaning or its associations or suggestions might be offensive, unpleasant or embarrassing." In this

* Grimm's Dissertation, page 7.

† Grimm, page 6.

dissertation, however, the meaning of the word conforms more nearly to its original etymological sense, denoting the use of words of good omen and the avoidance of all that are unlucky. Among the Romans when the sacrificial victim was brought to the altar the priests enjoined the people to keep silence, that the good effects of the ceremony might not be hindered by any ill-ominous word. *Favete linguis*, they cried, which signified in religious language: *have a care of speaking* at religious ceremonies for the sake of good omen; either *speak good words* or *abstain from evil words*. Now, our author aims to establish the fact that at the close of certain Psalms and of certain Prophetic books and sections of Prophetic books additions were made to the original text by later editors with the view of preventing the unpleasant impression that would be left on the mind of the worshiping congregation, if a Scripture lesson when read in the Synagogue should close with a severe judgment or a harsh denunciation. There was no omission, it is maintained, of anything that stood originally in the text, but there was an enlargement, in order that by appending some words of grace a painful thought might be followed in the minds of the hearers by a closing thought in itself agreeable and comforting.

Such a free handling of the Scriptures may seem strange to many, but it loses its strangeness when in imagination we transfer ourselves into the thought-world of the ancients. It was the belief of antiquity that the word by which a person or thing is made known is by no means something indifferent, or only arbitrarily connected with the object it designates. It was regarded not as a mere empty sound, but as a real power working objectively and containing latent forces which are set free when the word is sent forth.

The expression of such a belief is frequent in the Old Testament, especially as regards the Divine Word. This Word is a creative power. "By the word of the Lord were the heavens made, and all the host of them by the breath of his mouth." "For he spake, and it was done; he commanded and it stood

fast" (Ps. 33: 6, 9). In the later period of Old Testament thought God is represented as creating only by His Word. "He commanded, and they were created" (Ps. 148: 5). In the account of creation as given in the first chapter of Genesis, which belongs to the latest Pentateuchal document, the Word is the sole means employed. "And God *said*, let there be light, and there was light." And so, each new stage of creation is introduced by this ten-times uttered, "and God said." In the Targums the Word of God is even conceived of as an hypostasis, named *mēmrā*, signifying the Word (sometimes *dibburā*, with the same meaning), who is the mediator between the transcendent God and His world.*

Nor is it only in creation that the Divine Word is a real working power, but in history as well. As communicated through the prophets, it is no vain utterance, no idle foretelling of the future. It carries in it mighty energies that effectually accomplish what it announces as about to come to pass. This is beautifully expressed in Is. 55: 10, 11, as translated in the Polychrome Bible:

"As the rain comes down, and the snow from Heaven,
And thither returns not, except it have watered the earth,
And have made it spring forth and sprout,
And given seed to the sower, and bread to the eater,
So will my word that has gone forth out of my mouth;
It will not return to me void,
Except it have accomplished that which I pleased,
And carried that for which I send it."

Yahveh hews his sinful people by the prophets, slays them by the words of his mouth (Hos. 6: 5). He sends his Word against Jacob, and it lights in Israel (Is. 9: 8; A. V. v. 7). It needs not that the prophet should convey the Word to Ephraim; he has only to utter it in Jerusalem, and without fail it will reach its destination and work out its purpose.

Words expressive of a blessing or a curse, even when spoken by men, are effective, conveying good or evil to the person

* Weber, *Jüdische Theologie*, p. 180.

over whom they have been pronounced. The human speaker is viewed simply as the organ of God. The word he utters is the Word of God, infallible and irrevocable. So Isaac's blessing of Jacob, though won by deceit, cannot be recalled. When the deceit was discovered at the coming of Esau, the aged patriarch "trembled very exceedingly and said, Who, then, is he that has taken venison, and brought it to me, and I have eaten of all before thou camest, and have blessed him? Yea, and he shall be blessed." And that theocratic blessing fixed the destiny of Jacob.

It was thought by the ancients that the seer possessed a mysterious power of cursing or blessing. Accordingly, Balak sent for Balaam to come and curse Israel; for he said, "I wot that he whom thou blessest is blessed, and he whom thou cursest is cursed." But Balaam, whatever his desire, could but bless Israel, and when reproved by Balak for blessing them altogether, he asked, "Must I not take heed to speak that which the Lord hath put in my mouth?"

Such a belief in the inherent potency of words might easily degenerate into superstition. And it commonly did. Among rude untutored peoples the dread of using words ominous of evil is universal. It played an important part even in the life of the cultivated Greeks and Romans, of which Dr. Grimm gives a number of interesting illustrations. The Greeks euphemistically named the Furies *Εὐμενίδες*, *the gracious ones*, and change the name of the Black Sea, *πόντος ἀξενος*, *inhospitable sea*, into *πόντος ἔνξενος*, *hospitable sea*. "The Romans employed numerous paraphrases for the same reason to designate death and to die: *abitio*, *obitus*, etc.; *vixit*, *fuit*, *abiit*, *obiit*, etc.; when a census was taken, the names *Valerius*, *Salvius*, *Statorius* were called up first *ominis boni gratia*." Among the Semites also such euphemisms are widely prevalent, owing to the fear of using ill-boding words. To call an evil power by its proper name, rightly pronounced, is to incur the peril of misfortune from that power. And so, a dangerous illness is named an act of grace. In Damascus

the phrase "he is well, may thy head be unchanged" is the equivalent of "he is dead."*

Moreover, the belief in a real energy operative in words and names led not only to a superstitious fear of employing such as were indicative of any kind of evil, but also to the equally superstitious feeling of magical power through the right use of words and names. "In all spells, charms, incantations, amulets and other prophylactics, stress is always laid on the mysterious potency and significance of the name. *Nomen* involves *omen*. Name to the ancient Semite involves reality and personal power. And the superstitious dread of the ancient Greek who cried *εὐφῆμετε* at solemn crises and functions, and of the Roman, who under like circumstances, said *favete linguis*, was founded in this same belief in the underlying dread potency of words or names to summon forth catastrophes. To this tendency the etymologizing efforts and plays on words in the Old Testament are probably due, viz., to the endeavor to discover in the name a clue to the underlying power that shapes individual destiny. 'As his name, so is he,' says Abigail of her wrong-headed husband Nabal. 'Fool is his name, and folly is with him' (1 Sam. 25: 25).†

So close a relation was supposed to exist between the name and the person named that a knowledge of the name gave power over the destiny of its bearer. A change of name, it was believed, would work a change of condition or fate. A child sick unto death might be given a new name (as *hayyim*, life, *Rēphā'el*, God heals, *Yôseph*, he will add, *i. e.*, prolong life) with the hope of its restoration to health.‡ Superstition gathered especially around the four-lettered name of Israel's God, YHVH, the pronunciation of which, in course of time forbidden, at length became lost. It was believed that

* Grimm, pp. 3-5.

† Hastings, *Dictionary of the Bible*, Vol. IV., p. 604.

‡ *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft*, Bd. XXXI., p. 291.

he who should acquire the secret of pronouncing it aright would thereby possess a mysterious power of working marvels. A curious legend based on Gen. 6: 1-4 is related in the Talmud. Two of the angels remonstrated with God for creating man. If only they were on the earth, they said, they would live more virtuous lives than men. To put them to the test God sent them to the earth, where, seeing the daughters of men, one of them fell violently in love with a beautiful virgin, who was willing to listen to his suit, but only on the condition that he would communicate to her the secret name of God, by means of which alone he could re-ascend to Heaven. He consented; and no sooner was she in possession of the secret than, flying upward, she escaped from his wooing, and as a reward for not yielding to sin, was given a place by God in the constellation Pleiades.*

These remarks will serve to show the mental soil from which the euphemistic principle originated, and render intelligible its application to the Old Testament Scriptures. There are several ways in which it has been applied, and to which we wish to call attention.

One word might in reading be substituted for another. Wherever the text contains an indelicate expression, it was required that a euphemism be read in its stead. Thus instead of *šāgal*, to *ravish*, *violate*, *outrage*, *šakab*, to *lie with*, was read. The consonantal text, called the *Kéthibh*, was allowed to stand; the consonants of the substituted word, called the *Qérē'*, were written in the margin, and the vowel-signs of the *Qérē'* were combined with the *Kéthibh*, thus frequently yielding monstrous forms and unpronounceable words. In this way the stigmatized expressions and the authoritative substitute, or official reading, are plainly indicated in every edition of the Massoretic text.

Again, there are four books—Isaiah, Malachi, Lamentations and Ecclesiastes—at the conclusion of which, when read in the Synagogue, the reader was required to repeat the verse

* *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft*, Bd. XXXI., p. 225.

preceding the last. The reason is evident. Each of these books closes with words significant of evil, leaving a disagreeable impression on the minds of the hearers. To avoid this the last verse but one, which in each case is of good import, was repeated as if it was the end of the book. Thus the two last verses of Lamentations as given in the Authorized Version read:

"Turn thou us unto thee, O Lord, and we shall be turned;
Renew our days as of old.
But thou hast utterly rejected us;
Thou art very wroth against us."

Such a cry of utter despair as it rings out from the closing words is very surprising. Accordingly, other renderings of the verse have been proposed. The marginal reading makes it a question: "for wilt thou utterly reject us?" So, also, Noyes, who translates: "for shouldst thou utterly reject us? shouldst thou be so exceedingly wroth against us?" But both are opposed by the tenses, which are perfects and cannot in this connection be taken in a future sense. Calvin already regarded the compound particle rendered *but* as signifying *except, unless*, and renders: "Except thou hast wholly rejected us, and hast become very angry with us." In this he is followed by many exegetes to-day. Verse 21 is in this view a prayer, it may be for temporal, it may be more probably for spiritual, blessings—a prayer which the poet trusts will be answered, *unless* (v. 22) it be a sad reality that God has wholly cast off His guilty nation. However, even if the words be construed in this way, they still give forth a plaintive, only half-believing sound, which would jar harshly on the feelings of the later Jewish mind, and justify the repetition of the soothing prayer: "turn us unto thee, O Lord, and we shall be turned; renew our days as of old."

But it must be remarked that the rendering of the Authorized Version is strongly supported by the Septuagint, the Targum, the Syriac and the Vulgate, which give us, if not the original meaning of the poet, yet the generally accepted

interpretation of his words. And this interpretation would afford a still stronger reason for repeating the prayer of v. 21, in order that the reading of the book may not close with a knell of despair.

And so as regards the other three books. Ecclesiastes ends with the words: "God shall bring every work into judgment with every secret thing, whether it be good or whether it be evil"—a solemn warning, filling the mind with fear and awe. How fitly this is followed in the Synagogue service by the verse immediately preceding: "Let us hear the conclusion of the whole matter: Fear God, and keep his commandments; for this is the whole duty of man." Malachi concludes with a terrible threat: "lest I come and smite the earth with a curse;" but the public reading closes with the promise contained in the foregoing verse: "Behold, I will send you Elijah the prophet before the coming of the great and dreadful day of the Lord." And the closing words of Isaiah excite a shudder in the hearer's soul by the gruesome picture they paint: "And they shall go forth and look upon the carcases of the men that have transgressed against me; for their worm shall not die, neither shall their fire be quenched; and they shall be an abhorring to all flesh." This, it was felt, needs some relief when read in the public service, and accordingly the book was brought to an agreeable close by the repetition of the preceding verse: "And it shall come to pass, that from one new moon to another, and from one sabbath to another shall all flesh come to worship before me, saith the Lord."

But here the question arises, why the regulation as regards the repetition of the last verse but one should apply only to these four books, and then only when read in public worship. A moment's reflection will show the reason. The Hebrew Canon of Scripture was threefold: the Law, the Prophets and the Hagiographa. The whole Law, comprising the first five books of the Old Testament, was read through in the Synagogue in the course of every year according to the Babylonian Lectionary; and as there could be no more agreeable conclu-

sion than the glowing statement at the end of Deuteronomy of Moses' preëminence on account of the wonders wrought by his hand in the eyes of all Israel, there was no need for the repetition of anything going before.

Of the third division, the Hagiographa, the Psalms were the hymn-book of the Jewish Church, and only the five *Megilloth*—the Song of Songs, Ruth, Ecclesiastes, Lamentations and Esther—were read in the liturgical service, being appointed for certain feasts. Of these five only Lamentations and Ecclesiastes have ill-ominous endings, the conclusion of the other three is auspicious.

Of the second division, the Prophets, former and latter, not all the books were publicly read to the worshiping congregation, nor any one of them in its entirety. Selections, named *Haphtaroth*, were made, analogous to the pericopes of the church year, and in the Lectionary Joel, Nahum, Zephaniah and Haggai are not represented at all.

If now, we inquire whether any other of the books in the second division, besides Isaiah and Malachi, close with words that betoken evil, we shall find but two, namely, Hosea and Nahum. As, however, no part of the book of Nahum was read in the services of the sanctuary it does not come under the Talmudic regulation. It is otherwise with the book of Hosea, from which several *Haphtaroth* have been taken, and of which the closing portion (XLV: 2-10; v. 1-9 in A. V.) is the Scripture lesson for the ninth of Ab, the day of the destruction of the temple. Must we say, then, that in this instance the principle has not been consistently carried out? So it might seem. But that would be a mistake, inasmuch as the rule applies only to the close of a book, not of a section of a book; and while in one view the so-called Minor Prophets comprise twelve distinct books, among the Jews they were regarded as one book, called the *Dodecapropheton*, the Twelve-Prophet, or the Fourth Greater Prophet, Isaiah, Jeremiah and Ezekiel being the other three. The unity of the twelve books is evident not simply from the common title, *The Book*

of the Twelve, but also from the final colophon at the end of Malachi; for though it is true that each of them has its own colophon giving the number of verses it contains, there is at the close one colophon for all the twelve giving the sum of the verses from the first of Hosea to the last of Malachi. So that, after all, there is no inconsistency in applying to Malachi only, and not to Hosea as well, the rule for the repetition of the last verse but one.

The application of the euphemistic principle to these four books has wrought no change in the text of Scripture, as regards either its form or its contents. It simply affects the reading of them in the liturgical service, though in some editions the verse to be repeated is printed at the close of the book, but in smaller type.

It is probable that the remarkable order in which certain books in the Hebrew Canon have sometimes been arranged is due to the principle of euphemism.

At first each book of Scripture was written on a separate roll. As long as this was the case the question of the sequence of the books was not raised. It could not be till collections of books were made and written down in one or more volumes. For a long period there was no established order. Indeed as late as the first and second centuries after Christ, it was still a subject of discussion among the Rabbins, whether it is permissible to write the Law, the Prophets and the Hagiographa in one volume. This and similar questions received different answers.* It is not surprising in the circumstances that variations, often striking, in the order of certain Old Testament books are met with, and it is at least interesting, even if not very important, to inquire into their origin. The five books of the Law and the four narrative books of the Prophets—Joshua, Judges, Samuel and Kings—have always stood in the same sequence. But this is not true of the Latter Prophets—Isaiah, Jeremiah and Ezekiel—nor of the books of the Hagiographa. Let us look at the facts.

* Ryle, *The Canon of the Old Testament*, p. 224.

Isaiah, Jeremiah, Ezekiel: we are so used to think of these great prophets in this order that it requires an effort to think of them in any other. It is the order given in the Septuagint, although in that version the Minor Prophets precede Isaiah instead of following Ezekiel. It is certainly the most natural order, because it is the chronological. Isaiah preceded Ezekiel by more than a century, and Jeremiah was Ezekiel's earlier contemporary. This arrangement is equally proper if we have regard to the dignity of these prophets. What more fitting than that Isaiah should stand at the head and Ezekiel at the close? Isaiah has always been regarded as the prince of prophets, preëminent in majesty. Ezekiel, on the other hand, held a place so much lower in the esteem of the Jewish scribes, that his book encountered much opposition before its reception into the Canon, was long and largely neglected in the Christian Church, and has only in the last few decades through modern criticism been recognized in its true character and importance. The order of the three Greater Prophets to which we are accustomed in our English Bible has become firmly established. It was so already among the Jews in the third and fourth centuries. This is evident from the lists of Old Testament books furnished by Origen (died 254) and Jerome (died 420).* It is found in a large number of manuscripts, especially those of Spanish origin. The oldest Hebrew manuscript of whose age we are certain—the Codex Petropolitanus, dated A. D. 916—exhibits this order, as do also the five early editions of the printed text of the Hebrew Bible.

In view of this strong evidence in favor of the now accepted order we are greatly surprised by several strange deviations from it, long known to Biblical scholars. The Babylonian Talmud lays down on the highest authority another and singularly different order. In the Tractate *Baba Bathra* it is explicitly stated: "Our Rabbins teach that the order of

* Ryle, *The Canon of the Old Testament*, where the original of these lists is given in *Excursus D*, pp. 286, 287.

the Prophets is Joshua, Judges, Samuel, Kings, *Jeremiah, Ezekiel, Isaiah*, the Twelve.”* This is the most ancient record with regard to the sequence of the Hebrew Scriptures, and it is supported by many manuscripts, especially those of German and French origin. *Jeremiah, Isaiah, Ezekiel* is the order given in a number of manuscripts, among which is a splendid one in the National Library, Paris, dated A. D. 1286, and another in the British Museum.† A few manuscripts give the strange order: *Ezekiel, Isaiah, Jeremiah*,‡ and the arrangement in the list of Melito of Sardis, about A. D. 170, as quoted by Eusebius, *Hist. Eccles.*, is *Isaiah, Jeremiah, Minor Prophets, Daniel, Ezekiel, Ezra*.§

Of these several glaringly discrepant sequences of the three Greater Prophets, those that concern us now, are the one found in all editions and most manuscripts of the Hebrew Bible,|| and the one set forth in the Talmudic Tractate *Baba Bathra*. The latter is the more remarkable and has awakened much attention. In the one, Isaiah stands first and Ezekiel third; in the other, Jeremiah stands first and Isaiah third. Which is the earlier? Whether the original position of Isaiah was at the beginning or at the close of the series, it would seem that we have necessarily to suppose a change from the one order to the other. What was the purpose of such a change? Conjectures more or less ingenious have been proposed. But without discussing these,¶ we may yet ask, Is it at all requisite to suppose a deliberate intentional change from the one order to the other? May not the several arrangements of these books have originated independently in different localities, or in different Rabbinic schools? The Rabbins in fixing the

* Ryle in his *Excursus B* gives a translation of that portion of the *Baba Bathra*, which deals with the Hebrew Scriptures. The original of the above quotation is furnished by Ginsburg, *Introduction to the Hebrew Bible*, in a note, p. 1, and by Grimm, p. 5.

† Ginsburg, p. 5.

‡ Ryle, p. 229.

§ See the original in Ryle, p. 286.

|| The P̄̄sittā, or the old Syriac, has an exceptional order.

¶ See a brief discussion in Ryle, pp. 226-229.

order were certainly not all governed by the same principle. One school may have employed the chronological principle; another, the euphemistic.

And so it may well be that the Talmudic order is due to a regard for euphemism. This is, in fact, the explanation explicitly given in the *Baba Bathra*, as the tradition from an earlier age. It is there said: "But was not Isaiah before Jeremiah and Ezekiel? Then Isaiah should be placed at the head. The reason (i. e., for the Talmudic order) is that Kings ends with desolation, and Jeremiah is all of it desolation, while Ezekiel opens with desolation and ends with consolation, and Isaiah is all consolation; accordingly we join desolation to desolation and consolation to consolation."* This statement is not without its difficulties, as indeed the whole document is full of wild fancies and strange improbabilities. It will be observed, however, that while it recognizes the propriety of the chronological principle, the right of Isaiah to precede Jeremiah and Ezekiel, if regard is paid only to their ages, yet it deliberately sets this principle aside in favor of another, the euphemistic, which in this case it deems the weightier, and in accordance with which it places Jeremiah and Ezekiel before Isaiah.

Shall we hesitate, then, to admit the correctness of this Talmudic explanation? Shall we not rather say that here we have, in all probability, an instance where the arrangement of a group of books was determined by euphemistic considerations? It is not meant that this arrangement was universal. Other groupings were possible, and of some of these, as we have already seen, traces still exist. It is simply meant that before the order of the Prophets was finally settled, there existed, side by side and independently of each other, several variant orders, and that among these was the Talmudic order of the three Greater Prophets, which, based on the euphemistic principle and laid down probably by the Babylonian schools, was forced at a later time to yield to the chronological order

* Ryle, p. 274. See the original in Grimm, p. 5.

in vogue, it may be, among the Palestinian and Egyptian Jews. We have seen the prominent rôle played by euphemism in Jewish thought; what more likely than that it would exert, at least in certain circles, a controlling influence determining the external order of the Biblical books.

When, now, we pass on to the Hagiographa—the third division of the Hebrew Canon—we find the variations of order far more numerous. Ginsburg has collated fifteen manuscripts, the five early printed editions, the Talmud and the Grammatico-Massoretic treatise entitled *Adath Debirim*, A. D. 1207, and gives his results in a table comprising eight columns, each of which exhibits a different arrangement of the Hagiographic books.* We shall concern ourselves at present only with the relative position of the book of Chronicles and of the book of Ezra-Nehemiah. We link Ezra and Nehemiah together, because in the Hebrew Canon they form but one book with the title Ezra. This we know from the Talmud, as well as from the Massoretic colophon at the end of Nehemiah and the absence of a colophon at the end of Ezra.

Now in five out of the eight columns the book of Chronicles stands last and is immediately preceded by the book of Ezra-Nehemiah. This is the place assigned these books in the Talmud, the early editions and the ten manuscripts examined by Ginsburg. In the other three columns, which show the order set forth in *Adath Debirim* and five manuscripts, the book of Chronicles stands at the head of the Hagiographa and the book of Ezra-Nehemiah at the close, with the remaining nine books intervening in varying order. In every case the book of Chronicles is separate from the book of Ezra-Nehemiah. Yet it cannot be seriously questioned that the latter book is the continuation of the former, the two constituting originally one connected historical work of which the Chronicler was the author. The book of Ezra-Nehemiah begins at the point where the book of Chronicles ends; and where in the former older sources are not employed, the style, the spirit, the point

* Ginsburg, *Introduction*, pp. 6-8.

of view and the mode of expression are precisely those of the book of Chronicles.*

It is manifest, then, that for some reason Chronicles was cut off from Ezra-Nehemiah and assigned another than its original position. In the treatise *Adath Debirim* and some manuscripts, its place, as we have seen, is at the head of the Hagiographa, according to the Palestinian practice, based doubtless on some chronological consideration; but according to Babylonian practice as represented by the Talmud, it stood at the close of the Hebrew Canon and was immediately preceded by Ezra-Nehemiah.† The reason is at once apparent; for "the final paragraph of Ezra-Nehemiah, the record of the deplorable Samaritan schism, was considered too unpleasant a conclusion for the Canon of Sacred Scriptures. Hence the books were transposed, and the opening verses of Ezra-Nehemiah (v. 1-3^a) repeated at the end of Chronicles so as to conclude the Canon with the glad tidings of the edict of Cyrus granting the Jews permission to return to Jerusalem."‡

But the euphemistic principle is applied in still a third way, and this is of a far more serious nature. For while the first way affects only the reading of the Scriptures in public worship, leaving the Scriptures themselves unaltered both in form and contents, and the second simply determines the order in which particular books of Scripture are arranged, and that not universally, but only in certain circles, the third for a special purpose changes the very contents of the Scriptures by making additions to the original text. It is to these later additions that Dr. Grimm devotes his exclusive attention, merely touching in his introductory remarks on the other applications of the euphemistic principle by way of leading up to his proper theme. His book is a study of the *euphemistic* liturgical appendixes in the Old Testament.

However surprising at first sight later additions may appear,

* Cornill, *Einleitung in das Alte Testament*, Auflage 3 und 4, p. 128.

† Ginsburg, pp. 2, 3.

‡ Grimm, p. 1.

their existence, whether due to euphemism or to some other principle, becomes ever more apparent as we study the Old Testament with an open and candid mind. Says Professor Francis Brown: "I find the conviction growing that very little, if any, of our Old Testament has not passed through the hands of editors, annotators, correctors, and expanders, and that in many cases the process has been often repeated. Probably we shall never know the full and precise truth in this regard. But one of our problems is to determine this editorial element as well as we can, and it is an element the existence of which we cannot wisely lose sight of in any difficult passage."^{*} And this is supported by the testimony of so able and judicious a scholar as George Adam Smith, who says: "The general fact must be admitted that hardly one book has escaped later additions—additions of an entirely justifiable nature, which supplement the point of view of a single prophet with the richer experience or the riper hopes of a later day, and thus afford to ourselves a more catholic presentation of the doctrines of prophecy and of the Divine purposes for mankind."[†]

Here, however, extreme caution is necessary. Questions of genuineness are often very difficult because of their intricacy, and in deciding them the mind is liable to be warped by subjective influences. Yet they are questions that will be asked, and ought, if possible, to be answered. They are likely to be asked more frequently in the future than they have been in the past, and the more widely and dispassionately they are discussed by Old Testament scholars, independently of each other and from various points of view, the sooner we shall reach satisfactory results.

Dr. Grimm, in his dissertation, has given a valuable contribution to the general subject. His aim, however, is not to discuss all later additions to the Old Testament. He confines himself to the special question, whether there are addi-

^{*} *Journal of Biblical Literature*, vol. XV., p. 69.

[†] *The Book of the Twelve Prophets*, vol. 1, p. ix.

tions of a euphemistic nature. With this in view he has made a thorough study of the Psalms and the Prophets, in which books such additions are most naturally to be expected. He was not the first to recognize the application of the euphemistic principle. Occasional allusions to it are met with in earlier writers.* But he has the merit of having made the first systematic investigation of the subject, and for this he deserves, and will doubtless receive, the thanks of his co-laborers in the field of Old Testament science.

But how, it may be asked, can we detect such additions, intended to adapt the Scripture lessons to the public worship? Surely the determination cannot be safely left to the groundless fancy of the critics. There must be objective criteria for ascertaining whether a supposed addition, it may be only a minor gloss or it may be an extended passage, belonged to the original text, or whether it was inserted or appended by a later hand. Such criteria are not wanting, though we have no space to state, much less discuss them. They are, however, of such a delicate nature that they can be safely employed only by one who possesses a sober judgment and is free from even the unconscious sway of personal prejudice and interest. A greater or less difference of opinion among honest critics on such difficult questions is therefore not at all surprising. Dr. Grimm has applied his critical principles with discretion as well as skill. It is not to be expected, of course, that the results reached by him will prove equally satisfactory to all others. Some of them we believe to be certain, especially as regards appendixes to the Psalms; others, more particularly those reached in the critical study of the Prophetical books, rest on frailer supports and admit of serious question. He finds euphemistic additions 21 times in the Psalms and 76 times in the Prophets. It would be a pleasure, as it was our intention, to test some of his conclusions; but we have already far transcended our allotted limits and must forbear.

It only remains to say that this dissertation displays on

*Grimm, pp. 6, 7.

every page the author's thorough training, his broad scholarship and his extensive reading. He is intimately acquainted with the best modern historicocritical and exegetical literature on the Old Testament. Almost nothing pertaining to his theme has escaped his notice. The result is a work unusually fresh and interesting, as coming from a young man at the beginning of his scientific career. May the fair promise it gives to the world be amply fulfilled in the future by other contributions of still greater excellence and importance to Old Testament science!

III.

THE DISTINCTIVE ELEMENT IN THE NEW THEOLOGY.

BY REV. CHARLES E. SCHAEFFER.

In our day we hear and read a great deal about the so-called "new theology." A movement strong and far-reaching in its influence is sweeping over the theological world. By some this movement is most ardently fostered and advocated. Some of the most giant intellects of the day stand as its sponsors. By others this movement is just as vehemently and bitterly opposed and denounced. It is evident that theologically the world is in a transition stage. Old faiths are breaking up, new ones are being constructed. Some of the old standards are being forsaken and new ones are taking their place. Some of the host of God have left the old campfires smouldering in ashes and have kindled their fires on yonder mount, while many a saint, like the aged Eli, is sitting in the gate of his tent trembling for the Ark of the Lord. But in this warfare of the theologies there is really no cause for alarm, for after the smoke of battle has cleared away there will dawn the era of a purer and stronger faith. In view of these facts it may not be untimely to discuss the distinctive and determinative element which controls the new theology.

It is proper, however, that in the outstart attention should be called to a few well-known facts. First: Theology is a mere intellectual apprehension of the truth. It is not a new religion, but a new theology which here claims our consideration. Religion is the life of God in the soul of man. Theology is the science of God. The materials of theology remain unaffected even though the theological methods change. Theology, whether old or new, does not alter the facts them-

selves. We recognize the force of this statement in all other sciences. The facts of astronomy, the sun, moon and stars, remain the same whether one holds to the Ptolemaic or to the Copernican system. The facts of botany remain, the flowers bloom, the rose smells just as sweet if called by another name, regardless of any botanical theory. The great facts of biology remain though the theories may change. So the great facts of theology remain; the verities abide; God is God, Christ is Christ, no matter what theologians affirm or deny.

The second fact is: The sincerity of the theologians, the old and the new. Both are after the truth. Both are in search of light. The old theologians arrived at their positions doubtless through tremendous intellectual struggle and great travail of soul. They must be respected. They are the custodians of much truth. They must not be decried and ridiculed and laughed out of court. It is most ungrateful and unkind to talk flippantly and contemptuously of the mother who gave us birth and on whose bosom we were nourished and fed, even though we have outgrown her. A man who makes fun of a creed which he has discarded ought not to be trusted with the new creed which he espouses. Phillips Brooks says of such an one: "When he held that old creed he was either sincere or insincere. If he was insincere, let him abuse himself and not the creed. If he was sincere, let him know that much of the good faith with which he holds his new dear truth comes from the training of that old devotion." But, on the other hand, the new theologians must be credited with an equal degree of sincerity and earnest search for truth. They too are pious, reverent and consecrated men. Their motives must not be impugned. They must not be condemned as worthless nor ridiculed as heretics if they have come to occupy a theological position different from that of their fathers or some of their contemporaries.

Now, in order that the distinctive element of the new theology may be more clearly brought to view, it will be necessary to take a brief survey of the old theology and see what its

determinative principle was. The old theology is that body of dogmas and creeds and confessions which was formulated in the early centuries of the Christian era and which has been handed down from one period to another without undergoing any fundamental or radical change. It took its rise in the great Roman empire and found its chief exponent in Augustine, the Bishop of Hippo, who lived and wrote in the early part of the fifth century. Previous to Roman theology there flourished the theology of the Greek Church, which, however, went into a state of decline with the ascendancy of Augustine. His must have been a remarkable intellect. It has moulded theology for well nigh fifteen centuries. Not only was it dominant in Romanism, but also to a large degree in Protestantism. For while the Reformers rejected the ecclesiastical errors which sprung out of his system, they still retained the fundamental and distinctive element of his theology. What was distinctive in Augustine's theology? Now the regnant principle in any theology is its conception of God. Dr. John Watson, in his "Mind of the Master," writes: "Tell me what is your conception of God, and I will work out your doctrine of man, of forgiveness, of life, of punishment. Given the axioms and geometry is only a question of process. Given your God and your whole theology can be constructed in a reasonable time." The fundamental and governing idea of the Greek theology was the immanence of God. That of the Roman theology, as represented by Augustine, was the transcendence of God. Professor Paine, in his volume on "The Evolution of Trinitarianism," takes opposite ground. He insists that the Greek theology held to the transcendence and the Roman theology to the immanence of God. It would perhaps be doing injustice to either theology were we to affirm one conception of God to the entire exclusion of the other. At first these two theologies mutually affected each other. Elements passed from the one and were taken up and appropriated by the other. There is a sense in which the Eastern theologians conceived of the transcendence of God, and there

is a sense in which the Western theologians likewise conceived of the immanence of God, but it still remains true that the governing and controlling element of the Greek theology was the Divine immanence and that of the Roman theology the Divine transcendence.

Augustine received his conception of God doubtless from the philosophies he studied and from the organization of the Roman empire. He conceived of God in the terms of state, of law, of government. God is a great judge, a Caesar seated on His throne. He must be approached in the spirit of fear and trembling. He rules the world from without. He communicates His messages to men in an external and miraculous manner. God and man are at odds with each other. Man is not God's child, but an alien and can be received only by a process of external naturalization. The Church is the deposit of all grace and truth and salvation does not extend beyond its borders. This system which Augustine formulated was consistent throughout. Its logic was faultless. And doubtless its irresistible and relentless logic gave it such remarkable sway during all these centuries.

In the sixteenth century came the Protestant Reformation. This was not a sudden or spasmodic event. It had its roots from afar. Many influences conspired to bring it about. It was a great step forward. It was a disenthralment of the human soul, including heart, intellect and will. But Protestantism halted midway. It did not go far enough. Perhaps it could not go farther at the time than it did. It broke with Romanism; it discarded its excrescences, its errors and abuses, but it retained the fundamental principle of the mediæval theology. It retained the Augustinian conception of a transcendent God. It is true there were those who recognized this fact and entered strong protests against the old theology, but the mediæval conception nevertheless prevailed. In this respect the Reformation is not yet complete and Protestantism is an unfinished product.

Within the last half century, however, a new feeling has

come to prevail, a new theology has come forward, and if the distinctive element of the old theology has been clearly stated, it will not be difficult to recognize the distinctive element of the new theology. It is a new conception of God. And who is to furnish us with this new conception of God? The old theology obtained its conception of God from philosophy and from the organization of the Roman empire. It goes back to the fathers, to Augustine, to the creeds and dogmas of the early Church. The new theology has raised a different cry. Its call is "Back to Christ." It believes that Christ alone can give us a true conception of God. Christ lived in God. He knew God. He understood God, and hence He is the only true and absolute authority with reference to God. The Christ consciousness becomes the norm for the interpretation of God, and the conception of God, as interpreted by Christ, becomes the regulative, the distinctive element in the new theology. The new theology, therefore, does not inquire, what did Augustine or Clement or Athanasius, Justin Martyr, Origen, or any of the fathers think of God? But it does inquire, what did Jesus Christ think of Him? It regards the great councils and synods which formulated the creeds and confessions, less authoritative than Christ in their deliverances on God. Here, then, we come to the heart of the distinction between the old and the new theologies. The old was "primarily doctrinal and secondarily historical; the new is primarily historical and secondarily doctrinal." We may come to the problems of theology from two points of view. We may come through the *Person* that is to be interpreted or we may come through the *interpretations* of that Person. The old theology comes through the interpretations, through the creeds and confessions and interprets God and Christ as influenced and colored by these. The new theology starts with Christ Himself and through His consciousness interprets God and all other theological problems. It is repeatedly asserted, however, that the old theology does not rest absolutely upon the creeds, that it also goes back to the Bible, and accepts no

statements of doctrine unless they find support in the Bible. Certainly every theologian, in a sense, goes back to the Bible. All of the fathers appealed to the Bible. Every doctrine formulated by Augustine is fortified by an array of proof texts from the Bible. But to what kind of a Bible do the old theologians appeal? To a Bible which is regarded to be equally inspired and infallible in all its statements; to a Bible which is a mere storehouse of proof texts. The historical character of the Bible is entirely ignored. Texts are taken out of their historical connection, they are regarded to be of equal authority, whether spoken by Moses or by Jesus, and are thus loosely brought together to substantiate some preconceived doctrine. It is needless to say that by this method of dealing with Holy Writ any doctrine under the sun can find proof texts to substantiate itself. But the Bible is literature and it must be studied, interpreted and applied in the light of its history. It is dishonoring God's Word to make it something else than it actually is. The modern theologian, too, takes his Bible. He brings to bear upon it the light of modern scientific and historical study. He inquires into every book of the Bible and seeks to ascertain to whom it was written, why it was written, when it was written and by whom it was written. In this way he seeks to separate the facts from the tradition, the superstition, the misunderstanding which have grown up through the centuries. He is in search for truth at first hand.

Now if it be asked what has wrought this change in the theological world, the answer will not be far to seek. The scientific and historical spirit of our age has been influential in bringing about this change. It has affected every department of human thought and activity. It could not but leave its impress also upon theology. There is no more fascinating period in all history than that of the middle of the past century, when the modern scientific spirit began to make itself felt. It was like the opening of spring after the cold winter. It drove men out into the fields, into nature. The

poets left their courts and found their highest themes in common things. "Burns saw into the heart of a daisy as no eighteenth century poet had done." The great watchword became: "Return to Nature." John Calvin lived in Geneva. From his study window he had Mt. Blanc in full view and was surrounded by the most beautiful scenery in the world, yet we are assured that in all his voluminous writings there is not a single allusion to the wonderful works of God in nature. But when, in the last century, the poets went forth into nature for their greatest themes, when the modern botanists and geologists and entomologists went out into nature and studied life and truth at first hand, then a new spirit laid hold of men. The cry "Back to Nature" was taken up by the theologians and was changed into the cry of Herder: "Back to the sources." Then the old documents were brought forth and examined. Truth was sought for at first hand. The cry "Back to the sources" soon became the cry "Back to Christ" as the fountain and source of all truth. The last century, then, discovered the historical Christ. Principal Fairbairn says that if one would have entered, while the last century was yet in its thirties, a well stocked clerical library, he would have found works on apologetics, commentaries, works on dogmatic theology, on the creed, etc., but few books dealing with Jesus as a historical person. He says: "It was indeed a strange and significant thing: so much speculation about Christ, so little earnest inquiry into His actual mind; so much knowledge of what the creeds or confessions, the liturgies or Psalmodies of the Church said; so little knowledge of the historical person or construction of the original documents as sources of real and actual history." "It is still more significant," he continues, "that the men who were then most seriously intent on the revival of religion through the revival of the Church were the very men who seemed least to feel or conceive the need of the return to Christ. They were possessed of a passion to find and restore the Church of the fathers, and to the fathers they appealed for direction and

help; but in no one of their multitudinous tracts or treatises is there any suggestion or sign that Christ as the founder, supplied the determinative idea of His own Church." What a revolution therefore was occasioned when, at the age of twenty-four, in 1835, David Friedrich Strauss published his book "Das Leben Jesu." A storm of criticism followed. Strauss was banished from the university and his book was freely condemned. But while it contained many objectionable features, it accomplished one thing, viz: it brought into prominence Christ as a historical person. It furnished theologians with a new basis and with a new regulative principle, viz: the consciousness of the historical Christ.

It is evident that such a change of base must revolutionize the whole trend of theological thought. What was the consciousness of Christ? What did He think of God? He conceived of God as a Father. That was the one word ever upon His lips. Henceforth theology must be constructed in terms of Fatherhood. Heretofore it was cast in terms of jurisprudence from the Roman empire. Henceforth the terms are those of the family. Man is God's child. He may be a prodigal child, but he is a child still. Sin, forgiveness, the atonement and all other problems of theology must be interpreted from the same point of view. It is sometimes claimed that the new theology is but a slight modification of the old. But this is not strictly correct. There is a fundamental difference, a difference of principle and method between the two. The old theology was philosophical, the new is historical. Professor Paine well says: "The old theology starts from the ideal and abstract and proceeds to the historical and concrete; in other words, from what is unknown by experience to what is known. The new theology starts on inductive lines, from the historical and concrete, and thence proceeds from the known by experience to the unknown." Likewise, the assertion that the new theology is only a revival of Greek theology, is not founded on fact. The governing, the regulative principle is different. While the Greek conception of God

...as predominantly that of an immanent God, it derived this not from history, not from experience, not from Christ, but from philosophy. The new theology does not begin with philosophy. Philosophy deals with the ideal, the abstract. The new theology deals with the historical, the concrete.

The new theology with its Christocentric principle is no stranger in the Reformed Church. Our Mercersburg theologians were the first on this side of the Atlantic to come into possession of German thought. Rauch and Nevin and Schaff and Harbaugh and a host of others were the leaders of German thought in America. They coined the word Christocentric which has since become the keynote of the new theology. But our Mercersburg theologians did not go far enough. They could not then be expected to go farther than they did. They came into possession of the idea of historical development, but they continued to interpret Christ and God in the light of the creeds and councils rather than the creeds and councils through Christ. But it was a great gain when they saw that Christ was the center of the creed and that He was the regulative principle of life. One step needed to be taken, and that was, that the consciousness of Christ is the regulative principle of theology, and they would have been abreast with the latest theology of our day.

The new theology has come to stay. The cry "Back to Christ" is being reechoed from the pew. It is said that Sheldon's book, "What would Jesus Do," has had a sale of ten million copies. What does this show? It shows that people want to know the absolute, perfect standard. They want to know not what Paul or John or Luther would do, but what Jesus would do. So in the realm of theology, we want to know what was the mind of Christ, what He believed, and spake and taught. We believe that the clear water is found above at the fountain and that farther down the stream impurities from the neighboring fields have drained into its waters. And so we are not afraid of the new theology. We believe that it will lead us into a larger and fuller realization

of the truth. It will give us a larger and truer view of God. It will inspire in us a larger, richer, sublimer faith, "a faith," in the words of Dr. Hedge, "wide as the widest outlook of the modern mind, free as human thought, concurrent with reason, coördinate with science, a faith in which the present predominates over the past and the future over the present, in which judgment tops authority and vision outruns tradition."

Once Mary stood at the sepulcher weeping, saying "they have taken away my Lord and I know not where they have laid him." And thus many an old theologian has been weeping at the sepulcher of his buried theories. But Mary was looking for a dead Christ, and when she turned she found not a dead, but a risen, a living Christ. And so, if those who are mourning over and are searching for dead theories will but look around they may behold a new, a living theology.

IV.

WHAT ARE THE FUNCTIONS OF THE DIACONATE?

BY A. E. TRUXAL, D.D.

What are the functions which a deacon is expected to perform in and for the Church? Is the diaconate a perpetual office in the Church? If so, is it evermore, under all circumstances and conditions, engaged with one and the same kind of functions? I propose in this paper to discuss briefly these questions. That the diaconate is a permanent office might be affirmed on the ground that there always have been deacons. The New Testament speaks of the deacons in apostolic times; the Roman Catholic Church has had deacons from the very earliest period of her history unto the present time; the Episcopal Church has her deacons; the Reformed and Lutheran churches have their deacons; and some other churches have officers whom they call deacons, too. So that it can truthfully be said that the Christian Church has always had a class of officers known as deacons.

But the only thing that is the same in these officers is the name. So far as the functions are concerned which they performed or are performing, they differ from each other in the different churches and in the different ages of the Church. A deacon in the Reformed or Lutheran Church is something very different from a deacon in the Roman Church. And deacons in the Reformed and Roman churches to-day are something very different from the deacons of the New Testament Church. They have the same name but their functions are different. A very brief study of the subject at once reveals the fact that there are deacons and deacons.

Very generally the appointment of the seven to serve tables

in the mother church of Jerusalem is made the foundation for the diaconate ever afterwards. But these officers with a specific duty assigned them are nowhere called deacons; they are always designated as the seven. And it is a question whether the office which they were called to fill was continued in the Church. Professor Beyshlag holds that the elders who were afterwards called into service included in their functions the duties that had been assigned to the seven, and that consequently the office of the latter passed away. Professor McGiffert comes to very much the same conclusion; he says, "It is probably safer to conclude that the men whose appointment he (Luke) records in Acts vi. served only a temporary purpose, and that the duties originally entrusted to them were ultimately assumed by the elders, or elder brethren, who seem gradually to have become the leaders of the Church in its various activities." The same teacher is authority for the statement that Chrysostom, Vitringa, Dean Stanley and others held that the seven "constituted only a temporary committee." Bishop Hort has the following to say on the subject: "There is, of course, no evidence for historical continuity between the seven and either the Ephesian *διάκονοι* or the developed order of deacons of later times. The New Testament gives not the slightest indication of any connection. But the seven at Jerusalem would, of course, be well known to St. Paul and to many others outside Palestine, and it would not be strange if the idea propagated itself. Indeed analogous wants might well lead to analogous institutions."*

In the later writings of the New Testament deacons are mentioned, but the duties of the office are nowhere described. We are consequently at a loss to know exactly what functions they performed in the life of the Church. They were associated with the elders and seem to have been their helpers or assistants. But most likely their assistance would be in part at least in the way of ministering to the outward needs of the household of faith. The necessities in each congregation

* *The Christian Ecclesia*, p. 209.

would no doubt determine the work which would fall to the hands of the deacons. But it does seem clear that the diaconate with the elders belonged to the ministry of the Church. "In post-apostolic times, when the bishop was raised above the presbyter and the presbyter became priest, the deacon was regarded as a Levite, and his primary function of care of the poor was lost in the function of assisting the priest in the subordinate parts of public worship and the administration of the sacraments. The diaconate became the first of the three orders of the ministry and a stepping-stone to the priesthood."* The deacon was from the beginning a helper, and there must have been something in the service which he rendered in the latter period of the apostolic century which led to the position assigned him several centuries later. At the present time in those churches which have retained the historic episcopacy the deacon is the lowest order of the ministry and is an assistant to the priest. In the Reformed Church the deacon is an altogether different officer. It is not my purpose to give a history of the diaconate in the Reformed Church, but to call attention to the functions performed by it at the present time. The deacons of our day are not helpers to the ministers of the Gospel in the sense in which the deacons in episcopal churches are; neither are they almoners as the seven of Jerusalem were. Their work is in a general way included in the Gospel ministry; that is, if there were no deacons the minister of the Word and the elders would be necessitated to perform the duties now belonging to the deacons. But the work of the deacons is one always peculiar to the times. The condition of the Church and of the State in which the Church exists determines the nature and character of the works of the deacons. A condition in the early Church made the appointment of the seven a necessity. So the condition of the Church in any age and in any country determines the peculiar duties which will be laid upon the deacons. Changed conditions must always be taken into consideration when the functions of the deacons

* *History of the Christian Church*, Vol. I., p. 500, by Dr. P. Schaff.

are to be defined. Dr. Schaff says, "the primitive churches were charitable societies, taking care of the widows and orphans, dispensing hospitality to strangers and relieving the needs of the poor." But such is not the character of our congregations now. The orphans are provided for by the Church as a whole. The poor are cared for in other ways. The deacons have very little to do with the poor and needy. Their work now consists in procuring the funds for the support of the Gospel in the home congregation, in gathering the alms of the people and paying the same into the treasury, and in discharging their duties as members of the consistory. The moneys are paid out of the treasury as ordered by the consistory. So that ordinarily the deacons do not minister unto the necessities of the poor. Their main work is an altogether different one.

And yet the pastor in setting a deacon in office, if he uses the Order of Worship, must say, "The office of deacons has regard especially to the wants of the poor." "On them falls the honorable charge of looking after the desolate and poor, and of seeing that the charities of the Church are applied with proper effect to their weekly and daily wants." And what is further said of the duties to be performed by the deacons is based on the above two sentences. If the pastor uses the Directory he must say the same thing, only that he adds the duty of providing for the pastor's support so "that he may give himself wholly to the work of the ministry." This paper is written to call attention to this remarkable incongruity. When a deacon is set in office such duties are defined as do not exist at all—such duties as he is not expected to perform, and could not even if he would; and when in office he is expected to perform such functions as were not set before him at all in his installation. The office of deacon as described in the service would fit the seven of the early Church, but it does not fit the deacons of the present day. For more than a quarter of a century I have performed the service for the ordination and installation of deacons with an ever growing

sense in me of the inapplicability of the words of the service to the office of deacons as it now exists. And my conceptions and feelings with regard to the matter have reached such a state that the incongruity is almost intolerable. To tell the deacons at their ordination and installation that their office "has regard especially to the wants of the poor" and that they are to see to it "that the charities of the Church are applied with proper effect to their weekly and daily wants," when they know and the pastor knows and the congregation knows that the duties which they are expected to perform in the congregation are of an altogether different kind, is, to say the least, something that ought not be done. The general constitution of the Church, in Art. 21, gives the functions of the deacon a wider range, including that of ministering unto "the necessities of the congregation" and of providing "for the support of the ministry of the Gospel." Yet it makes "the relief of the poor" come first, and bases its teaching on Acts 6: 1-6 and I. Tim. 3: 8-13. There can be no objection, of course, to the requirement of a proper Christian character of the occupants of the office of deacon. But the service in the Order of Worship is not as appropriate as the article in the constitution. The General Synod in 1825, in response to a request of Lebanon Classis, referred to it through the Eastern Synod, for "a more complete definition of the office of deacon," appointed a committee on the subject, which reported at length to the next General Synod. The report was adopted and published in tract form. The description of the functions of the diaconate given in this report is by far the best we have. It is better than that in the constitution and very much better than that of the Order of Worship. The duties of deacons are, however, perhaps too comprehensive and extensive. But the objection to it in my mind is the fact that it finds the idea and functions of the office primarily in the appointment of the seven and in the duties assigned them, and makes "the spiritual and temporal needs of the poor" the first concern of the deacons. In all the formularies of the

Church it seems to be assumed that the functions of the office of deacon in our day are to be determined by the condition and needs of the original churches two thousand years ago, rather than by the condition and needs of the present day. The argument seems to be that because officers were needed in the congregation of Jerusalem in the days of the apostles to minister to the necessities of the poor, officers for the same purpose are a requirement now and always. Whereas my contention is that the functions of the deacons in any given time and place are determined by the existing demands, and not by the functions performed by the same officers at other times, and in other places, under totally different circumstances and conditions. Our deacons are performing duties for which there is a demand at the present time. They may not be performing them as fully and thoroughly as ought to be done. And their duties might perhaps be properly enlarged and extended. Some of the particulars mentioned in the deliverance of General Synod in 1878, to which reference has already been made, might be legitimately included in their work. But, according to my way of thinking, the duties to be placed before the deacons, when they are set in office, ought to be those which they are expected to discharge, and not those which belonged to deacons of past ages, and which no longer exist. Hence it is my conviction that the time has fully come for a revision of the service for the ordination and installation of deacons, so that the duties described in the service will be the same as those which actually attach to the office in our Church at the present day.

V.

THE FRAUDS OF SPIRITUALISM.

BY REV. S. L. KREBS.

DR. HENRY SLADE.—Known the world around, noted as the most famous slate-writing medium on this planet, unique and unrivalled in his department of Spiritism, stands Dr. Henry Slade.

This man is a remarkable individual from whatever standpoint he is viewed. If the wonders he performs are exactly what he claims them to be, then he is one of the most extraordinary thaumaturgists that ever appeared in the world's history; but if he is an impostor, then he is king of his kind, the most successful conjuror and illusionist that ever lived.

He has travelled around the world; exhibited his so-called occult powers before the crowned heads of Europe and the uncrowned heads of America; has had these powers investigated by some of the keenest scientific savants at St. Petersburg, Berlin, Leipsic and elsewhere, and has filled the heads of thousands of ordinary folk (at \$2 per head) with wonder, astonishment and awe.

He claims that a small bit of slate pencil placed between two slates that are firmly held together by himself and the sitter above a table in plain view, is moved about and made to write messages by the "spirit power" of a dead man who in earth life was known as "Dr. Davis." The modus operandi seems very simple, open and free from fraud, and has impressed nearly all who have sat with Slade either as a genuine and wonderful means of communicating with discarnate acquaintances across the river of death, or else as a marvelous new power discovered in nature.

The writer was delighted, therefore, when he landed at a

popular summer resort and found the "Dr." there too, occupying a comfortable cottage, and by his shingle displayed conspicuously on the front door offering the public the stupendous privilege of securing a written message from the other world for the small sum of \$2 a message. I immediately engaged a sitting, and went, not anticipating the rich find I got, but filled instead (I must confess it) with a semi-superstitious awe as I called to mind the remarkable history and all the mystic wonders I had read of this occult professor in whose unique presence I at last found myself seated.

This was at 10 a. m. He began by handing me two of his slates to examine. Without asking him, I rubbed and cleaned the surfaces of these slates. He then deliberately CHANGED THEM. How? By passing them under the table, "to develop power," as he said, and then picked up two other slates of same style, frame, size and appearance, from a *whole stack of them* that was concealed behind the white lace curtains of a window that reached to the floor just back of his chair and within easy reach of a person sitting on it. Before he did this he had given me another slate to examine, in order to cover up that movement of his when he reached for the second pair of slates. I pretended to examine it, but really was watching him *in my little lap glass*, by means of which I saw HIM PICK UP THAT SECOND PAIR OF SLATES and drop the first pair, which I had cleaned. We then held this second pair of slates between us on their edge, or vertically on the table top. After awhile he said he felt a strong current, that I was strongly magnetic, would make a good medium myself some day, and more of the usual time-killing twaddle, and that we should soon have writing. "Dr. Davis, can we have writing? Can you write for us?" he asked of his "guide." Three raps. Soon thereafter there was a sound of scratching heard in or around the slates somewhere. Let me say right here, in its proper connection, that this sound can be produced by a spring concealed in the hand holding the slates, or by the finger nail, or a piece of palmed metal. In order to see whether such was

the method employed in this case I asked Slade whether he would object if I were to place my ear against the slate to hear the sound more distinctly. This was my pretext. But what I really wanted was to get my eye over the top edge of the almost vertical slates and thus see the underside or the side turned away from me and toward him, the SIDE WHERE HIS LEFT HAND WAS, or rather where the four fingers of his left hand were, the thumb being visible on the side towards me. He said he had no objection to me placing my ear there. So I stooped over and placed my right ear against the slates, and after holding it there for a moment or two, slowly, so slowly that I thought he would not detect the movement, commenced to move my head up towards the upper edge of the slates, thus trying to get my right eye just over the edge to see what those four fingers of his were doing on the hidden side of the slates. But he was on the alert. This evidently was a dangerous movement on my part. He detected it at once, and so as my eye approached the edge, which was the critical point, he LOWERED THE SLATES; lower and slowly lower they went, as higher, slowly higher moved my eye, until finally the slates were almost flat on the table. I saw it was useless to proceed, and so desisted. Three raps soon indicated that the "spirits" had finished their job. He handed me the slates, which contained a long message from "Dr. Davis," telling me that facts would knock out my doubts, that I should continue to investigate, &c., &c.

And thus was this wonderful (?) "spirit-message" secured. The reader can easily see and understand the fraud and its secret, namely this:—The message was written beforehand on the slates, ready for any new investigator that might happen along or else specially prepared for me as I had told him when I made the engagement the day before that I was skeptical. These prepared slates were then substituted for the two he originally had handed to me for examination. The sound of writing was produced in the manner before described. The substitution I saw in my lap-glass as plain as daylight.

After this he picked up a new slate, just one, and said he

thought he could get answers to any *short* question I might ask, and requested that I should frame my questions in such a manner that a categorical "yes" or "no" would form a sufficient and sensible answer. So I wrote in large letters, "Will M. K. communicate with me through you ?" and handed him the slate which he at once passed out of sight under the table "to develop power," commencing at the same time to talk, and cough, and hem and haw, and clear his throat and make an incessant noise. I immediately gazed down into my little glass and **SAW HIM DELIBERATELY WRITING SOMETHING ON THE SLATE** (the coughing, talk, &c., being intended to cover up the noise made by the slate pencil), and in a moment handed me the slate again. "She will later" was the message he had written—thus trying to get another \$2 sitting out of me.

He then spit on his fingers and rubbed it all out, and handed me the slate to write another question. "Shall I go to C. or remain in R. ?" I wrote in **VERY SMALL LETTERS**. He took the slate, under the table it went, on his knees there, the hemming and coughing again commenced, and so **DID HIS WRITING** which I again saw in my snug little lap-glass, and when he returned me the slates there stood the mystic (!) words "You will." Highly satisfactory and definite, wasn't it, as an answer to my question ? The fact is, as before stated, I had written the question in such small letters that the partially blind "Dr." dared not take too much time to decipher it all, dared not look down so steadily and sharply, and so must have contented himself with answering the first part. "Shall I go to—" ? risking the rest !

"There was one hiatus in each sitting," writes J. E. Williams in "Suggestive Therapeutics" for Nov., 1899. "At some point there was a moment of time in which the slates passed out of my sight and out of my hands. I think it was after trying them on top of the table awhile that the medium (in his case Miss Bangs; but his remark applies to Slade as well), said, 'Let us try them under the table,' and withdrawing them from my hand, would put them under the table, and dur-

ing that transition I would lose them. If there was substitution it was at this point." Exactly so, and had Mr. Williams thought of using a mirror at this critical point and during the entire seance, he would have seen distinctly what he here wisely and rightly surmises. It is at this point of disappearance that substitution of slates previously prepared is made, or the writing of "yes" and "no" and other short words or sentences is executed.

This was all the "slate-writing" I cared to have from Dr. Slade's "spirits." But, having read Zollner's remarkable book,* and remembering one of the learned professor's experiments with Slade, which I shall here call

SLADE'S MYSTIC MAGNET experiment, I engaged another hour for a seance on the following day.

At the hour appointed an ordinary pocket compass was placed in the centre of the table top, far beyond the reach of Slade's arm, a fact he wanted me particularly to notice. We sat awhile with the tips of our fingers resting lightly on the edges of the table, "to develop power." In a few minutes Slade said, "Dr. Davis, if there is enough power, please move the needle in the compass box a little." Lo and behold! the needle actually oscillated slightly, say in an arc of from 20 to 40 degrees. "Move it more," ordered Slade. It obeyed. "Swing it clean round the circle, if you can," commanded the mighty magician. It so swung.

Wonderful! marvelous! Yes, apparently so. But had the reader gazed into my little lap glass—(That glass was a "little" but after all a big thing. It was great and greatly to be praised. O ye seekers after "spirits" take one along with you and you will see more materialized hands, and arms, and feet and legs, than you ever dreamed of before)—had he gazed into that little glass, he would take those adjectives all back, and substitute something that would sound more like "whew! hist! what a rogue and a rascal." For every time the needle

* "Transcendental Physics," by Johann Carl Friedrich Zollner, Prof. of Physical Astronomy at the Univ. of Leipzig, Member of the Royal Saxon Society of Science, etc., London, 1880.

oscillated or swung round, I saw Slade's left leg (the only strong one he had, being helpless in the other) rise up from the floor until the tip of the shoe was near or against the table top on the under side almost directly beneath the spot where rested the compass. Fastened to this shoe tip was a nail or small piece of steel! I could not see exactly what it was, but that there was something there I could see and did see, and it was that iron or steel something that caused the needle to swing. He misjudged the distance from the floor to table top several times (for I got him to repeat the whole "experiment"), and the consequence was that his toe *struck the table top* with a faint but clear *metallic* impact, a sound that could not have been produced by the leather of the shoe, which would have made a duller thud.

I have since tried this trick myself, and others mentioned in this report, before puzzled friends in private and before public audiences or classes when referring to frauds in platform lecture work, and always with flattering success.*

SLADE'S SPIRITUAL CIGAR BOX.—On a glorious summer evening, in a bit of the forest primeval, at the witching hour of sunset or a little before, I saw a party of 60 or 80 people surrounding Dr. Slade, who, seated with his back against a giant oak, was engaged in giving tests and messages to the circle of admiring believers, by means of a common cigar box which rapped out the answers to questions asked of the "spirits" by the persons in the circle.

I joined the crowd and watched the proceedings for a while,

* Prof. Zollner says Slade made the needle move when *standing* at the table. In that case the foot could not have been used. But Zollner also states that Slade's hands were on the table top, linked in the hands of himself (Zollner) and in those of a friend, and this circle of hands was "*in motion*." The needle moved as above described. Under these circumstances what I would have examined with great care would have been Slade's cuffs, cuff buttons, the ends of his shirt sleeves and ends of his coat sleeves, for it would have been quite an easy matter to conceal a piece of magnetized metal large and strong enough to produce the responsive movements in the compass needle, which movement would take place without rousing suspicion as the circle of hands was kept "*in motion*," that is approaching and receding from the compass.

and then, quietly withdrawing, made a detour through the woods coming up BEHIND the oak against which Slade leaned. I was within three feet of him. I watched his hands closely and soon discovered the secret of the humbug he was practicing upon the people. I retraced my steps to the circle, detached a gentleman from it, brought him with me around back of the tree, and pointed out to him the simple method of Slade's imposture. The shock of this discovery was so great to this gentleman, who had been a life-long Spiritualist and "believer," that he actually turned pale in the struggle of his emotions. He was perfectly honest, however, and agreed that Slade must be exposed. So I drew up the following statement of the facts in the case, and here it is, signed by both of us:—

We, the undersigned, solemnly affirm that we detected the celebrated medium, Dr. Henry Slade, in palpable fraud on the evening of July 29th, 1898. He had delivered an hour's most interesting talk concerning the travels and experiences of his life to a large gathering of people in "the grove" on the Cassadaga grounds at Lilly Dale, N. Y., and then offered to have his spiritual guides answer questions by means of raps. He opened and untied a cigar box, to the bottom of which was attached a tape about four yards long, which ran through a hole in the center of the bottom of the box and was held inside by a knot, which prevented it slipping through when pulled or stretched from the other end. He held the free end with his left hand, while the interrogator held the box, stretching the tape taut,* and asked the question in it. The answers came, one rap for "no," three for "yes," and two for doubtful or "don't know." Many stepped up and had their questions thus answered, among them being mothers anxiously inquiring, as from an oracle of God Himself, about long lost sons, &c. We, the undersigned, were behind a tree against which Dr. Slade sat, and saw exactly how the raps were produced. He slid the thumb once, twice or three times respectively, over the tape a

* Which, by the way, would thus keep the crowd at least fifteen feet away from Slade, from which distance they could see nothing at all of the trick.

very short, almost inperceptible distance, which by friction caused vibrations in the tape and communicated them to the cigar box which acted as a sounding board, where they were heard as sharp raps. If the thumb be previously rubbed with rosin and the end of the tape too, the raps come out very sharply and distinctly. We reproduced Slade's raps that same evening in the hotel "Grand," with complete success. In the interests of truth, pure and simple, and with no desire to persecute Dr. Slade, we make the above statement.

(Signed.) S. L. KRAEMER, *
C. E. TOBEY.

In this affidavit we referred to "Mothers anxiously inquiring, as from an oracle of God Himself, about long lost sons." Let me give but one instance. A fine looking, feeble, motherly old lady, leaning for support on the arm of a middle aged woman, approached Slade's cigar box and, trembling with the profound and matchless emotion of a mother's undying love, asked, "Dr. Davis, is my son, who left home three years ago, and from whom I have never heard since, is he still alive?" There was a hush of deep, sympathetic expectancy in that crowd as all waited for the reply. The cigar box gave one rap, "no." The poor mother fell backward in a faint, but was caught in the arms of the friend standing beside her, who began to comfort her. "Ask again, ask again," cried out Dr. Slade, "perhaps you misunderstood." So she did. This time the box rapped out three raps, and that dear deluded soul went away, COMFORTED! And comforted by what? By *rank fraud*, by the mere guess of an unblushing and contemptible impostor. Let me here record my utter abomination and detestation of fraud such as this, fraud that trifles with the holiest feelings of a human heart, fraud that will stop at nothing, not even a mother's love. When I think of that poor old forsaken mother and the deceit practiced upon her, it makes my blood boil. And yet, there seems to be a tremendous

*The pseudonym I used while at this camp, in order to prevent the mediums there from using "the underground system" on me.

amount of such disreputable imposture going on in Spiritualism.*

Such are the "phenomena" (!) I had with Slade. Is it not passing strange that so many hundreds and thousands of people can be found who religiously believe in the honesty and supernormal powers of this "noted" individual? Indeed many of these good and honest people themselves are not only willing but anxious to come out in public print in Slade-eulogies; † although editor J. R. Francis seems to have a very poor opinion both of Slade and of his mediumship. I need hardly add that if these are the sentiments of Dr. Francis, I echo them with all the emphasis of sincerity and truth. Farewell to "Dr." Slade!

PIERRE L. O. A. KEELER.—In the Spiritualistic press this gentleman figures as "one of the best known mediums in this country." I never had a complete sitting with him, for the reason that he would never give me one, for "lack of open time" was the reason generally assigned. I tried to arrange

* I heard Mrs. Mary Ellen Lease, the famous Kansas suffragist, denounce the horrors of frauds toying with the holiest feelings of the heart. She followed a materialized form to the cabinet and would have seized it there, had not the medium struck down her arm at the same time saying she should not dare to touch the spirits unless permitted. "Madame," indignantly cried Mrs. Lease, "Madame, this is an outrageous fraud, and a criminal thing to trifle thus with the holiest feelings of the human heart." She also asserted openly on the hotel porch to seven or eight gentlemen that Rev. Hull, Dr. Peebles, Hicks, Gaston, and others, told her that a large per cent. of the mediums were frauds. And the more you seek for phenomena, the more you find husks. (After reading the above to Mrs. Lease, Aug. 2d, 1898, at 9 A. M., just after breakfast on the porch of hotel "Grand," she said to me that she could and would endorse every word as bona fide her own.) Moreover, Mr. Curtis, Esq., of Bradford, Pa., after years of experience with professional mediums, asserted as his belief that *all paid* mediums are tricksters and frauds. Prof. J. C. F. Grumbine says nine tenths are frauds. This estimate means volumes, coming, as it does, from so able a writer and pronounced a Spiritualist as Prof. G. and constitutes a sad commentary on a shameless propaganda.

† Within the past two years I have read a number of such eulogies in the Spiritualistic press: *e. g.*, from Rev. Moses Hull, Lyman C. Howe, T. D. Kayner, Dean Clarke, etc.

for an hour in Washington, D. C., and elsewhere, but without avail. He persistently refused to give me a date in advance, though I begged him to do so each time I saw him. So that the only chance I ever had of making any test whatever was when I first met him at Cassadaga, where I was introduced to him by a gentleman by the name of Ford who claimed to be an old acquaintance of Keeler's. On that occasion I made a date with him, and had about 15 minutes in his seance room. Once seated at the table with K. opposite me, I adjusted the looking glass and watched his lap which I could see very clearly. He placed my two slates on the top of the table. Then he requested me to write out the questions I wished to ask of my spirit friends on a small note tablet which was lying on the table, one question on each sheet of it. These four or five sheets he had me roll up into small balls or "ballots." When I looked over into his lap through my lap-glass at this point of the proceedings, I ~~SAW A THIRD SLATE LYING ACROSS HIS KNEES.~~ It was at this interesting moment that he suddenly said, "Conditions are not favorable. George" (his guide) "says you must seek other conditions. I cannot do anything for you," and insist as I would, he positively declined to proceed further. So that ended it, once and for all.

Now all I ask is, What business had that third slate in his lap? How came it there? (Still this particular question is not so hard to answer. For he had a whole pile of slates, as Slade had, on the floor behind the chair and *within easy reach*, so that it is easy to see how the slate could get into his lap without a miracle of levitation). But I repeat, what *business* had it there? Why didn't he tell me he wanted to use a third slate, *and let me see it?* Why did he keep it concealed in his lap below the table?

Subsequently a lady showed me a slate she had received from Keeler. It contained three messages each written with different colored pencil, three colors in all. Every one of these messages would have suited me or almost anyone else, as well as they suited her, and she said that they were not what her

father would say at all, from whom they purported to emanate, for her father, she asserted with emphasis, never did and never would address her by "hello!" a word frequently occurring in these purported paternal messages.

To say the least, all I saw at Mr. Keeler's residence looked sublimely suspicious, and while I do not call Keeler a fraud, simply because I would not be demonstrably sure of that assertion, yet I do want to tell what I saw him do, and let readers everywhere draw their own conclusions.

THE CAMPBELL BROTHERS.—Like Keeler, the Campbells never gave me a seance. Although I had a card of admission to an evening circle, for which I had paid one dollar in good United States cash, they refunded that money and requested me to leave the seance room assigning as their reason for this request that they saw that *I was skeptical*. "But," I replied, "I am an honest investigator seeking the truth everywhere and always, and am skeptical simply because I have never yet been convinced. I have heard of your excellent mediumship, and am come to see. Now is your chance to convince a doubter." This reply seemed to irritate or annoy one of the brothers, and so, somewhat angrily or sternly, he retorted that inasmuch as the other 29 sitters were all earnest and sincere, my presence might "spoil the conditions," which he thought I as a gentleman would not wish to do for these 29 earnest and believing souls, each of whom had paid their dollar too. Seeing that he was obdurate, and not wishing to "spoil the conditions" for those 29 "earnest and believing souls," I quietly withdrew.

But what was the real secret of Campbell's request, and HOW DID HE KNOW THAT I WAS SKEPTICAL? A word will explain it all. That afternoon I, with a stream of other interested persons, visited the Campbell's elegant cottage to examine and admire their "spirit portraits," each of which was indeed very striking, and had cost each sitter from \$35 to \$50 apiece. Whilst the others contented themselves with gazing at these pictures from a distance of from four to ten

feet, I walked up much closer and scrutinized them critically through a powerful pocket microscope, in this way observing that they were *as much like ordinary pastels as one pea is like another*. Now, THE CAMPBELLS SAW ME DOING THIS. That settled it. That same evening I was debarred from their seance in the manner described, though they were glad enough to get my dollar in the morning for said seance before they saw MY INVESTIGATING TURN OF MIND. What a grand opportunity those inspired(?) mediums lost for converting a skeptic and leading him from error to the truth! For, if the strong faith of 29 "earnest believing souls" could not neutralize the supposed antagonistic influence of the impartial and open-minded skepticism of but one solitary and honest investigator, ready and glad to be convinced, why surely then, yea certainly and inevitably, mediums will have to gain their recruits and patrons from the "gullible" portion of humanity. You are respectfully requested to leave your reason, common sense and judgment behind when you enter the door of the Campbell's sanctum, and to come prepared to gulp down everything as being just what they call it, without question, examination or a scintilla of sensible doubt.

"Most of them were investigators," writes C. Hagen of large numbers of Buffalo people who turned out to see the Campbell brothers in mediumistic performances, "and this is the class of people the Campbell brothers cater to." Indeed! Is it possible! Then at Lilly Dale, where I met them under the most favorable circumstances, *i. e.*, surrounded with sympathetic Spiritualists and personal friends, they suddenly lost their desire and specialty for catering to investigators. "They are always pleased to see old friends and to **MAKE NEW ONES**," continues Mr. Hagen. True, they stuck most touchingly and pathetically to the 29 old friends, "tried and true," whom they had around them that evening at Lilly Dale, but they did not seem to care a rap (Mr. Hagen to the contrary notwithstanding) about making a new friend, but seemed, on the contrary, to do all in their power to transform an inoffensive

stranger who was within their gates that night into an enemy.

But they did not succeed. I am not their enemy, unless they are the enemies of truth. I am simply telling what happened, and I still have in my possession their own card of admission to prove it.

Truly, as Mr. J. Benoni Wateman says in writing of an unsatisfactory seance he had with the Campbell brothers, "something generally does interfere when things get pinched down to a focus." Amen, Mr. Wateman. Amen! The only thing I regret is that I had no opportunity to pinch things down to a focus in the cases of Keeler and the Campbells, as I should like to have done.

A WORD IN CONCLUSION.—There are Spiritualists, who love truth more than "isms," even if it be their own beloved Spiritualism. These are ready to see even prominent mediums fall, upon whose deliverances and performances they have been relying for their facts and philosophy, rather *THAN THAT TRUTH SHOULD SUFFER*. Such a man, I take it, is Editor Francis. "We look for good results from what you are doing," he wrote to the writer on August 4, 1899. In a conversation with him in Chicago I had acquainted him with the fact that I had been investigating, and had discovered *an overwhelming amount of fraud*, all of which I do not give in this report. He very earnestly remarked, "Fraud is what the Spiritualistic movement needs to be thoroughly cleansed from, and the quicker the better. It must be placed on a scientific basis."

And this, by the way, is my view exactly of Spiritualism. The phenomena should be studied by scientific men qualified in psychology, especially practical psychology, simply and purely *from the scientific standpoint*, to discover what PSYCHOLOGICAL truth there is in them, and what laws of mind, or soul, if you please, are manifesting themselves in the phenomena of trance, telepathy, clairvoyance, telekinesis, and allied phenomena. This is just exactly the invaluable work the S. P. R. is doing, of which Gladstone said already in

1886, "It is by far the most important work now going on in the world—by far the most important," he repeated, reflecting upon the words he had just uttered; and these, too, are the mental depths and activities of which the now sainted Dr. Philip Schaff, the greatest of modern Church historians, wrote, when he put on permanent and public record ("Church History," Vol. III., 465) the words, "Clairvoyance, magnetic phenomena and unusual states of the human soul are full of deep mysteries, and stand nearer the invisible spirit world than the everyday mind of the multitude suspects."

It was said that nine-tenths of professional mediumistic phenomena are fraudulent. That leaves one-tenth as genuine, and indeed this one-tenth of genuine psychic phenomena, especially those occurring *in private families* and in cultured individuals "without money and without price," contain psychological laws of so marvelous and mysterious a nature, as to demand, I am now fully convinced, the most earnest and painstaking investigation of *the best scientific minds* the world can lend. And it is the very fact that these wonderful phenomena point to such sublime and transcendently important truth that renders imposture in this sphere all the more reprehensible and contemptible, misleading and dangerous.

It is, among other things, in the interest of this great truth, that this report has been prepared. If it shall in any wise contribute to the clarifying of the atmosphere in the still cloudy but **CLEARING** world of psychic research, and especially if it shall tend to the destruction of the fraud business, the writer will feel more than repaid for the time and energy spent upon it.

VI.

CAN CHANCE BUILD A WORLD?

BY REV. DR. J. COOPER.

The word Chance is the expression of our ignorance. For if we knew all the conditions involved in a phenomenon and could integrate them in their true relations, we would see that what seems fortuitous is as much subject to law as the ordinary sequences in nature. That there is an invariable sequence is involved in all the theory and applications of science. Agnosticism even shows that there must be a causal relation between its results and the influences which produced them. For to be a consistent agnostic can only arise from a man's being a fool, either naturally, or as the successful result of persevering effort. Unless a true causal relation be admitted, something more than mere sequence between events, such a regularity between them that we instinctively believe there is some necessary connection; the mind can neither have any grasp on external nature, nor depend upon conclusions from her phenomena. In order for scientific knowledge to be possible or physical investigation to yield any results, there must be uniformity in the hidden process of nature from whatever cause this may arise. For if one result followed a given manipulation at one time, and a different one on a second trial, and a third, fourth and fifth, each unlike, it would be folly to investigate nature who would thus mock the inquirer by a different and capricious answer to each question. So, whatever men may profess, be it the crudest agnosticism or the grossest materialism with chance for the generating principle, their actions belie their theory. For the only consistent agnosticism would go beyond even the extravagance of Kratylus,* who would not make an assertion, would not even speak, but

* Arist. Met. 1010, v. 13.

merely point the finger at what could be indicated in that way, and let the questioner judge for himself. The Greek agnostic who professed to know so little that he would assert nothing, showed that he understood what was said to him, and had the power to indicate that knowledge to another—which was a total surrender of his vaunted position. It would be difficult to be a consistent agnostic even as it is to deny design. For the modes of thought, and language which is the petrification thereof, are constituted on the principles of purpose and express this even in the act of attempting to disprove it.

Investigations into the doctrine of Chance have eliminated the element of uncertainty from the word; and hence the original signification has disappeared from science. For it has been found that those events which seemed most strictly fortuitous are amenable to the most rigorous mathematical calculation. While many eminent analysts have grappled with this subject and arrived at substantially the same results, yet the greatest of them, La Place, has treated it more profoundly than any other, and with the most definite results in his *Théorie Analytique des Probabilités*. The results of his thoroughgoing investigations establish the fact that those phenomena which have seemed most capricious are subject to precise enunciation and prediction, and therefore depend upon some fixed law, which in turn is the expression of an invariable causal sequence. This important discovery removes the doctrine of chance from the universe, and makes every event, however isolated and apparently strange, an integral part of a system which acts with perfect uniformity and effects its results as the product of an intelligent purpose.

But when agnosticism is driven from its long occupied fastness it takes refuge in a new application of the word Chance, as the fortuitous concurrence of events which so adapt themselves to each other after they have come together by pure accident—neither designed nor caused by themselves nor anything else—begin a development by adaptation, and finish by producing a universe, where all is so perfectly adjusted that

all the parts are reciprocally means and ends. Without particularly noticing at this stage the paralogism or sophism of those reasoners who surreptitiously introduce such words as concurrence, adaptation, development, life, growth—each of which involves purpose and excludes accident—it is proposed to examine the word Chance, or the principle which it expresses and as it has been understood by atheists from Lucretius to Clifford and Haeckel. The purpose is to see whether it is possible for the factor which chance represents to be a Demiurgos or world builder. To deal fairly with this word and with those who use it to designate the principle by which the universe has been formed, we must divest it entirely of every conception of design; whether immanent, or transcendent. For if any of this signification clings to this word it ceases at once to be what those who employ it understand it to mean. For it then reverses the meaning which the agnostic or atheist attaches to it, and involves the idea of purpose, working with selected means to accomplish some specific end. The inconsistency of such reasoners is glaring in the process they employ. They would have no intelligence in the construction of a universe, yet must subsidize intelligence in the explanation of that which has been formed. Moreover common experience teaches us that it requires greater power to conceive some new machine, construct it, set it to work and make it efficient for use, than it does to explain the structure and mode of action after it has been completed and its movements rendered plain by constant service. The real purpose of all who have employed chance as a factor seems to be to get rid of a personal God, of a transcendental creator, of design in nature. They would make the most complicated scheme that could be devised, far more intricate than any machinery that the most skilful master workmen ever constructed spring up automatically. There was no design, at least at its inception; but all its complicated parts created themselves, fell into their proper places by chance and all the subsequent movements so orderly and yet so profoundly intricate, are directed fortuitously.

Setting out with this design they advert to a primeval condition of things in which there was no organized matter, no worlds; and, of course, no inhabitants. Everything was in pure chaos. The materials of the universe were in a state of rarefaction greater than hydrogen gas; perfectly unorganized in their arrangement. Being in the highest degree subtle and rarefied they were of course repellent to each other. They could have no attraction, else they would not be, to the last extent, rarefied; or if they had, this tendency was entirely overcome by the force which held them apart. Here we encounter the first insurmountable difficulty to world building by any immanent power which the atoms could of themselves possess.

A change comes over this primeval condition of star dust, or incandescent gas, whose particles were so repulsive to each other that they kept apart as far as space would permit. For they, repulsive as they can be, form a truce, and agree, contrary to their nature, to come together, and all by the merest chance. This principle has more power than repulsion, than design which always works in line with the nature of things; whether in the case of man's industry or the development of the physical universe. Kingdon Clifford* knows all about this, and therefore can tell exactly how it was done: "Any particular molecule meets another, not exactly plump but a little on one side, &c." Now these molecules of star dust or incandescent gas "meet each other, not plump, but a little to one side," either by design or by chance. But why should they all meet each other "not plump, but a little to one side"? If acting purely by chance there is no reason that they should all meet each other in the same way. By the theory of permutation there are almost infinite chances that no considerable number should meet each other a "little to one side." If they acted fortuitously they must meet each other in every conceivable way, and so never could begin any concerted action. It is a gratuitous assumption that they should meet each other "a little to one side," and involves design at

* Essays, Vol. I., p. 194.

the very start. So we shall see in every stage of mechanical evolution that this principle is surreptitiously introduced.

But our veracious author means pure Chance. Yet if they met always "not plump, but a little to one side," this involves purpose. For no number of rencontres of an infinite number of particles, as there must be of the attenuated star dust, could ever produce concerted action, since any one diverse meet would derange all the rest. And if the particles always met in the same way, this, according to the analogy of our thought and action, must be by design. So if there was antecedent design, then of course a design of some sort—personal or impersonal. But let us grant our author's postulate, that the conjunction be by chance, and this understood in the sense used by Democritus, Lucretius and all reasoners who profess to reject design. If the molecules of star dust have no affinity, no previous adaptation, and the rencontre be purely accidental, we are prepared to deal with the postulate. If they have adaptation for each other, creating a tendency for a rencontre, then this adaptation or tendency removes the case from the domain of chance. For the quality by which these molecules are attracted together, or have an adaptation to coalesce rather than repel—which is their nature as shown by their extreme attenuation—must be accounted for. This fact must be accentuated in any discussion of the method by which the elements of matter first united. For substances which are very attenuated could not be in this condition unless they were repulsive to each other, or were held apart by some external force. For if they had by their constitution an attraction for each other, then their condition would have been one of aggregation; so that they never could have met each other obliquely in a casual rencontre—for they would never have been apart. But, for the sake of argument, and to make the premises entirely fair let us take two particles, wholly destitute of all appetency and motion in one direction, that is "not quite plump, but in an oblique and downward direction"; though here are more assumptions which should be disposed of before

the accidental rencontre can take place. For why should the molecules have motion? Did they give it to themselves? If so whence obtained, and (if possessed of it), why should it act in one direction rather than another? But if we stop to notice all the postulates surreptitiously introduced, we will never arrive at the accidental meeting of these two molecules. Grant then: 1. That they meet. 2. That their sides are all alike. 3. That their material is homogeneous. 4. That they always meet, "not plump, but a little to one side." 5. That their motion is invariably downward. 6. That while their repulsion for each other was so intense that they removed the widest possible distance apart, and were as attenuated as it is possible for matter to become, 7. That suddenly, of their own movement, purely automatically, with no external force, and no internal purpose, they moved toward each other and began to coalesce. But if all these diverse conditions be happily met there will still be an equal chance, at the least, that they will not meet in such a way as to secure union. There is one chance out of two that they will meet in the proper way, provided the possible methods of rencontre are limited to two. The likelihood in subsequent rencontres, provided the possibilities of combination be thus limited, will be represented by the formula

$$\frac{C}{2 \times 3 \times 4 \times 5 \times n}.$$

Now let a third molecule meet the two, and we will have $C/6$. that is to say there is one chance out of six that the three would meet in the same regular way. Then let a fourth molecule join the little system, and there is one chance out of twenty-four that this will occur in the way to produce order; and at the next the chance would be $\frac{1}{120}$. But the number of molecules which would have to unite by this process of chance would be absolutely innumerable; and unless they were all both equal sided and homogeneous, the difficulty would be still farther increased. For science tells us that those composing an inch of what we term solid material are more numerous than the human

mind can enumerate, or even conceive. These then not of a solid inch, but of a world, and not of our world, but of the solar system; and not of this system to which we belong, but of the countless systems in space—all the molecules comprising these *must come together by chance, yet invariably in the right way!* We grow dizzy in trying to grasp the numbers expressed by the possible permutations before these molecules could arrange themselves into a regular system. La Place, the most capable in this line of all mathematicians who have ever lived, may help us out. In treating of the bodies of our solar system in their concerted arrangement, and the possibility that such arrangements could have occurred by chance *hazard*, he says:—"En soumettant au calcul leur probabilité, on trouve qu' il ya a plu de deux cent mille millards, à parier contre un qu' ils ne sont point l' effect du hasard," etc. Here we have a number expressing the probability that the bodies of the solar system (after each several body had been integrated by the chance rencontres of innumerable molecules which had "met each other not plump, but all are of them a little to one side"), would arrange themselves as we find them. The chance that these, comparatively few, would fall into their proper places is expressed by the fraction $1/200,000,000,000,000$, a number which can indeed be indicated by figures, but cannot be grasped by the mind. Yet this is only an insignificant trifle compared with the number of permutations required by all the separate molecules making up the entire universe. These make the probability of chance as an integrating factor so infinitesimally small, that a line of digits extending from the earth to the farthest fixed star visible could not express it!

Granting to Professor Clifford that the first molecules all had the same motion at first, "not plump," i. e., directly toward each other, "but a little downwards" yet they did not persist in this exclusive direction after they became integrated into worlds. Their motions become many. Their arrangement complicated beyond the powers of human analysis to

* Expos. du Système du Monde I. II., p. 393.

express. Professor Clifford was a most distinguished mathematician, but he could not calculate the path of one of the bodies of the solar system affected by only three motions. No one as yet has been able to express by the utmost resources of the calculus the path of the body though he has the model, and can view its movements at his leisure. Nay more. The motions of the bodies of the major planets of the solar system are not 3 only, but 43; and to these must be added hundreds, perhaps thousands, of others occasioned by the interaction of the sun, planets, and asteroids on each other; movements so intricate, so numerous and so small that they entirely transcend our powers of thought. But somehow—Clifford and those of his way of thinking say by chance—the single downward sidewise motion of the original molecules integrated them into bodies obeying these innumerable and inconceivably intricate movements and which sweep grandly on from age to age. Yet chance, without any purpose and without any mind, by the accidental rencontre of the molecules of matter, has done all this; has effected more than the greatest scientists of the world can express in symbols or conceive in thought. There we have a verification of the paradox: The unbeliever believes more than the believer! "I had rather," says Bacon* "believe all the fables in the Legend, and the Talmud, and the Alcoran, than that this universal frame is without a mind."

But, says the advocate of Chance: The molecules have had an eternity of duration in which to arrange themselves. Time is a very convenient condition when you let out contracts in world building; and the opponents of the Theistic system appear to think they can do anything by their methods provided they are allowed enough time for experimenting. Yet time is a vacuum which, while it contains an incalculable amount has no power of its own to effect anything. It does not interfere with the action of mind or matter; either as a hindering force or as an assistant. It is wholly neutral in its effects; or, rather, it has no effect whatever. Therefore unless the actors

* Essays, XVI.: of Atheism.

themselves or their forces are equal to their work it will remain undone forever since time will not do it for them. Perhaps there is no corner of absurdity where paralogisms and sophisms swarm in greater numbers than where the geologist or evolutionist assumes to himself an unlimited time for the development of his system. They seem to forget wholly that there must be a force, and an actor to apply it, working at each successive moment and effecting some progress, else the world will never be built; or the species change from one thing to another which must necessarily be as different as it is possible for two things to be which are *in rerum natura*. The reasoning of the geologist and evolutionist is as hazy—when they speculate about “adaptation” and “selection”—which are *epithet arguments*, and are really a begging of the whole question—as the vista of unmeasured time and space through which they look. But grant them all the time they wish, yet unless the principle on which they proceed is effective in its own right, *propria vigore*, and shows a tendency by what we see it do in measured periods, to effect the purpose they claim, it is a most glaring fallacy to foist it upon us as a satisfactory explanation of the building of a world; or the evolutions from the same protoplasms of creatures which have nothing in common as to shape, function, or habitat, *e. g.*, octopus and humming bird. For there can be nothing evolved by time. That there is nothing in the effect which was not in the cause is a principle as old as philosophy, and as firm as a mathematical axiom. Hence there was as much intelligence, power, adaptation, design in the protoplasm, in Clifford’s dancing particles which move first—not *contra*, but somewhat crab fashion, and then *dos a dos*—before they effect a permanent congress: as much of all these qualities as in the bright consummate flower of a Plato or a Pascal. For time, no matter how long continued could contribute nothing to the process. This fact is conveniently lost sight of by our scientific friends who build their world castles in the expanse of time; without foundation, without architects’ plan, without any end in view;

and of course without workmen. And why not, we may well ask? For will not the star dust do everything provided you give this master workman a sufficiently long day for his contract? Let him go to work, shall we say with the purpose to accomplish something? But here already is design disclosing itself. The molecules must not have this guide for their action. But unless they have appetency for each other they will not coalesce. This appetency however shows that they have a purpose or inclination to do one thing rather than another. This however means choice, even when confined to the rencontre of two. For they might accidentally get together. But without at least having the end in view of uniting rather than staying apart, there would be quite as much reason for them to turn their backs on each other, *dos a dos*, forever as their faces for a fructifying embrace. But admit that the difficulties in the way of the banns have been removed, and the two molecules are in a cordial embrace. Still two little molecules cannot effect much by themselves. Being ultimate particles they have no organs, no structure, and can beget nothing. For, be it remembered, they cannot impart to others what they do not themselves possess. They cannot create any material or force. They therefore cannot develop any growth or magnitude except by accretion from without. If, therefore, they were only two separate molecules before they came together, they will be nothing more than a double molecule, just twice the size that each one was before. But let another come near by the merest accident in its wanderings at loose ends in space, and let this have the proper internal nature and external structure so that it can unite with the other two.

Then there will be $\frac{1}{1 \times 2 \times 3}$ equal to one chance in six or five to one on their uniting. As we ascend in the table of permutations the number of chances rises with marvelous rapidity, 23 to 1; 119 to 1; 719 to 1—against there being any combination. Considering the number of molecules in the universe,

nothing short of an eternity would be sufficient to enable them to make trial rencontres.

Again, they must have attraction rather than repulsion, else they would not come together. Hence how often soever they met, "not plump, but a little to one side" in their casual rencontres, they would repel each other and never coalesce. They must have chemical affinity rather than aversion, else they would try to escape when chance brought them together. Moreover, these qualities must have been in existence before, only waiting for the rencontre in order to evolve themselves out of a chaos into an order. The process, however, is but just begun. Six molecules have come together, though there were at least 719 chances to one that they would not meet in the right way to form a union. Here we must notice a fact vital to this method of cosmogeny. This goes on the principle that in all the rencontres which are possible chance invariably lights upon the only one that will effect a union. It is marvellous that when there are 5 chances to 1, 23 to 1, 119 to 1, 719 to 1 the outcome of the purest chance was the only one that could secure a successful issue. This looks to plain common sense so much like design that if the agnostic or evolutionist did not say such a thing was impossible and unworthy of a man of science we would be compelled to think that there was some preconcerted plan to impose upon us. As* the Abbé Galiani told Baron D'Holbach at one of their infidel seances: "If I gamed in your house with a guest who had no more skill than I, yet he invariably beat me in the game, I would—though reluctantly, since the robbery took place under your roof—conclude that the dice were loaded. The materials and laws of nature are the dice with which chance has to play. Hence they must be loaded, because the result of the game is constant." For, as the Abbé said, Chance always wins the game; not up to the sixth, but to the *n*th throw. It never fails once. No player at Hamburg or Monte Carlo is so absolutely sure of winning the game. No plan of earthly

* Baron D'Holbach reproved by the Abbé Galiani.

wisdom so sure of a successful issue. No scientific investigation; no mathematical calculation where the terms are fixed, the instruments the best that can be made, and the reasoning most logical—that is not subject to some error; if for no other reason from the influence of the personal equation. And it is well for chance that this is so, since one failure out of the n th number of rencontres among the molecules would not only vitiate the whole process, but require the entire work to begin again from the first attempt at meeting. This is a fact which has never been noticed, though indispensable to the success of chance. Possibly it has not escaped the scrutiny of the advocates; but if so, has been quietly ignored. But we could scarcely expect them to overturn the foundation on which they must stand. Yet why the enemies of this absurd system have not adverted to this fatal weakness is marvelous. For the very first failure to integrate the molecules would introduce a disorder which would reverse the whole process achieved thus far. Grant that by some lucky fortune chance has in the n th number of throws, or rencontres, formed a perfect system; quite as perfect as though it had been thought out by a perfect designer. Though the cosmogeny were perfect thus far, yet the disturbing error will at once throw the whole into confusion.* For it is impossible for chance as a principle to rectify itself. So we cannot conceive of a chaotic mass changing into an orderly system, directed by intelligence. There are, as we have seen, two hundred thousand billions of chances *against*, to one *for*, the solar system arranging itself in such perfect order as we find it, and which, according to the competent authority quoted above, will move on regularly forever. Now had any one of the astounding number of rencontres introduced a wrong collocation, our system would never have arranged itself; or if it had in some way that even an evolutionist cannot tell, it would now be unstable and again on the high road to disintegration. But much work had to be done

* Aristot. Met., 989, § 9 διὸ τὸ μὴ πεφύκεναι τῷ τυχόντι μηγνοθαῖ τὸ τυχόν.
κ. τ. λ.

by the master workman Chance with his supply of molecules before they grew to be earths and suns. A number of rencontres—all lucky—had to occur between the molecules, so much more numerous than the contingencies involved in forming our solar system that those necessary for this work have no appreciable relation to them.

We see the effect which a particle of dirt has on the movement of the most perfect watch. This will not rectify its own movement because there is no immanent intelligence among the works to expel the intruder and re-commence the movement which had been temporarily stopped by its presence. But suppose it had been not a foreign body, but one of the wheels which was in the wrong place, or reversed in its action. Nothing but the removal of the obstacle and its hostile force, and the introduction of those fitted for the place will permit the resumption of the movement. The watch cannot do this itself. All that it can do is in the way of self-destruction by a continued movement through which the wrong wheel will either wreck the rest of the system or cause it to stop altogether. There must be a transcendent personal intelligence which interferes, removes the offender and substitutes another in its place. But the molecules which have already arranged themselves must go on in their disordered state reversing their previous harmonious action, until they are reduced again to their primitive chaos. For there is no transcendent power, according to evolution, which might be able to substitute the proper molecule at any point. Chance could not do this because it must act blindly, and could know neither the error nor the means of its rectification. This requires a superintending intelligence both to see wherein the movement was wrong, and to control all the parts with reference to a specific purpose. Pure chance when once balked would have to begin all over, where in some one of the countless rencontres of molecules a single wrong one occurred. And this could not be avoided unless provision was made to eliminate chance from the system altogether. For if the throw of the dice must

always be made in a certain way, and if a false throw never occurred, this would be possible only on the supposition that the hazard was superintended by intelligence to such degree that error was impossible. For the likelihood, as we have seen at each successive throw of an error is c/n and in six the probability will be 719 to 1; and this increases almost beyond enumeration as we ascend. To avoid this possibility would require infinite intelligence to arrange a system in such a perfect way that either no false rencontre should be made, or if there was, there should be enough of knowledge and power wielded by it to secure immunity from further failure by the rectification of the error. For it is demonstrably sure that no pure chance concurrence of atoms could go on indefinitely without some wrong rencontre occurring. And the instant one did occur the retrograde action would begin, which must continue, unless there be an interposition outside of chance to stay the disorder. Without such interposition by an entirely different principle the work of dissolution would necessarily go on till chaos was reached again. Thus the process might be repeated forever, beginning at the start, and continuing so long as a happy throw of the dice prevented the introduction of a disturbing element; but must then stop without any power to progress further because the mistake could not rectify itself. It is barely conceivable that such a number of rencontres as La Place says is requisite to render the solar system possible should have occurred. But as the number must be increased beyond all power of enumeration in order to effect the concurrence from Clifford's two molecules, and ending with an infinite universe, this becomes mathematically impossible since one false rencontre reverses all progress.

That such a reverse should not occur would be more miraculous, more contrary to scientific experience, to the conceptions of mind expressed in language, as well as the results of the most rigorous analysis, than any event claimed as miraculous in the history of the world. A false rencontre must necessarily occur somewhere unless this be provided against by an absolute

necessity or unerring wisdom—which are the antithesis of chance—and would preclude the method altogether. There is, therefore, no principle in formal logic or pure mathematics which is more demonstrably certain than that chance is an impossible architect in world building. For if it were the case that this produced an infinite number of rencontres which were of the sort to secure coalescence and growth, this must be by virtue of the fact that this principle was subject to some power, immanent or transcendent, which compelled it to act in a way which is really purposive. So that the attempt to use this principle tacitly assures a knowledge somewhere, a purpose in the nature of things, which subverts the doctrine of chance itself. And that this is the effect is plain from the assumptions constantly made and necessary to the employment of such a principle. For we see that chance which cannot be permitted to act but in one way, and which always produces a definite result, has lost its distinctive character. It works with as much forethought, coupled with as much design in achieving its purpose, as the highest intelligence. For no intelligence, even if it be omniscient, can do more than design that which never fails nor can fail. And no power, not even omnipotent, can do more than achieve a plan which is so perfect that it will work on without interruption forever, and prove superior—if interruption did occur, as in the case of a false rencontre—to all obstacles by their removal or rectification.

In this way we see that chance is surreptitiously invested with all the attributes of intelligence, design and power; with these acting in a regular way and achieving a definite result. Thus again, by the legitimate consequences of the theory of those who strive to make this, the builder of the universe, we see that it is in reality another principle which they have foisted in under a misleading name.

But still farther: As to the molecules of matter themselves, unless they had a previous adaptation to each other they would not unite when they met. They might be endowed with mo-

tion, but unless it was of some constant kind they might come together at one moment, but the next be driven asunder. Their inner nature might be such as to unite mechanically, but without the mysterious power of life they would not grow by simple union or intermingling. Their motion itself cannot be assumed unless there were force to generate it. For the existence of matter does not involve power to move it. And after generated it must be applied in some definite way, else the molecules moving at haphazard, even though they met one moment, they would be separated the next. And if they have an affinity so as to hold them when they meet, this must be by a previous adaptation. Hence there can be no adaptation of one thing to another so as to cause it to act in one way rather than another, either with reference to itself exclusively, or in common with others, unless there be a knowledge to bestow such constitution and foresee the effect which the several qualities would have on each other.

There is intelligence in the universe sufficient to elaborate and superintend the infinitely complicated scheme of the cosmos. So there is in the rational part of the creation to comprehend in a constantly expanding degree the facts of the system and the laws according to which it has been formed and is governed. This knowledge will continue to grow constantly and without end. Doubtless there is enough still to be known to occupy the industry and arouse the inquisitiveness of men for all the ages of the future. The subjective and objective are correlative to each other. The one adapted to know, the other to be known. But we must notice that *natura naturans*, so far as regards the formation of the material world, is a closed record. There is nothing new either in the materials, the growth, the structure, or the functions of external nature. The universe, so far as our powers of sense can reach, so far as they may be assisted by future discoverers in science by the aid of human invention, is a completed work. "When it was evening and it was morning—

day sixth,"* the Supreme Architect rested from all his labors with which we are acquainted. It is true that man is carrying on this work as the viceregent of this Divinity on earth. The facts of man's intellectual progress, his growth of character, multiply in number and enlarge in importance constantly. But what relates to the development of man by himself, the creation of character by his independent personality, may be set aside in our present inquiry. There can be no doubt that all such growth in mind and moral character is a veritable creation. For what a man does by virtue of his own purpose, and at the behest of his own freedom, is distinct from the work of the Divine Creator. But as regards the material world—its forces, functions, and their laws—it has not been increased since the universe began, whether in its primordial state of particles of gas, or as a solid globe filled with sentient creatures and controlled by the intelligence of man. In whatever form the cosmos existed, whether as molecules fitting in space, or as globes becoming ready for the occupancy and control of intelligent creatures, there was as much material force then as now—at one time as another. In like manner, whatever intelligence is now shown in the control of the world, in the construction of new appliances for the growth of knowledge and the progress of man, existed then. Is there intelligence, forethought, adaptation, purpose in the material world, or in man's power to control and utilize its forces at the present time? If so, there was also then, the same potentiality, on any system of naturalism as there is now, or shall be to the end of the world. For as it could not spring from nothing there must be, on the grossest interpretation of evolution, in the germ all that is contained in the final product. For neither chance nor evolution can create something out of nothing. All that the most advanced materialist ever dared claim is that the materials and forces, which have existed from eternity, are arranged and developed according to their theory. It is true this is all they have formally claimed, and all that fair dealing

* Gen. II., Hebrew.

with their theories will allow them. But they surreptitiously introduce, from somewhere, intelligence, design, adaptation, choice of means; and with such additions to their stock they can begin very nicely their process of world building, and the integration of materials by organic forces. Then, with the further addition, from nowhere, of life, the work of evolution can go on apace. Yet if the world was to be made by chance operating purely on molecules of matter it would be demonstrably impossible, as we have seen, to evolve any structure which required so great a multitude of parts as even the smallest body that is appreciable by the senses would require. Therefore, chance as a world builder is to be utterly excluded from science; and all the fine spun theories from Democritus the Greek, Lucretius the Roman and Clifford the Anglo-Saxon, the three representatives of atheism in western thought, are found to be impossible and absurd.

Now, as we have seen, there must be intelligence, purpose, will, adaptation, employed in any organic arrangement and evolution of primordial materials into organic structures. Our friends who profess to be so strictly scientific that they will believe nothing which they cannot prove, and ask for nothing except sufficient time for evolution to do its work, yet are compelled to employ as many forces, and borrow as many tools from somewhere as those who believe in a transcendent creator require for their system of world building. The chief, if not the only difference, is that the evolutionist who works through chance, rejects a personal agent and introduces us to a universe which makes itself, formulates and executes its own laws. This demands something without precedent in human experience, and contradictory to all our methods of thought. We see evidence of will, purpose, adaptation to an end, all around us. These properties are now existing, and their presence made known by their acts. Not only are their doings manifest both objectively and subjectively, but the knowledge which they involve, and is necessary to apply them, must also exist somewhere. If it did not their constitution

and modes of action could not be known nor applied. The problem of science is to discover the materials, forces, and laws, so that as Schleiermacher has well expressed the truth: "The content of logic, *i. e.*, the expression of human thought through language—shall equal the content of nature." This is in itself an endless task; but the progress toward this goal, which can never be reached, is increasing in a geometrical ratio. All the knowledge now gained and all that shall be the immeasurable future, exists somewhere potentially, and has, on the principles of materialism forever. For if no force is ever created or lost, however much it may be changed or transferred by evolution, this must have existed coeval with the molecules which science must have as material on which to work. Hence, whatever intelligence there is now in the world—and naturalists think they have a great deal—whatever is necessary to the building up of science as it now exists or as it shall be in the future ages—this existed potentially from the beginning; or if there was no beginning then from eternity. For this knowledge which is the embodiment of the facts must have existed with them; either immanent or transcendent, just as is the case now. The whole amount of knowledge contained in reality, whether it be embodied in its subject, or apart from it as the expression of the same, existed as long as the reality. So now the essential science which displays itself by activity and is apprehensible by our intellects when we have become acquainted with the facts of nature and the laws according to which they act—this science, exists somewhere. For it is bound up in material nature and the intellect which apprehends it; masters it by knowing its methods and applying them to actual phenomena. A part of this is already embraced in the systematized knowledge of the world. Much the larger part is still hidden awaiting discovery by human sagacity and to be embodied into systems of human knowledge. But it is not created by the mind which discovers it, any more than America was created because Columbus sighted its coasts. Herein Kant and his followers, able though they be, are

guilty of a paralogism when they represent the mind as impressing its forms, its categories upon things, and therefore making the world what each man's representation shows it to be. The absurdity of this becomes manifest when we reflect upon the consequences of this theory. For there would be as many worlds as there are men, and the representation of a Jasper as true as that of La Place. The categories of Aristotle, of Kant, or of Ampère are true, provided they agree with the facts of nature. But nature is not exactly what the learned at any time represent her to be, else the sciences could make no progress. For nature is constant, and those who would become acquainted with her truths must accommodate their ways of thinking to her reality. The material reality is the body, of which knowledge is the soul. The spirit is the immaterial energy which makes matter its instrument. Accordingly we say that the knowledge existed somewhere, and in some mode from the beginning of the material at least; and will continue unchanged the same; embracing all changes or rather providing for them before they begin, and will continue this sovereignty, this executive power in enforcing the laws of nature while there is any nature remaining.

This fact being demonstrably clear, it follows that the knowledge, the intellect, the design, the adaptation—whatever is involved in the formation of the universe—existed from the very inception. Nay rather, as Aristotle* so well says, *τὸ κινοῦν* must antedate *τὸ κινοῦμενον*: the mover must precede the thing moved and be eternal. There was as much of these qualities then somewhere in existence as there is now, or ever will be. They existed separate, in a personality antedating the material organism which involved them in its constitution; or the substance of which the *world to be* contained them in immanence. One of these suppositions is unavoidable. This fact should not be lost sight of, and should be held up before the face of evolution, and its advocates compelled to look upon it *nolens volens*. For our present purpose it

* *Metaph.*, XI., VIII., 2. 1073: *τὸ κινοῦν ίδιον καὶ πρότερον τοῦ ἀκίνοντος.*

does not matter in the least whether these qualities are immanent or transcendent, or both—which is the proper way of viewing the subject. But it is indispensable if we reason from analogy, if we try to penetrate the *unseen* by help of the lenses through which we have always viewed the *seen*, that the work of creation or evolution be effected by a personality. For, as far as we have seen, there is no work done without the intervention, directly or indirectly, of a personal agent. And the more completed the machinery, the more it is made to work automatically, *e. g.*, the spinning jenny or the printing press; and the further the human instrumentality is removed out of sight, the more does it prove the sovereign and paramount control by personal agency both in its conception and execution.

All this, however, is conveniently ignored by the advocates of chance or of mechanical evolution. Both begin with nothing but material in its primordial state. The other factors, which are quite as necessary, are created out of nothing, or are all immanent in the matter. But in complete disregard of all analogy derived from human industry, these begin and continue their work until there is a universe which had no maker; moved by forces which had no originator; governed by laws which had no enactor; accomplishing work of infinite complexity, but without any purpose, and aiming at no end. For this cosmos, though unlimited in its extent and inconceivable by the utmost powers of the human intellect in its complexity, is evolved out of nothing, so far as all the causes recognized by philosophy are concerned, except the bare material in molecular chaos. Hence there is neither formal cause—though this is involved in every architectural plan for construction—nor efficient, since there is no master workman nor laborers to do his bidding, and, of course, no final cause. For if we admit teleology, the occupation of the evolutionist with his coadjutor chance is gone. Still these causes are all necessarily involved in every construction, material or mental. They therefore, if we reason according to the principle *Homo*

Mensura, and the evolutionist, who can of necessity have no other than human experience and deductions therefrom, must admit that these causes were present in some method of existence or mode of action, quite as much at the beginning as at any subsequent period of the work. So it is undeniably true on the principle of evolution, and equally demanded as a silent partner of chance, that whatever is contained in the effect was present in the cause. And that these factors were present in the primordial substance is proved by the fact that they are all manifestly active at this time in the natural world. For if the extreme view of Kant and Schopenhauer be taken that it is the mind that puts these conceptions into external nature, and molds reality according to its own form, then there must have been a mind possessed of intelligence, design, etc., present at the beginning of evolution to stamp these qualities on the cosmos at its birth. They are, *a fortiori*, present, provided there be any reality, because they fashion it into organisms and formulate laws for the government. For surely without them the primordial elements had remained in their chaotic state forever.

It is often objected to the theist and the teleologist that they make unwarranted assumptions. For they find it necessary to postulate design when they see evidence of it on every hand, and a maker as the only possible ground for a universe which has come into existence in some way. For all analogy teaches that there must be a maker when there is an accurate organism which could not have come into existence without adaptation of parts, and a designer where there is any structure which gives proof of choice in the selection of means to effect ends. This is no violent assumption. It is what we do continually, when we estimate human industry in the language of daily life, or account for conduct rigorously in a court of justice. It is the only means we have for analyzing a complicated machine or in accounting for a scientific fact, and is indispensable for all inventors of new apparatus or improvements of what is old. When we look at the condition of human

experience we find that such an assumption obtains everywhere. We always proceed upon the principle that the effect must be potentially in the cause, else there could be no effect. So we are justified in postulating that the intelligence, foresight, design, adaptation of means to ends, were involved in the creation of the world since we find unmistakable evidences of them in the completed product. For these undoubtedly are operative now, even on the supposition that the mind impresses them as forms or categories on the material which it grasps by the senses. And we should not fail to observe that these predicates have an existence, if nowhere else than in the mind which employs them, whether they have an actual counterpart in external nature or not. If they have no existence save in the mind which formulates them, we have a drastic argument against those who deny a transcendental cause. For the idealist who would admit no existence save the spiritual must *ex necessitate rei* admit that this is a personality. For spiritual qualities cannot exist apart from an individual, rational agent who employs them. And hence, if there be no such attributes or categories in things of external nature, or if there be no external nature, then *a fortiori* the spirituality or personality in which they exist, and through which they operate, must have an independent existence. So out of their own mouths will we convict the evolutionist of inconsistency in denying that there are such attributes, save as immanent in matter. But the truth on which the present contention rests is that these attributes existed somewhere, and in some mode in concord with the molecules of matter as soon as they had any existence, and were operative through it as an instrument by which phenomenal results could be achieved. And, we repeat, it makes not the least difference whether these attributes were immanent or transcendent, personal or impersonal, so far as their existence and instrumentality in evolving the universe is concerned. So it becomes demonstrably clear that the evolutionist or the advocate of chance makes as many, and more violent, assumptions before he can begin

his work of cosmogeny than the most advanced theist. We have the paradox: The unbeliever believes more than the most simple minded believer! The difference between him and the theist is that the latter evolves the world in strict analogy to the industry of man, according to anthropomorphism—the only standard which we have of measurement—while the evolutionist surreptitiously invokes the aid of all these same forces, but working in an unheard of way, a way that has no parallel either in human action or logical conception.

Doubt has claimed too much, has vaunted its own freedom from assumptions, its dependence on fact exclusively, until it has worked itself up to the conviction that its methods are infallible, the results of pure science. It has accused the theist of groundless assumptions in proof of an obsolete belief until the thoughtless world has concluded that he has no rational ground on which to stand, that his only basis for the position of teleology is a blind and unreasoning faith whose strength is necessarily in direct proportion to its irrationality. The design of this contention has been to show that the theist does not make a single assumption that is not quietly and surreptitiously employed by the most advanced materialist. For neither can get along without intelligence, design, adaptation of means to ends, and a personal agent to employ these factors. Such is certainly the fact in every conceivable case of human experience. This personality must be either immanent or transcendent. But a force which can direct matter according to design must be transcendent to the senses, that is, different from the instrument it uses whether it acts *ab intra* or *ab extra*. Moreover, it must be somewhere within the circuit of infinite space, since there is no place outside. Hence it is a useless distinction in regard to an infinite and omnipresent being who must, according to finite conception, exist both ways, but, no doubt, in an absolute sense, beyond our finite reach, though the maker of a balloon who ascends in it furnishes at least an analogy of the mode.

Chance then being ruled out of consideration as a factor

either of creation or evolution, it remains to say a few words as to the rational method by which we may conceive the world to have developed from the primordial molecule or star dust, in which the material of our cosmos once existed.

Since intelligence, design and adaptation are necessary conditions of any organic growth or scientific evolution, they must be assumed in any rational system. And when they are admitted the process is substantially the same, no matter what name it bears. The process of development by which higher and more perfect forms are evolved out of the lower, is the order of human industry in everything. Progress is the watchword of human nature, and is the basis of our education, our work and our growth in character. This, however, is not effected spontaneously or blindly, but by constant effort directed by thoughtful purpose. This is the only way by which we can make improvements either in ourselves or in external nature. Things do not become good, and tend constantly toward that which is better, save by sedulous effort guided by necessary vigilance. By such means the character of man, the minister of nature, is elevated. He possesses thought—*the thinking-reed*—which makes him superior to the residue of creation. He has a conscience which approves the right and condemns the wrong, and by following its monitions he can elevate himself without limitation. The world is put in his charge, and through his wisdom shown by the adaptation of means to ends he can improve every creature endowed with life and utilize every material force for the betterment of himself and all other things which have a capacity to be employed by his superior intelligence. It is not by the survival of the fittest as the result of chance, or of nature's unaided processes that there is evolution and ascent. The coarser, the more gross and brutal have more capacity in the struggle for existence than the beautiful, the elegant and the useful. But the coarser organisms, especially if endowed with life, are capable of improvement if superintended by power under the direction of intelligence. The wild products of the earth, its animals,

fruits and flowers, are capable of indefinite improvement when superintended by man's wisdom. But the same, be it rose or apple, corn or fig, horse or sheep, after they have been raised to their highest pitch of excellence, deteriorate and relapse into their well-nigh worthless primitive condition—where they were originally found—when bereft of this superior care. The relapsing process begins at once, as soon as the care is withdrawn, and continues uninterruptedly till the lowest point where the species can exist is reached. Hence, if analogy is any means of passing from the known to the unknown, then in human action, in its influence upon all nature, we see an exact transcript of the Divine agency in evolution. But this doctrine by itself means nothing. For things do not evolve, or develop, without some force acting on the material and directed by a purpose that can control this force. In the effort to get rid of a personal God as the creator and governor of the universe every violent and unwarranted postulate has been subsidized. The plainest facts of daily experience have been ignored. The presence of design in nature has been denied by those who showed their purpose in pushing their theories to the utmost verge of possibility, and so by their conduct perpetually denied their theory. There is design displayed by their action as certain as the action itself. But there can be nothing in the effect which was not contained in the original cause. Therefore there was design in the first movement which brought the molecules of matter together.

Again, to get rid of specific creation, the protoplasm has been called to develop, from identically the same substance, the most diverse species—and this without either intelligence or purpose—by an adaptation of molecules to each other differentiating into creatures most unlike. In this way the same causes operating upon the same molecules would be followed by different effects, and so destroy the uniformity of nature. Thus the same thing becomes anything whatever by the process of natural selection, which, if it means anything, would consist in objects choosing each other because of their possessing

a like quality or affinity. This is assumed when the purpose of the author is to teach the "survival of the fittest," but is quietly ignored when it is found that opposite and repulsive qualities tend to a healthier and more vigorous offspring. Moreover, the origin of species is maintained in the face of well-known facts demonstrating that there can be no union between opposite species, either in fauna or flora, without producing a monster as an offspring. This we know cannot propagate itself even when under man's most sedulous direction; but it can do so forthwith without assistance, provided a sufficiently long time be permitted for differentiation! Thus a process which not only shows no tendency in a given direction, but precisely the opposite, during the time it can be observed and abetted by intelligence, reverses the mode of procedure when there is no intelligence or purpose to achieve any result, and thus acts contrary to that constancy of nature which is proved by the widest possible induction and which is the *a priori* condition of induction and the basis of all scientific knowledge.

The result of the effort to expel intelligence from the universe is that the advocates of evolution as a self-sufficient factor for cosmogeny have shown that they themselves are destitute of this intelligence; and their persistent efforts to prove that there is no design in nature, have excluded themselves *ipso facto* from any share in its workings. They are, therefore, the only illustration of the working of chance which effects its results without any purpose, without any energy to work, without instrument to apply force, or provision to achieve anything. The outcome of such a principle, when exposed in its actual working is its own condemnation; and those who by elaborating such a theory profess themselves to be wise, have insured their own conviction of being fools!

It was wittily and mockingly said by Voltaire: "If we had no God we would be compelled to make one." Those who attempt to exclude a God of reason and faith from the universe, which in every part of space and each moment of

time attest His presence, have to create another in His place. This is Chance: working contrary to all human experience; working without any of the means which human industry compels us to employ if we effect anything. This god has no intelligence to comprehend what is to be done; no design to adapt means to ends; no will to execute a purpose, if he had one, and no end in view as the result of all his work. This be thy god, O science of Evolution by Chance, which has brought the mind of man out of Egyptian darkness, and by the aid of Lueretius, Clifford and Haeckel, as man-midwives, has delivered a universe from the womb of chaos!

VII.

EDITORIAL DEPARTMENT.

DR. RICHARD AND THE REFORMED CHURCH.

Dr. Richard, of Gettysburg, has done us the honor of devoting thirty-six pages of the July number of the *Lutheran Quarterly* to a reply to our strictures, in the January number of this REVIEW, on his articles, published in the *Lutheran Observer* about a year ago, on *The Distinguishing Doctrine of Lutheranism*. The honor, however, may hardly be considered a compliment. The reply is written in a tone that betrays some soreness of feeling rather than the calmness of the great scholar. It lacks at least that *suaviter in modo* which one is accustomed to look for in modern theological writings. And we have some suspicion, too, as to the cause of this apparent displeasure of the writer. He was engaged in a quarrel with brethren of his own church, who are not always disposed to accept his theories without questioning; and our strictures on some of his views may have seemed to be an unwarranted interference in his quarrel. Besides, if these strictures are just, they will spoil for him a fine theological conceit, which, being in the nature of a new discovery, must be very dear to him. Hence this feeling of soreness, and these often undisguised expressions of contempt for the editor of the *REFORMED CHURCH REVIEW*; while his pretensions to superior learning may be considered as something quite natural with him. These are, however, matters of taste, in regard to which every one must be left to his own sense of propriety. We shall, therefore, not take them seriously to heart; and we shall try in this respect not to follow the example of our critic. Our readers will discover that we have not been crushed by our critic's wonderful performance.

Dr. Richard's contention in the *Lutheran Observer* was,

however, not purely a Lutheran affair. It touched the Reformed Church as well as the Lutheran; for in his effort to convince his brethren that the Lutheran doctrine of the Lord's supper is not the *distinguishing doctrine* of the Lutheran Church, separating it from other denominations of Protestantism, as has generally been supposed, he virtually declared the Lutheran Church to be the whole of Protestantism, and denied to the Reformed Churches the possession of any right or true doctrine of justification by faith. He set up the theory that the doctrine of predestination which he attributes to all the Reformed Churches alike, so vitiates and perverts the thinking of Reformed theologians that their doctrine of justification must be totally wrong, supposing, of course, that the Lutheran doctrine is totally right. This position, if it were well taken, would in fact put the Reformed Churches out of the pale of Protestantism, if not of Christianity itself. Justification by faith in Christ has always been held to be the material principle of Protestantism, being supposed to be equally common to all its branches, the Reformed no less than the Lutheran. There might be minor differences in the way of defining and setting it forth, but these have not been believed to imply any *specific* difference in the two leading Protestant denominations. But now comes Dr. Richard and contends that the Reformed doctrine of justification differs so essentially and radically from the Lutheran doctrine that it must, in the nature of the case, be unsound and unchristian; and that this difference results from the assumed fact that the Reformed Church makes predestination to be the principle of Christianity.

In opposition to this contention we undertook to show that if the doctrine of predestination be incompatible with a true and Christian doctrine of justification, then the Lutheran Church must suffer no less than the Reformed; for her leading Reformers and theologians, in the time of the Reformation, and later, were as thoroughly committed to the doctrine of predestination as were any of the Reformed. Luther, as

is abundantly evident from his tract against Erasmus, *De Servo Arbitrio*, was as much of a predestinarian as was Calvin. The same is true of other Lutherans; and the doctrine, in its positive form of *election*, which, however, implies the negative form of *reprobation*, has even found a place in the *Form of Concord*, which forms the ultimate confessional standard of the Lutheran Church. Therefore, we asked, if Luther could be a predestinarian, and utterly deny the freedom of the human will, making God's will the sole ultimate causality in human action, and yet hold a sound doctrine of justification by faith, then why could not Dr. Hodge, for example, do so, too? This reasoning seems to have affected Dr. Richard quite considerably, and he calls it "plausible." But what does he do to break its force? He offers a lengthy quotation from Dr. Hodge in which the latter stoutly affirms his predestinarianism! Why, nobody ever disputed that. But the question we raised was, How could Luther be sound on the doctrine of justification with *his* predestinarianism, and why could Hodge not be sound with *his* predestinarianism? Anyway, we believe that, as a matter of fact, Hodge's theory of justification by faith differs little from that of Luther, and of the Lutherans generally in the time of the Reformation. It rests, we believe, upon the same presuppositions, namely, the doctrines of the fall and of total depravity, and the doctrine of a juridical atonement, and implies the same forensic theory of an imputation of the righteousness of Christ to the believing sinner as the ground of his justification.

Dr. Richard, indeed, admits that the Reformed doctrine of justification is usually expressed in the same terms as the Lutheran. But he contends that the use of the same language does not imply a sameness of sense. It must be admitted, of course, that this may sometimes be the case. Two persons, or two parties, *may* say the same thing, and yet not intend the same thought. The only question is whether this was the case in the matter now under consideration. If it was, then the

fact is proof of an astounding degree of astuteness and cunning on the one side, and of a like degree of dulness and stupidity on the other side. At any rate, the one party so craftily practiced its deceit that the other party never suspected any deceit. But Dr. Richard has now discovered that there was, in fact, a great deal of deception, and that the Reformed theologians did not, and could not, hold the true and orthodox doctrine of justification because, forsooth, they made the doctrine of predestination central in their theological systems. Luther, indeed, was a predestinarian as extreme and radical as Calvin himself; but then he did not hold his predestinarianism quite in the same way; he held it in subordination to his solifidianism, while Calvin and the Reformed subordinated the doctrine of justification to the doctrine of the decrees. With Luther the doctrine of justification by faith was fundamental and central; with Calvin and the rest of the Reformed the doctrine of predestination held this place of centrality. But this makes all the difference in the world. Luther's doctrine of justification was correct in *spite* of his predestinarianism, while Calvin's was wrong *because* of his predestinarianism. This, we say, is a new discovery. In the time of the Reformation at least nobody thought of it. In modern times it has often been pointed out that Calvin's doctrine of election, if consistently held, would be hostile to his own doctrine of the church and of the sacraments; but it has remained for Dr. Richard and a few German theologians to make the discovery that he did not hold any true doctrine of justification. Luther never charged Calvin with putting a wrong emphasis on the doctrine of predestination, and Calvin found no fault with Luther for the stress which he laid upon justification by faith. The probability is that Calvin would have characterized these notions all together as *mera nugamenta*.

We are willing, however, to admit that the doctrine of predestination was not a fundamental and determinative principle in the religious and theological thinking of Luther, not

withstanding the violence of his language on this subject in his *De Servo Arbitrio*. Men who are so violent in expressing their convictions, are usually but half convinced. There was doubtless something deeper in Luther's religious thinking, as there is in that of all men, than the notion of absolute determinism which he proclaimed in that and other books. Dr. Richard intimates that his language in this instance must not be taken too seriously. His resort to the theory of determinism which makes all free will on the part of man a nenenity and a lie was only a rhetorical expedient in order the better to overthrow the Pelagian doctrine of merit. Dr. Richard does not tell us whether he supposes this rhetorical artifice to have been a consciously chosen trick, or an unconscious and instinctive operation of the great Reformer's mind. We are quite willing to adopt the latter supposition. At any rate, we agree with Dr. Richard that determinism was not the deeper, the ruling principle of Luther's religious thought. A man who really and trully denies that there is any freedom of will could not writhe under a sense of sin and guilt as Luther did. For such an one guilt would have no existence, and there would be no need for any doctrine of justification. There is, accordingly, an inward conflict between a *real* belief in determinism and a *real* belief in justification; and we have no doubt that Luther *really* believed in justification by faith. We suppose, therefore, that the strong language in which Luther denied freedom and affirmed determinism, found no deep echo in his heart. It was not an expression of his inmost mind. The doctrine was useful as a weapon with which to beat down, if not to convince, the Papists, and Luther was willing thus to use it; and the more so as, according to the then current ideas of the Bible, passages could be quoted in its favor; but his real religious life and thought were determined after all by the deeper and better principle of freedom. And this is true whether his adoption of determinism was really a matter of the heart with him, or whether it was only a matter of the head.

But, now, if this be true of Luther, why may it not be true also of Calvin, and of other Reformed theologians before and after him? Certainly, so far as the outward form of presenting the doctrine of determinism is concerned, there is no apparent difference between the manner of Calvin and that of Luther. The doctrine of predestination was not the first and deepest thing in Calvin's thinking. His theological system as we have it in its final form in the *Institutes*, as is well known, follows the order of the Apostles' Creed; and it is only after the contents of all the articles down to that concerning the church have been discussed that, in the *twenty-first chapter* of the *third book*, the doctrine of election is reached. This doctrine is not logically *deduced* from the doctrine of God, of His nature and sovereignty, but from experience—from the experienced fact that the gospel does not meet with the same reception, or produce the same effects, among all men. In formal logical phraseology, it is not an *a priori* but an *a posteriori* doctrine. It is not first and fundamental in the theological system, but is presented only as a philosophical explanation of a fact of experience, though, after the manner of the time, abundantly fortified by quotations from Scripture. In fact, the doctrine of election is, in the last analysis, a philosophical and not a religious doctrine. It is a creation of the head for the purpose of accounting for a fact of experience, and not an original idea of faith necessary for the existence of religious life. Nor is it consistent with Calvin's general conception of religion and morality. In fact, there is reason to believe that, as in the case of Luther, so also in the case of Calvin, there occurred here a contradiction between a formal subordinate doctrine and the fundamental conception of Christianity, or between a notion of the intellect and a belief of the heart. There was a deeper principle in the mind of Calvin which served as a correction and contradiction of his doctrine concerning the "horrid decree," as he himself called it. The doctrine of absolute predestination, with its denial of the freedom of

the human will, is consistent neither with morality nor with religion in any true Christian form. And yet Calvin devoted more attention to ethics, both theoretical and practical, than any other Reformer. And this habit he has impressed upon the Reformed Church as a permanent characteristic. Dorner says that "in the *Lutheran* Church the self-sufficiency of faith betrays for a long time a certain indifference towards the ethical construction of the different departments of human life * * * and that it is only in the *Reformed* Church that faith operates as a regenerating principle for the spheres of public life," *Christian Ethics*, p. 286. Is it not a singular fact that the Reformed Churches which are supposed to hold, and to some extent do hold outwardly, a theological doctrine which, if consistently adhered to, would make all real moral life impossible, yet thus confessedly do give more attention to the subject of morality than the Lutheran Church does? What does this fact prove? Does it prove that the moral life of these churches is the fruit of their doctrine of election, as is sometimes contended; or does it not rather prove that this doctrine has no deep hold upon the consciousness of these churches, and that their morality must be sought in some other cause? Dorner has noted this want of consistency in the case of Calvin also in relation to the matter of sin and guilt. "Although his (Calvin's) doctrine of predestination," says Dorner, "properly leaves no room for free guilt in our sin, still he proceeds, like Luther, as if free guilt were there; and his doctrine of predestination, in disclaiming here its proper consequences, makes as it were an atonement to the moral consciousness by this defect in systematic consistency," Hist. Prot. Theol., Vol. 1, p. 391. It is, in fact, simple nonsense to suppose that any *church* can be consistently deterministic. In proportion that it should become so, it would cease to be religious; and if the Reformed and Lutheran communions are really Christian-religious communions, then they are not really separated by any doctrine of deterministic predestination.

We adhere, therefore, to the commonly accepted view, Dr. Richard to the contrary notwithstanding, that the real distinguishing doctrine of Lutheranism is its peculiar doctrine of the Lord's Supper. That belongs to Lutheranism alone; while the doctrine of justification by faith belongs to the whole of Protestantism as over against Roman Catholicism. The Reformers may in the beginning have been led to the acceptance of this doctrine in different ways—Luther, for instance, by his profound feeling of sin, Zwingli rather by his profound study of Scripture; but it was the same doctrine essentially to which they, in the end, all came. The Lutherans never had any monopoly of this doctrine, just as the Reformed had from the first no monopoly of the doctrine of election. The doctrine of justification in the form in which it was originally held by both sides of the Reformation, may now be open to criticism—the idea of a purely forensic imputation of righteousness, for instance, may not be acceptable to the modern ethical mind; but such as it was, it belonged to all alike. It was on the Lord's Supper that the Reformers differed; and that difference, as we have said before, is still the sign of division between Reformed and Lutheran Christians. Dr. Richard professes to be surprised that we used this word *sign*, and that our "philosophy of history did not lead us to search for the *principle* that lay behind the 'sign.'" He thinks that this is only a "sign" that we have "not comprehended the situation." On this charitable assumption we can evidently have nothing to say. Dr. Richard, of course, *knows*. But the fact is that we were discussing *his* articles on the "*Distinguishing Doctrine of Lutheranism*"; by which we presume that most intelligent people would understand him to mean, not some deep and recondite principle, but the *doctrine* which manifestly *distinguishes* the Lutheran Church from other Protestant churches. That he made this doctrine to be the doctrine of justification by faith seemed to us wholly preposterous, as it would exclude from Protestantism all the Reformed communions; and we presumed that after

calmly reconsidering the subject, he would hardly have the courage to reiterate his tremendous proposition. He, however, does this now; and a singular thing about it is that he now entitles this reply to our strictures, "*The Formative Principle of Protestantism*," and then wonders why we did not "search for the principle behind the sign." Why this change, we may leave our readers to guess. Was it to throw dust into the eyes of his readers, and create confusion in their minds? But let that pass. But now, if our readers will turn to page 102 of the January number of this REVIEW, they will see that we did recognize the difference between a *principle* and the *distinguishing mark* of a system of thought, and that we expressed the idea that the doctrine of the Lord's Supper which separates the Lutheran from other Protestant churches may not be an essential principle of Lutheranism, and may, therefore, be given up, as in fact it has been given up, by a large part of the Lutheran Church, and if we are not mistaken, by Dr. Richard himself. But we were not concerned with the *principle* or *principles* which led the Lutheran Reformers to think differently from other Reformers on the subject of the Lord's Supper. There are, no doubt, radical causes which induced the prevailing peculiarities of the Lutheran Church, chief of which is its doctrine of the Lord's Supper, without fundamentally separating it from the general Protestant community. What this "Lutheran spirit" is has often been discussed by eminent theologians, though without reaching any general agreement. None, however, so far as we are aware, has heretofore claimed to find this difference in an exclusive possession of the principle of justification by the Lutherans, and of an exclusive possession of the principle of predestination by the Reformed.

Dr. Richard professes himself to be greatly surprised at our saying that all parts of the Reformed Church never accepted the Calvinistic doctrine of predestination, that the German Reformed Church in particular did not do so, and that this doctrine is not contained in the Heidelberg Cate-

chism; and the greater part of his article in the *Lutheran Quarterly* is devoted to an attempt at refuting our assertion. We are willing to believe that his surprise in this instance is genuine, but that does not prove that he is right. He questions the competency of our scholarship, hints that we are only dreaming and do not know what we are about, and calls up a great array of witnesses to prove that we are mistaken—all of which again does not prove the correctness of his contention. The reader will remember that our statement on this subject was quite incidental, and that we offered no proof of our assertion. The fact is that we did not consider it essential to our argument, which was to the effect that if the Lutherans could be sound on justification with their pre-destinarianism, so also could the Reformed with theirs. Nor did we suppose that among our readers, who are informed on the subject, our statement would be questioned. We are aware, of course, that the truths affirmed have been disputed, especially by high Calvinists and extreme Lutherans; but we thought that among the readers of this REVIEW, for whom we were writing, no argument was needed in support of the statement that they and their Church do not hold the Calvinistic doctrine of predestination. But now, after this explanation, we stand by our assertion, and, in what follows in the remainder of this paper, shall proceed to vindicate the correctness of it. We think we are sure of our ground, and have no fear of the results of a free discussion.

Dr. Richard proposes to settle the points in question by an appeal to the opinion of a large number of witnesses. And the number of those whom he calls up is so large that there is something suspicious in this very fact. Had he been able to produce a few witnesses of decisive weight, the probability is that he would have been content to do so. As it is, it looks much as if he meant to confuse the question and throw dust into the eyes of his readers, by the very mass of the authorities cited. Some of these authorities, moreover, are garbled and misrepresented, while others, when

their testimony is sifted, simply prove nothing at all. As an illustration of the first class, we may take the case of Dr. T. G. Apple, who is represented as declaring, in a paper read at the second meeting of the Presbyterian Alliance, that the Heidelberg Catechism "asserts in general the position of Calvinism over against Arminianism, and that we find in it the substantial and positive elements of the Calvinistic system." Now, any one who knows nothing of Dr. Apple would, of course, suppose this to mean that he attributed to the Catechism the Calvinistic doctrine of predestination, including the two-fold decree of election and reprobation. But all who ever knew Dr. Apple will know that such a supposition is impossible; and referring to the paper mentioned, the reader will find that the only Calvinistic elements which Dr. Apple allows to be in the Catechism, are those which relate to the doctrines of the fall, of sin, and of redemption through Christ, which are common property among all Protestants. In fact Dr. Apple states distinctly that the redemption, as taught in the Catechism, instead of being limited to the elect, "is organic as the fall is organic." In an article in this REVIEW, January, 1872, p. 453, Dr. Apple says: "It is not difficult to see that the Catechism is not a Calvinistic symbol in the sense of modern Calvinism. * * * Looking at the Catechism itself we are at once confronted with a system which rests rather in historical than speculative metaphysical Christianity." This is one illustration of the way in which Dr. Richard uses his authorities. We have another in the case of Dr. Ebrard, whose work on Dogmatics our older readers studied at Mercersburg. Dr. Ebrard is represented, or rather misrepresented, by one of Dr. Richard's witnesses—to whom he gives a certificate of good character, vouching for his competency as a historian and his devotion to his church—as "holding that the Catechism expresses the Sublapsarian school of Calvinism (sic) afterwards adopted in France." Now, in the first place, the teaching of the school of Saumur, which we suppose to be here referred to, was not Sublap-

sarianism at all, but conditional universalism, and, secondly, if it had been, Dr. Ebrard would by no means have acknowledged its presence in the Catechism; for he was an uncompromising opponent of Calvinistic predestinarianism in any form, and yet an ardent admirer of the Catechism. But, again, some of Dr. Richard's authorities prove nothing, because they are acknowledged Calvinists, who find everywhere what they themselves believe. Sudhoff and Alexander Schweizer are of this class. They are predestinarians, and see predestinarianism everywhere. Of Schweizer Ebrard has said that he was engaged in "the futile effort of introducing pantheistic determinism into the Reformed dogmatics by means of the fog of dialectic confusion." But perhaps the most remarkable thing in Dr. Richard's historical argument is the use which he makes of the endorsement of the Catechism by the Synod of Dort and by the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in the United States. The fact that these strongly Calvinistic bodies have endorsed the Heidelberg Catechism, Dr. Richard holds, of course proves the Catechism to be Calvinistic. That is quite *naïve*. Did not these bodies also endorse the Bible? And does this prove the Bible, too, to be a Calvinistic book? If so, then Dr. Richard, and with him the Lutheran Church, had better endorse the Catechism too, and so get themselves right with the Bible.

But what is the use of quoting authorities? This may be done in such way as to prove anything. But there is the Catechism itself and explains its own meaning. Why did not Dr. Richard study it, and get his knowledge from its own teaching? Let us examine the Catechism and see what sort of Calvinism it holds. Calvinism means different things. Originally it stood for a theory of the Lord's Supper, opposed to that of Luther; and the "accursed Calvinistic heretics" with whom Luther contended, were "heretics" in this sense. He had no quarrel with them as predestinarians. In *this* sense the Heidelberg Catechism is unquestionably Calvinistic.

Later, especially in and after the time of the Synod of Dort, Calvinism came to stand for a theory of election. This is the modern sense of the term. The so-called "five points" of Calvinism are all related to this sense. The doctrine of the Lord's Supper has no place among them. "What Calvinism" is in *this* sense may perhaps best be learned from Calvin himself in what he says on predestination. "Predestination," he says, "we call the eternal decree of God, by which He has determined in Himself what He would have to become of every individual of mankind. For they are not all created with a similar destiny; but eternal life is foreordained for some, and eternal damnation for others." *Institutes*, III., XXI., V. In this sense we have said that the Catechism is not Calvinistic; and we say so now again, even at the risk of being pronounced utterly ignorant by those who do not know the Catechism.

Those who have studied the Catechism do not usually claim that this Calvinistic doctrine is in it directly and explicitly, but only indirectly and by implication, or inferentially and constructively. No one, as far as we know, has ever contended that there is a formal expression of it in the Catechism. But it has been claimed, for instance, that it is involved by implication in the doctrine of providence, Quer. 27, and elsewhere. Providence is defined to be "the almighty and everywhere present power of God, whereby, as it were by His hands, He still upholds heaven, earth, and all creatures; and so governs them that * * * all things come not by chance, but by His fatherly hand." Now, we do not think that the doctrine of Calvinistic predestination is contained in that; but if it is, then it is also in Matt. 10: 30, and in Rom. 8: 28. We believe, however, that these passages can readily be explained without recourse to the fatalism of Calvinistic predestination; and we imagine that Dr. Richard believes so, too. We certainly believe that God is almighty as well as omniscient, and that in His providence He realizes the eternal purpose of His creation; not, however, by the sup-

pression of creaturely freedom, but *through* that freedom. Again, the doctrine of *foreordination* has been discovered in what is said, Ques. 31, in explanation of the name of Christ, that "He is *ordained* of God, the Father, and anointed with the Holy Ghost, to be our chief Prophet," etc. These terms are doubtless used in allusion to Heb. 1: 9 and 8: 3, the former passage referring to the appointment of the high priest, the latter to the prophecy concerning the anointing of the Messiah. There is not the slightest reference in all this to the idea of the eternal election and reprobation of souls. Ques. 52, relating to the second advent of Christ, has also been quoted as involving the doctrine of predestination, because it is said that "He will take me with all His *chosen*, i. e., *elect* ones to Himself into heavenly joy and glory." There, it has been said, is the very word *elect*; but the existence of *elect* ones presupposes the eternal act of *election*. The same word, however, occurs in Matt. 24: 22, 24, where it evidently means the choicest, the best, the most perfect Christians; and there is no reason to suppose that it means anything else in the Catechism. But Ques. 54 has usually been regarded by the Calvinist as the very bulwark of the doctrine of election in the Catechism; and with this question is connected the formal discussion of the subject of predestination in Ursinus' *Commentary*; which implies that, in the view of the author of that commentary, there is nothing stronger than this in the Catechism. It is here said that "out of the whole human race, from beginning to the end of the world, the Son of God, by His word and Spirit, gathers, defends, and preserves for Himself, unto everlasting life, an *elect* church; and that I am, and forever shall remain a living member thereof." Here let it be observed, in the first place, that the action of Christ by which He builds up His church, is throughout an *historical* action, and that there is no hint that this is merely an execution in time of an eternal decree; and in the second place, that the word *elect* here applies only to the church collectively as a body *called out* (hence *ecclesia*) and *separated*

from the world; and thirdly, that the conviction of being and remaining a member thereof on the part of the individual, is an assurance arising out of present living faith which has its foundation, not in the metaphysical notion of election, but in the certainty of present vital union with Christ.

It will thus be seen that the effort to read the doctrine of Calvinistic predestination into the Heidelberg Catechism, even by inference and construction, ends in complete failure. But it has been said that this doctrine runs all through the Catechism *silently*, as its determinative principle. This view, however, is positively disproved by the absence of all reference to it in places where, on this supposition, it should be expected, as well as by direct statements which are utterly inconsistent with it. In fact, the omissions on this subject are more significant than the statements. Take, for instance, Ques. 20. It is here asked, "Are all men then saved through Christ as they have perished in Adam?" The answer is, "*No; only such as are by true faith engrafted into Him, and receive all His benefits.*" Now, if the Catechism were a Calvinistic book in the modern sense, who can doubt that here is a place where the fact would appear? How natural it would have been for the Calvinist to say, "No; only such as are eternally predestinated are saved." But nothing of the kind. So again in the answer to question 32, "Why art thou called a Christian?" it is said, "Because by *faith* (not by *election*) I am a member of Christ and a partaker of his anointing." The fact of the individual's salvation is not traced to anything deeper than his union with Christ by faith. Redemption, according to the Catechism, is universal, and, as Dr. Apple says, "*organic as the fall is organic*"; and every individual who *realizes* this redemption by faith is saved. His faith makes him a member of Christ; and in that relation is involved the potentiality of sanctification and the assurance of salvation. Should it be said that, in the view of the Catechism, Ques. 21, faith is the gift of God, being wrought in us by the Holy Spirit, we would reply that substantially the

same, or even stronger, language is used in the Augsburg Confession, Art. V.; and that if that can be taken in a sense consistent with human freedom, so also can the language of our Catechism. And it requires but little reflection, of course, to understand that faith is only possible where the gospel is truly presented to the soul in the power of the Spirit, who may be expected to come to every soul somehow and somewhere, and yet that such action of the Spirit, being in its nature *spiritual* and not *physical*, does not abrogate the soul's freedom; just as the eye cannot see without the presence and action of the light, and yet the presence of the light leaves the eye free to exercise its power of vision, or not, as it chooses. But as in the exercise of vision the eye becomes one with the light, so in the exercise of faith the soul becomes one, or flows together, with the substance of the gospel; or in other words, it becomes a member of Christ. And upon this fact of union with Christ is based that assurance of salvation which comes out so often in the Catechism, and which we have, for example, in the answer to the first question: "What is thy only comfort in life and death? That I, with body and soul, both in life and in death, am not my own, but belong unto my faithful Saviour Jesus Christ, who with His precious blood has fully satisfied for all my sins. * * * Wherefore by His Holy Spirit He also assures me of eternal life, and makes me sincerely willing and ready henceforth to live unto Him." This assurance of salvation is a characteristic of Reformed Christianity. When Olevianus, one of the authors of the Catechism, was dying, his friend Alstedt said to him: "You are doubtless certain of your salvation, as you have taught others?" And his reply was, "*Certissimus.*" Dr. Richard, on the strength of one of his authorities, considers this an avowal of the doctrine of Calvinistic predestination in the face of death. Such a conclusion, to say the least, shows a want of appreciation of the deep significance of faith in the thinking of the Reformed Church. Faith is not an intellectual conclusion drawn from the metaphysical notion of

election, but a conviction arising from contact of the soul with Christ through the gospel. We commend this Reformed conception of faith to Dr. Richard in the hope that he will now master it. One more argument proving that the Catechism is not Calvinistic in the modern sense which Dr. Richard is trying to fasten upon it, may be found in the answer to question 37, where it is said that "Christ bore in body and soul the wrath of God *against the sin of the whole world.*" Could the Calvinistic doctrine of "limited atonement" be more flatly contradicted than it is here? One of the authorities introduced by Dr. Richard, a Dutch theologian, whose name is D'Outrein, asks: "Is it to be said that Christ bore the wrath of God against the sin of the whole world?" and answers, "No. But the wrath of God which was kindled against the whole human race was borne by Him *for the elect of the whole human family.*" And this is introduced to prove that the Catechism is Calvinistic! How strange that Dr. Richard did not perceive the discrepancy! But this is like many of his arguments elsewhere. Who is it that is sleeping?

But the authors of the Catechism were both predestinarians, says Dr. Richard; and there at least he is awake. But when from this he reasons that the Catechism must of necessity be predestinarian, *the fact that it is not so* proves that his logic must be faulty. He tells us that "it is an uncontested principle that confessions of faith must be interpreted by the known theological positions of their authors," etc. Well, now let us see how this is. If a confession of faith for a church were merely a private document, this rule of interpretation would doubtless be correct. But a public confession of faith must express, not the religious convictions of its authors merely, much less their philosophical speculations, but the common religious consciousness of the church. In such a production there must evidently be a good deal of compromise and accommodation; and the private views of its authors, therefore, are no infallible guide to its interpreta-

tion. Dorner accounts for the absence of predestination from the Augsburg Confession by saying that "Melanchthon and the other theologians were guided by the consciousness that they had not to state Luther's doctrine of predestination as the common doctrine of the Evangelicals," Hist. Prot. Theol. Vol. I., p. 218. But there are a number of reasons why the doctrine of Calvinistic predestination should not have been put, and why it was not put, into the Heidelberg Catechism; although its authors were both predestinarians in the sense of their day, when the doctrine of absolute predestination had not yet become a watchword of opposing parties. In the first place, this doctrine is rather a philosophical theory than an article of Christian faith. But a Catechism is an expression of religious faith, and is intended for the instruction of simple Christian people. In the second place, this doctrine could not rightly be put into the Catechism, because it was not in the consciousness of the German church in the Palatinate; for, if Dr. Richard and Dr. I. J. Good, his most *important witness*, will pardon us for saying so, Dr. Heppe is right in affirming, and they are wrong in denying, that the church in the Palatinate was Melanchthonian in its original character, and shared the common faith of German Protestantism, in this form of it; of which the doctrine of absolute predestination was not a part; any more than were the rigoristic puritanic notions which were current at Geneva and elsewhere. In fact, there is reason to believe that the authors of the Catechism were themselves not deeply impressed with the doctrine of Calvinistic predestination; as we have seen before to have been the case with Luther, and with Calvin as well. It was a theory for them rather than an article of Christian faith. They too shared the common consciousness of the people whom they were called to serve; and it was, therefore, the most natural thing for them to do to exclude their theory from the Catechism. How true this is, and how foreign the doctrine of absolute predestination is to the religious consciousness of Reformed Christians, even outside of Germany, is shown by the

fact that, as Ebrard has stated, "there is no form of public prayer, or any liturgical formula of any kind, in any Reformed agenda of any land, in which there occurs any reference to absolute predestination," *Dogmatik*, first ed., Vol. I., p. 53. This shows how untrue it is that all men are Calvinists when they pray. A *consistent* fatalist would not pray at all.

The Heidelberg Catechism is a book designed for religious instruction, expressing the common consciousness of the church for which it was intended, in terms generally of the Bible itself. On the subject of election it teaches what the Bible teaches, no more and no less. If any one can find the doctrine of a double decree, of election and reprobation, in the Bible, he will of course, find it also in the Catechism. But to say that the Catechism teaches the Calvinistic doctrine of predestination is utterly wrong. Hence the welcome which this Catechism has always received from persons of different theological views, and the popularity which it still enjoys. They can all find therein a reflection of their piety expressed in the language of Scripture. No wonder the Presbyterians could adopt it. Why, the Lutherans could do so too, if it were not for its doctrine of the sacraments. On the general character of the Catechism, in the views now under consideration we quote here a few sentences from Dr. J. W. Nevin's *Introduction to the Tercentenary Edition*, p. 80. Here this most eminent Reformed theologian, whom it did not occur to Dr. Richard to mention, says: "Substantially Calvanistic as the Catechism is, however, in its doctrine of the sacraments, it has carefully refrained from committing itself in like manner to Calvin's doctrine of the decrees. This is the more remarkable, as both of its authors, Ursinus and Olevianus, are known to have been themselves strenuous disciples here of the great Genevan teacher; which, however, goes again, with other things, to show how in this work a sort of general objective spirit, in their ecclesiastical surroundings, seems to have taken possession of them, and to have made use of them as organs for reaching its own end. There is an innate opposition here,

unquestionably, between the two sides of Calvin's system, as it was taught by himself in the sixteenth century; his theory of election and reprobation can never be made to agree with the old church idea which he labored with so much ingenuity to conserve in his theory of the sacraments. * * * Where the Calvinistic theory of the decrees has been allowed to rule the course of theology, the Calvinistic theory of the sacraments has gradually lost its meaning altogether; whereas, in proportion as the sense of the sacramental has prevailed anywhere, as in Germany especially, the doctrine of the decrees has been held only with much qualification and reserve."

Now, in the German Reformed Church, the church of the Heidelberg Catechism it was the second of the two theories which lay uncoördinated in the mind of Calvin, namely, the sacramental, that has always been predominant; and this fact itself has made it impossible for this church to be Calvinistic in the modern sense. The German Reformed Church, *as such*, has therefore never accepted the Calvinistic doctrine of predestination. Theologians have done so, and even ecclesiastical assemblies, but these have not in the end controlled the faith of the church. It is true that this Calvinistic theory, in its most extreme form, triumphed at the Synod of Dort, fifty-five years after the publication of the Heidelberg Catechism. That was a sort of ecumenical Reformed synod as there were delegates there from all Reformed Churches, with few exceptions. But in Germany, at least, its temporary triumph at Dort was its defeat. In Brandenburg, and in England also, the decrees of Dort were never adopted. The Church of England, it should be remembered, was then considered a Reformed Church, and sent her delegates to Dort; which is another proof that it was not the doctrine of justification by faith, but that of the Lord's Supper that separated Protestantism. The English doctrine of the Lord's Supper was originally Calvinistic; now, alas, it has become, to a large extent, Romish, and is sometimes claimed to be Lutheran. In Germany the doctrines of Dort were not universally accepted even by the theologians, and

they never largely touched and moulded the life of the German people. They made no impression upon their faith, their hymns and prayers. The theory of the decrees never became the principle of Christianity for the people; that always was Christ and union with Him by faith. And even where the theory was adopted by the theologians, because it had been declared orthodox at Dort, it exercised no important influence upon German theological thought. The theologians, indeed, gave it respectful treatment in a separate *locus*; but when they had done that, they were usually done with it. As Ebrard says, they "encrusted" it in their systems, and made it harmless, somewhat as a mollusc encrusts a grain of sand in its shell and thus prevents it from getting into its body. In the Calvinistic sense of the Synod of Dort, accordingly, the German Reformed Church never was predestinarian; and it is a baseless fancy to imagine that she was Calvinistic in the beginning—in any other than the *Sacramental* sense—but lost her Calvinism through her contact with rationalism.

If any further proof of this statement were needed, it would be found in the fact that the German Reformed Church in this country certainly is not Calvinistic in any predestinarian sense. This statement will not be disputed by any one who knows anything about our church, unless he has a purpose to serve. There are some theologians and preachers who hold the Calvinistic theory; but even they could not preach it in plain terms, because their congregations would not have it. But did not the ministers and elders of this church for a long time subscribe the confessional standards of the Calvinistic church of Holland, including the *Canons of Dort* and the *Formula Consensus Helvetica*? Yes, but even that did not make the Reformed Church in the United States Calvinistic. The situation was peculiar. The membership of the church was German, consisting mostly of Palatines who had been robbed and driven from their homes by Catholic persecutors. The government of the church was Dutch and therefore Calvinistic. The ministers were for the most part sent over by the

Dutch Church and paid with Dutch money. And it was, therefore, natural that, when the *Coetus* was organized, subscription to the Dutch standards was required. That these early German missionaries supported by the Calvinic Church of Holland should, to some extent at least, preach Calvinistic doctrines, might have been expected. Some of them doubtless were sincere Calvinists themselves. But all this did not avail to make the masses of the German people Calvinistic. The relation lasted more than half a century; but in all that time the spirit of the church could not be changed; for the moment that the Dutch dominion ceased, and the church became independent, in 1793, she threw off all confessional authorities except the Heidelberg Catechism. The effort to make her Calvinistic, though continued for more than a generation was a complete failure. Such are the facts of Reformed Church history; and no partisan chicanery and special pleading can twist them into proof that the Reformed Church is, or ever was, predestinarian.

THE NEW PHILANTHROPY.

Dr. A. J. Lyman, in his Hartford lectures on *Preaching in the New Age*, noticed elsewhere in this issue of the Review, considers what he calls the *new philanthropy* one of the distinguishing elements of the new age upon which humanity has entered. By this Dr. Lyman means that there is abroad among men now a deeper and tenderer sense for humanity than formerly. Christian men, at least, have more sympathy for the pains and sorrows of their fellowmen than they had in other ages. Something that was called charity has, of course, always existed. The presence of the poor has always been recognized as imposing upon the well-to-do the duty of almsgiving. In view of what is said in the New Testament on this subject, it would scarcely have been possible to ignore this duty altogether.

But while it could not be ignored, it could at least be mis-

apprehended and distorted. Alms could be given in such a way as would turn the act into a mere act of selfishness. Indeed, during the middle ages alms were often given in this way. The motive was merely selfish. It was the salvation of one's own soul, an escape from hell-fire. Money was often set aside for benevolent purposes by wealthy individuals 'for the health of their souls.' To give alms was considered one of the surest ways of getting into heaven, and the rich would devoutly thank the Lord for the existence of the poor. This was the *old philanthropy*. In recent times such almsgiving has been called "purgatorial fire insurance," and "cyclone insurance." Those who are fortunate enough to have money to spare may in this way turn it to good account for the benefit of their souls. There is in this no love or charity; any more than it would be an act of charity if a farmer were to give a tramp a meal in order to prevent the latter from returning at night and burning down his barn. This kind of almsgiving has been called "hurricane insurance." It may be good worldly wisdom to spend a small portion of one's wealth in order to make the larger portion secure. But there is not in it any love; and so there is no love in the act when people set aside a part of their wealth for the health and peace of their souls. This is the old philanthropy whose moral worthlessness is coming to be more and more recognized. Alms given with this motive fail to accomplish the very purpose for which they are given.

Now the new philanthropy differs from this in the first place in the motive by which it is inspired. The old philanthropy was, and is, selfish; the new is altruistic. In the spirit of the old men gave alms in order to do themselves good; in the spirit of the new they give in order to do good to those to whom they give. In the spirit of the old they gave to bless themselves; in the spirit of the new they give to bless others. In the old they gave to keep their own souls out of hell; in the new they give to drive privation and pain from the souls of their fellowmen in this life. There may be some men and women still who have no higher motive in giving than this of doing good to themselves. If they can be made to see that there is some reward in giving—that it will pay to give—then they may be induced to open their hands and purses. For the love of God, or for the love of their fellows they will do

nothing. This is the old philanthropy which distinctly lacks that spirit of humanity which is now regarded as inseparable from Christianity. It is the philanthropy of the law, not the philanthropy of Christ. Jesus said: "When thou givest alms, let not thy left hand know what thy right doeth"—that is, let not thine almsgiving be influenced by any selfish earthly consideration, by any thought of loss or gain, but only by love for your fellowman.

But there is another quality of the new philanthropy, which should not here be forgotten. It is this: the new philanthropy is not bent merely on feeding poverty, but on removing the causes of poverty, or on alleviating pain but on removing the causes of pain. Its principle is not merely to help the needy by bestowing alms, but by putting them in the way of helping themselves. The best kind of help the poor can receive is the ability to be their own helpers—the ability to provide for their own wants. To this end the fierceness of modern competition must be moderated, and the conduct of society must become more equal and just. Meet the poor man with the *justice* which his *manhood* demands, and then for the most part he will be able to help himself. During the middle ages it was not an unusual thing on the part of pious highwaymen first to beat and rob a man, and then to give him alms for the health of the robber's soul. The new philanthropy says there is no merit in that. Men must be just before they can be generous. The good Samaritan must not have been the aggressor of the man whose expense he pays at the inn. There is, indeed, still much charity in our modern Christian life that is no better than this. For instance, men are exposed to needless danger in their employments at the very moment when their employers are comfortably seated in church; and when they have lost an arm or a limb, they are piously offered an alms—the widow's mite, perhaps. That is not yet the new philanthropy. It never was the spirit of the gospel. And when that sort of philanthropy shall have been driven from the churches, then we believe that their courts will be thronged again with worshippers. Let the principles of the gospel pervade the conditions of modern life, and industry, and administration of law, and there will not be much almsgiving needed. According to Warner's *American Charities* eighteen out of twenty-three different causes of poverty are preventable.

VIII.

NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

[Any books noticed in this REVIEW can be obtained, at the lowest prices, of the *Reformed Church Publication Board*, 1306 Arch St., Philadelphia, Pa.]

PRINCIPLES OF WESTERN CIVILIZATION. By Benjamin Kidd. Pages, 538. The Macmillan Company, New York. 1902.

Mr. Kidd is well known to the literary public as the author of works on "Social Evolution," the "Control of the Tropics," etc. He has made a reputation for himself as a profound thinker on sociological questions. His book on *Social Evolution* has especially been widely read, and is doubtless well known to many of our readers. The present work is in some sense a continuation and commentary on that earlier one. While in that the laws governing the social evolution of the world are investigated, in this these laws are applied to the explanation of the phenomena of the social history of the European nations. The peculiarities of manner and style which marked the former work are present also in this one, only in a much intensified form. *Social Evolution* was not easy reading; the reading of the *Principles of Western Civilization* is downright hard work. The sentences are long and involved; so much so that it is often difficult, and sometimes impossible, for the ordinary reader to perceive the grammatical construction. The terminology is often new and uncouth, reminding the reader somewhat of the language of Kant. The manner of approaching an idea is often oblique; and when the reader thinks that the author is about to express an important fact or truth immediately, he finds him, at the end of a long sentence, perhaps, only saying that "something remarkable is now to be considered," and to find out what that "remarkable something" is, he may have to read through three or four paragraphs, or even pages, of heavy sentences. The style of this book, accordingly, makes heavy demands upon the attention of the reader, and a good deal of courage and patient perseverance are required in order to read it through. And then it must be read more than once in order to get the full import of its meaning. It is, in fact, not a book merely to be read, but a book to be carefully and patiently studied.

But Mr. Kidd, while sometimes careless and even slovenly as to style, is not a fool in sociological science; and those who have the patience to peruse this work with the necessary care, and to

get his meaning, will find themselves well repaid for their pains. He is a man of wide reading and of profound reflection, and what he says is worth thinking about; and when carefully pondered, his long and heavy sentences will always yield a good and intelligible sense. It will be remembered, for instance, how, in his first work, Mr. Kidd puzzled his readers by affirming, in various forms, that there is "no rational sanction for the conditions of progress" in human society, and no rational motive for the individual or any number of individuals, to make sacrifices for the benefit of other individuals, or of society as a whole. But if it be remembered that when an individual sacrifices his own profit or advantage for the benefit of the oppressed or of the poorer classes, he does so not because he expects any present or material profit to accrue to him, but because *it is right* that he should do so, then Mr. Kidd's contention will at once be seen to be correct. The terminology will, indeed, be felt to be strange, but the sense will be found to be all right; for right doing, though it may involve, not immediate or present gain but loss, will be regarded by most men of sound minds, as an act, not contra-rational, but supremely rational. It is an act of the *highest reason* to love one's fellow men as one loves himself, and to treat them as one would wish himself to be treated; but it is not an act of the carnal mind, which judges only according to sense, and can perceive only finite and temporal things—which is what Mr. Kidd means.

In the present work the phrase just now considered does no longer figure so prominently. But the same thought substantially is now expressed by the new phrase "projected efficiency." In order to explain this, however, it will be necessary to take a rapid glance at Mr. Kidd's course of thought in this volume. It will be understood that Mr. Kidd is an evolutionist. He treats the progress of human society from the standpoint of cosmic evolution, in which natural selection forms an important factor. The process of evolution, however, is not an accidental or aimless process—mere motion without aiming at any end. It has an ideal end which is aimed at from the beginning, and which is progressively realized in nature and history. This presupposes the presence in nature and history of a supreme mind and will directing all things—a power that makes for righteousness—a thought which Mr. Kidd does not emphasize, but which he nevertheless distinctly recognizes. In the volume before us he traces the evolution of the social ideal, which is an ideal of righteousness, and peace, and love, from the dawn of western, or European, history up to the present time. The parts of the world not embraced in the movement of western history lie outside of the main stream of the world's life; although they have their vocation too,

which will, however, be accomplished only in connection with the western world.

The course of western civilization is embraced in two grand divisions, or eras, separated by the advent of Christianity. Both eras aim at one grand result in the end, but their immediate aims and results are different, and their causal principles are different. The ruling idea, or principle, of the epoch before the Christian era, is thus described by Mr. Kidd: "In the first epoch of social development the characteristic and ruling feature is the supremacy of the causes which are contributing to social efficiency by subordinating the individual merely to the existing political organization." This epoch embraced the old Greek and Roman civilizations. It was the period of military development and of military efficiency. Society and the state were the same; and the latter embraced the whole life, duties and rights of the individual. Even religion was no exception to this comprehensive grasp of the state. A rule of the state was a rule of religion, and conversely a law of religion was a law of the state. All interests of society centered in the present. Even morality and religion have their end in the present, and come within the limits entirely of political consciousness. Mr. Kidd shows how this is true of Greek *politics* and *ethics*. "It is the fundamental idea of Aristotle's *politics* and *ethics*," he says, "that the goal of all human effort is the attainment of the most perfect possible life in the existing political organization," p. 178. And again: "Virtue is conceived as a form of political activity," p. 180. And in this view Mr. Kidd simply voices the views of writers on ethics generally, who have long since made the discovery that in Greek ethics the highest good was the highest perfection and efficiency of the state. Mr. Kidd enters into a lengthy discussion of the origin of the state, involving the interest of religion, in blood relationship and ancestor worship, to which we can here only call attention. During this epoch there was developed, according to Mr. Kidd, a form of society in which the individual was thoroughly subordinated to the social body, and in which the ascendancy of the present was the predominant feature. And the result of this epoch could not have been wanting in the general progress of civilization. "It is only from the type of society," he says, "in which there is still potential the highest military efficiency that there can be developed that principle of social efficiency which, in the second epoch of social evolution, must ultimately subordinate organized society to its own future," p. 150.

We come thus to the consideration of the second epoch of social evolution which is coextensive in time with the Christian era, and which had its origin in the advent of Christianity. The

characteristic feature of this epoch is thus described by Mr. Kidd: "In the second epoch of the evolution of human society we begin to be concerned with the rise of ascendancy of the ruling causes which contribute to a higher type of social efficiency by subordinating society with all its interests in the present to its own future," p. 147. During the former epoch the individual, with all his interests, has become subordinate to the social whole which is dominated mainly or entirely by the interests of the present world. Men then lived only for the present life. Even religion was concerned mainly with the life which now is, and gods were worshipped chiefly because they could be useful to men in their present pursuits and interests. Now, after the advent of Christianity, the ascendancy of the present is gradually giving way to the ascendancy of the future in the life and striving of the Christian nations. And those nations in which the tendency to substitute future for present ideals has been the strongest, have been the winning nations during the modern era. This is what Mr. Kidd means by saying that the highest social efficiency now is *projected efficiency*. Those nations win who bend their energies not merely to the achievement of temporal results, but to the achievement of future results. The finite interests of time must give way to the infinite interests of the boundless future. "The principle of our civilization," says Mr. Kidd, "transcends all theories of an enlightened self-interest in the present." And nations as well as individuals who cling perversely to earthly ideals and interests, living for the present and not for the future, lack in *projected efficiency*, and fight a losing battle in the struggle of life. Here we see how the power which rules the world makes for righteousness; and how the most successful human life is not that which is determined by carnally intellectual motives, like that of the foxy, slimy politician, or that of the selfish exploiter of other men's toil, but that which is determined by super-sensuous and super-intellectual, that is, by moral and spiritual motives.

The realization of the ideal towards which western history has been moving since the beginning of the Christian era, has been a very slow and gradual process, in which the tendencies of the former epoch have been continually reasserting themselves. The process has therefore been a struggle between the old and the new, between the present and the future, all along the line. We can not follow Mr. Kidd in the account which he gives of this struggle. The whole period of the middle ages was involved in it. The ideal towards which the process, as we now see it, was plainly moving, was a social condition in which all human forces are in free competition with each other and the whole meaning of the conflict is related to the future. Freedom of life in all its de-

partments is the result to be attained; but the attainment is very slow, and the movement towards it meets with much resistance. Mr. Kidd maintains that even the ancient Christian heresies were in the nature of such resistance. They were "attempts to bring the human mind back again to the self-centered standpoint of the ancient philosophies," and if successful "would have closed again the very antithesis opened in the human mind wherein lay all the characteristics of the potentiality of the future." Mr. Kidd illustrates this conflict by the history of the struggle between the spiritual and the temporal power, or the church and the state, during the middle ages. The attempt of the church to rule the state, and to make it an instrument for the execution of her own decrees, as in the doctrine of two swords, is nothing else than an effort to make religion again an interest of the present, and make the rules of religion and the rules of law again identical. And this effort did not cease until the beginning of the 19th century. It survived even the period of the Reformation, in which other forms of the predominance of the present, or of the ancient pagan principle still persistent in Christian life, came to an end. There is one sphere, however, in which the modern, or Christian, principle has not yet triumphed, namely the sphere of *economics*. And this forms the storm-center now of social unrest and struggle. The conflict of capital and labor all the world over, the formation of great capitalistic trusts, etc., are all evidences that in this department of life at least the interests of the present are still predominant. They must, however, give way, and the ideal towards which the process of human evolution is tending must be realized. All opposing forces must be swept out of the way. This, however, will not be accomplished by the application of the theories of the Manchester school of economics, neither by the application of the principles of the English utilitarian school of ethics, nor by the application of the Marxian doctrine of socialism; for these all, as Mr. Kidd attempts to prove in a striking review of sociological thought in the first three chapters of this book, are involved in the error of merely emphasizing present interests at the expense of the future.

It will be seen from this very imperfect recapitulation of Mr. Kidd's thought as contained in this book, that it is not the production of a novice in social science, who does not know what he is about. It will be seen also that, though conceived in the light of the theory of evolution, the scheme of sociological thought presented is in harmony with the principles of Christianity. What Christianity teaches as the rule of social life and conduct for men is here shown to be the law of social evolution; which brings to pass the ends contemplated by the author of nature and of man. The book should, therefore, be welcomed by the Chris-

tian minister, and indeed by all Christian thinkers. Let them not be deterred by the difficulties of style and language from reading it, not only once, but again and again; for, though after such study one may perhaps not agree with all of Mr. Kidd's views, yet the study of the book can not be otherwise than stimulating and profitable.

PREACHING IN THE NEW AGE. By Albert J. Lyman, D.D. Pages, 147. Fleming H. Revell Company, 158 Fifth Ave., New York. 1902. Price, 75 cents.

This volume consists of a series of six lectures delivered in the Hartford Theological Seminary upon the "Carew" Foundation, in the spring of 1900. The original form of the lectures has been preserved in this publication. The respective subjects of the lectures are as follows: 1. *Introductory*; 2. *Preaching an Art*; 3. *Preaching an Incarnation*; 4. *The New Age and its Relation to Preaching*; 5. *The Preacher of To-Day Preparing His Sermon*; 6. *The Preacher of To-Day before His Congregation*. The general character of these lectures is indicated in the introductory lecture in the following language: "It may perhaps be said that these lectures do not enter the field of apologetics or Biblical criticism. The irenic thought and faith of modern enlightened Christendom is not challenged. The position taken is that of a liberal but evangelical faith welcoming indeed the spirit of rational critical inquiry as a part of the product of the Spirit of God working upon and within the mind of man, but yet accepting also, in common with the Church universal, the substantial integrity of the main New Testament literature, as inspired by that same Spirit, and especially emphasizing the divine supremacy of Jesus Christ, true Man of men, and yet also Master and Saviour of men and Son of God."

Dr. Lyman has faith in the efficacy of preaching. To the oft-repeated assertion that the power of the pulpit is waning, he replies: "What is true is simply the waning power of certain pulpit types that ought to wane." When the true gospel is preached in the right way to this new age, it will not fail to produce its old effect. What, then, is preaching the gospel, and what is the new age? These are the main questions which are discussed in the lectures. To the first of these questions the lecturer replies that "preaching is both an *art* and an *incarnation*." The term art he defines as "denoting the principle which seeks to express a truth in forms of beauty, with the result of producing in the mind a certain expansion and delight." A use of language which will produce these effects must contain the quality of *inspiration*. It is a quality, however, that comes to the preacher not simply from without, but must be cultivated.

True art is something which the true preacher can by no means afford to neglect or despise. But in the second place *preaching is an incarnation*; and this is the most essential quality that makes a true sermon. It is usually said that the Christian preacher must preach Christ. But there is a great deal of preaching about Christ that is not preaching Christ. Presenting the dogmatic formulas about the two natures in the unity of person, and the like, is not preaching Christ. Dr. Lyman, therefore, claims that true preaching of Christ must be in fact a re-incarnation of Christ. The true Christian preacher must preach to his audience *the mind of Christ*; but he can do that only if he has lived himself into that mind, so that Christ really speaks in him and through him, as the Father spoke through Christ. Thus to preach Christ is something far different from expounding and commanding an objective body of truth. We have heard a good deal of the "Christological order" of preaching. What is it? It is presenting the order of divine truth as it lay, and as it now lies, in the mind of Christ, in the power and Spirit of Christ. Thus to preach Christ, the preacher will have to realize in his own intellectual life Christ's way of regarding God, the world, and the soul. There is something mystical, no doubt, in these views; but we believe that it is the mysticism of the New Testament. It means no more than what St. Paul meant when he said, "We have the mind of Christ."

But in order to preach the gospel effectively to this new age, the preacher must know the age and be in profound sympathy with it. A man can not preach the gospel effectively to this modern age who himself lives entirely in some past age, and looks upon the present always with the eye of a pessimist. A man who is constantly regretting that his lot has fallen in this active, stirring modern age, in which there is so little respect for antiquity, for the venerable old creeds, and for the solemn pomp of ancient ritual, can not preach the gospel with much comfort or success to this modern world. But in order that a man may preach well to the age, he must know the age well. Dr. Lyman in the fourth lecture, therefore, inquires what are the chief features of our time, which are most important for the preacher to consider. He notices four, namely, the spirit of scientific investigation and criticism; the spirit of social combination; the spirit of economic enterprise; and the spirit of the new philanthropy. These are features or factors of the age which the true preacher will not quarrel with, but which he will seek to direct and control. They are not totally bad. "The great critical movement in modern thought reveals the breathing of the Spirit of God upon the intellect of man and is to be rejoiced in and honored. Criticism is a phase of faith," p. 83. Dr. Ly-

man does not regard the theory of evolution as anti-christian or atheistic. He says: It agrees with true theism in its doctrine of the immanence of God in the process of human history and the development of the human mind, and it agrees also with that more special Christian doctrine of the continued spiritual presence of Christ with His true Church,—a doctrine with the renaissance of which the new century is opening and which is now the enthusiasm of many Christian souls," p. 84. The spirit of social combination which is characteristic of this age has led to the new science of sociology, which the preacher of the twentieth century can not afford to neglect. This science has given us a new conception of the relation of man to man in the organism of society and of the kinship of all men as children of God. The preacher can not be a technical sociologist; "but Christian sociology should reappear in him in the form of geniality." "He will reproduce Christ's fellow-feeling with the people." In reference to the spirit of industrial enterprise Dr. Lyman says, "The preacher should embody in his sermon a certain tone, caught up from the industrial life about, a habit of practicality, of swift and sinewy movement in style, of Saxon brevity instead of Latin rotundity, of concrete wrestle with actual fact, a tone which the business man appreciates without knowing why he likes it," p. 91.

The last two lectures are rich and valuable in advice to the preacher, but we have not room to enter into particulars. The title of the first of these, "The Preacher of To-Day Preparing His Sermon," implies that sermons as heretofore should be *prepared*. There is a well known prejudice against written sermons and a demand for extemporary preaching, which is wholly senseless. The objection to written sermons, moreover, does not understand itself. It relates not so much to the manner as to the matter of sermons; and if the unwritten sermon were as insipid and as remote from the conditions of the age as the written sermon usually is, it would be equally objectionable. But sermons carefully prepared need not be fully written out, nor need they be dull and far removed from the actual conditions of modern times. On the subject of preparing sermons, and on the best style and kind of sermons, we must refer our readers to the book itself. So also on the delivery of sermons, or on the preacher before his congregation. The lecturer discusses the question, what is the congregation of to-day, and what is the effect of the presence of this congregation upon the preacher, and how should he deliver his message to the congregation? But we can enter into no farther particulars; and must close by recommending this volume to the attention of our readers. We can assure them that they will find it to be instructive and helpful.

Students of theology, candidates for the ministerial office, and young preachers generally, we are sure, can find nothing better than this brief series of lectures to prepare them for their solemn and difficult work. If they will study these lectures, and follow the advice which they contain, they will not preach aimless sermons, and their preaching will not be in vain; nor will their churches be deserted. They will realize the truth of what Dr. Lyman says in this sentence: "The twentieth century is to be yet more than the nineteenth, Christ's century." The gospel is not a failure.

THE THEOLOGY AND ETHICS OF THE HEBREWS. By Archibald Duff, M.A., L.L.D., B.D., Professor of Old Testament Theology in the Yorkshire United Independent College, Bradford, England. Pages, xvii + 304. Charles Scribner's Sons, New York. 1902. Price, \$1.25, net.

This volume belongs to the *Series of Semitic Handbooks*, now in course of publication by the Scribners, under the general editorial management of Professor J. A. Craig, of the University of Michigan. The object of this series, as stated in the *prospectus*, is to give "the results of the Semitic studies, now carried on among scholars, in popularly scientific form. Each work is complete in itself and the series taken as a whole neglects no phase of the general subject. Each contributor is a specialist in the subject assigned him, and has been chosen from the body of eminent Semitic scholars both in Europe and in this country." The series will consist of thirteen volumes, of which four have thus far been published. The publication is intended especially for ministers and intelligent laymen, who desire to be posted on the latest and best results of modern Biblical and historical scholarship. Ministers and theologians who wish to have any part either in the discussion or settlement of modern Biblical or theological questions, or even any intelligent comprehension of the matter in controversy, should not fail to study the successive volumes of this *Semitic Series* as they come from the press. The theological public is under much obligation to the Messrs. Scribner for furnishing it so valuable a publication at so small a cost.

The present volume, treating of the development of the Religion and Ethics of the Hebrews, is perhaps one of the most interesting and valuable of the series. One marked peculiarity of this book, differentiating it clearly from older works on the same subject, is its *historical method*. The author studies and presents the Theology and Ethics of the Hebrews in their *origin* and *development*. "A true exposition of the Religion and Ethics of the Hebrews," he says in the preface, "must be a narrative of a constant movement. The men of those ages were mentally alive and progressive. Consequently our exposition must prove

to be a vision of a steady progress of religion through the ages. The movement and development of men are seen truly only in their utterances, not in what chroniclers have said of them. Therefore in our pages we try to let the thinkers' own words be read. This becomes the more imperative to-day when the careful student of texts and times tells us that the traditional views of these have been mistaken, and that much rearrangement of passages is necessary, if we are to read the words of the original writers as they were written." Accordingly, the progressive origin and composite character of the Hexateuch and other portions of the Old Testament are distinctly recognized, and the reader is transported into the times when the Old Testament originated, and is enabled to read it in the light which those times and the manner of its composition throw upon it. We have in this volume four very valuable appendices containing critical analyses of the Biblical books extending from Genesis to Kings, from which the student can see at a glance what portions belong to the Jahvist, the Elohist, or the Deuteronomist. A similar analysis is given of the writings of Jeremiah. These appendices are of the utmost value to the critical student, who wants to know just what his Bible is.

From what has now been said the reader will perceive that such a work as this must put the student of the Bible into an entirely new atmosphere as compared with that which pervaded the older works on the same subject. They recognized no real movement and no history in the material treated. If any movement and change were recognized, they were movement and change only from the better to the worse condition. There was no progress in the development of religion and morality among the Hebrews, but only periodical retrogression and degeneration. The religion and morality of Israel were a finished product communicated to this people in the beginning by inspiration, and afterwards preserved and corrupted by tradition. Adam, so the theory ran, was created in a state of moral and religious perfection, possessing from the first all possible goodness, wisdom and knowledge. There was properly speaking no history in his becoming. But he fell from that height; and then, in subsequent ages the course of history was all downwards until the lowest stages of immorality and idolatry had been reached, and men, with few exceptions, had lost all knowledge of the true God. In the origin of the Israelitish nation, however, a new moral and religious beginning was made by wholly supernatural means. Moses was chosen as the instrument of this new start. He, by immediate divine inspiration and direction, gave to the Israelites a new revelation, and a complete law regulating all the affairs of their moral and religious life. But as soon as the eyes of Moses were closed

in death, a new process of degeneration set in, which continued ever getting worse until the coming of Christ, notwithstanding the work of the prophets which God sent from time to time. This is a view which is now no longer entertained by any considerable number of intelligent theologians. As represented in the volume before us, the religion and ethics of the Hebrews came about in a very different way. It was the way of progressive evolution. The progressive steps of this evolution can be traced in the successive writings of the Old Testament. The process began on the plane of Semitic heathenism. But from that low stage the people of Israel gradually arose to the height at which we find them in the times of the greatest prophets, and psalmists, and teachers. The question whether the evolution of religion and morality in Isreal was merely a *natural process* with which God had nothing to do, is not to be answered by criticism of a literature, but by philosophy, and did not come within the scope of the author of this volume. But there can be no doubt how he would answer it. He would probably say that there is no such thing in the world as a natural process with which God has nothing to do. God is in all the world's process; and the history of Israel, although entirely natural, was nevertheless throughout a process of divine education by which the people of Israel was prepared for its task in the religious development of the world.

The order of this development in Israel is traced by our author in the following six parts: I. *Early Hebrew Life: Its Religion and Morals.* Here we have an account of the origin, and of the religious and moral condition of the Hebrew people previous to the time of the composition of the earliest extant literature. II. *The Early Narrative Literature*, 900-800 B. C. Here we have an analysis and study of the Yahvistic writings contained in the Hexateuch and of the remaining historical books down to the beginning of the ninth century B. C. III. *The Prophets of Goodness*, 800-700 B. C. These are Amos, Hosea, Isaiah (the historical prophet of this name), and Micah. Their writings are analyzed, and their moral and religious ideals explained. IV. *Formal Doctrinal Teachers*, 750-700 B. C. This is the time of the Elohistic school of writers. It only lasted about half a century, and then gave place to the Deuteronomists. V. *The Theology and Ethics of the Period of Political Reorganization in Judah*, 700-600 B. C. This is the period of what is commonly called *Josiah's reformation*. We here have the theology and ethics of Jeremiah. VI. *Religion and Ethics in the Exile*, 500 B. C., *Onward*. The exilic literature is comprised mainly in Ezekiel, Jeremiah, Job, and portions of the Pentateuch, and above all in Deutero-Isaiah. The chief problem which confronted the writers, and in connection with which they developed their

religious and moral ideas, was the question of evil. Why do good men suffer? The study of this problem inspired the profoundest thoughts; and according to our author the height of religious faith and inspiration in Israel was reached in the "Comfort-Poems" of Deutero-Isaiah, whom Professor Duff would no more think of identifying with the historical Isaiah than he would think of identifying John Wesley with Martin Luther. "The songs of the suffering slave" are the profoundest expressions of Hebrew religious thought, and the author of them was the first monotheist among Hebrew writers.

We have tried to give our readers something of an idea of what they may expect to find in this volume; and now close this notice by commanding it to their careful consideration and study. The book ought to be in the hands of all theological students, and of all ministers who aspire to the best knowledge on the subject of which it treats. To say that "we do not agree with all the positions taken by the author," is so cheap a way of criticising what one has not fully mastered, that we prefer not to say it. It always implies an assumption of superiority over the author on the part of the critic, which would only be justified if the critic had really expended more thought on the subject than the author has. This in the present case we do not claim; and we simply commend the book to the thoughtful consideration of our readers and leave them to make their own criticism when they are done with it. Criticism in any case, as we understand it, is not the object of a "book notice." That object is merely to advise the readers of the contents and character of a book. They are to be made aware in general of the way and spirit in which the subject of a book is treated. We may say, however, that the study of the book under notice, we are sure, will profit those who undertake it.

A DICTIONARY OF THE BIBLE, Dealing with its Language, Literature and Contents, Including the Biblical Theology. Edited by James Hastings, M.A., D.D., with the assistance of John A. Selbie, M.A., D.D., and Chiefly in the Revision of the Proofs, of A. B. Davidson, D.D., LL.D., S. R. Driver, D.D., LL.D., and H. B. Swete, D.D. Volume IV. *Pleroma-Zuzim.* Pages, 994. 10 6 inches, double columns. Charles Scribner's Sons, New York. 1902. Price, \$6.00.

This volume concludes the series of Hastings' Dictionary of the Bible; although it is announced that "an extra volume is in preparation to contain indexes and certain subsidiary articles of importance." This Dictionary may be considered the first important contribution to the theological literature of the new century. It is conceived and executed in the light and spirit of the latest and best theological science. Hitherto no Dictionary of the Bible has existed in the English language of which this could be said. Many of the Biblical and theological articles con-

tained in the ninth edition of the *Encyclopediæ Britannica* are abreast with the theological learning of the last quarter of the nineteenth century; but this Dictionary of Hastings is the first one in the field that applies the results of the new learning to the contents of the Bible throughout. Of course the articles are not all of the same character and level. In a work of such extent, which must necessarily employ so many writers, there will be diversity of ability and spirit. The list of contributors to this last volume embraces the names of one hundred and sixteen persons chosen from the body of English and American scholars; and yet, while there are differences of theological tendencies to some extent, there is a remarkable degree of unanimity in the work as a whole. The articles all give evidence of careful preparation, and breathe a spirit of fairness and honesty in theological thinking. Even those which are not up to the level of the latest theological thought, yet give evidence of ability and careful investigation on the part of their authors. In the list of contributors we notice the names of a number of distinguished professors of German universities, and of scholars in other spheres of activity, giving the work something of an international character. The writers, moreover, represent most of the leading Protestant denominations in England and America, and among them are the names of a few Jewish scholars.

In the way of further description of this volume, by which the reader may get a better idea of its contents, we refer briefly to a few of the longer articles. Passing over some thirty-eight pages we come to the article on *Prayer* by Professor E. R. Bernard, Canon of Salisbury. The article is really a history of prayer from the earliest times down to the last book in the Bible. Prayer, says the author, is not commanded in any law; nor are the words and postures prescribed. Men pray because their spiritual nature leads them to do so; and they pray as their nature and wants prompt them. The author assumes it as an axiom that God hears prayer and is moved by prayer. In regard to the *Lord's Prayer*, the author states that "there are grounds, which to him seem sufficient, for believing that the prayer was given on two occasions, and in two different forms"—a statement, however, which will not be accepted by all New Testament scholars at the present time. The article on *Predestination* was written by Dr. B. B. Warfield, of Princeton University, covering seventeen pages, and reflecting the theological attitude of the Presbyterian Church at the present time. It is an able presentation of the Calvinistic doctrine on this great subject. The author finds the theory of absolute predestination, in its twofold form of election and reprobation, or preterition, taught in the Bible, from beginning to end, both clearly and distinctly. Dr.

Warfield emphasizes the fact that, according to the Biblical writers the *subject* of predestination is the righteous, holy, and *loving* God, that the decree is set forth as in its nature eternal, absolute, and immutable, and that its end is the glory of God. Non-Calvinists will, of course, not accept this view; and they will feel sure too, that before the new century shall have advanced far, this theory will have few defenders. Dr. Warfield's clear, though cautious, statement of this doctrine, we think, will have the effect of eliminating it from theological thinking. As bad laws are best gotten rid of by executing them, so bad theories are best silenced by clear statement.

The article on *Priests and Levites*, thirty pages in extent, was written by Wilhelm von Baudissin of the University of Berlin. Speaking of the Hebrew word for priest, *kohen*, Professor Baudissin concludes that it comes from *kâhan*, equivalent to *kun*, and signifies *one who stands before another, a servant*. But in this article we note especially the fact that, in agreement with the modern method of theological thought, the subject is treated *historically*. The priesthood is treated from the first as a gradual product of history. The older theory was to the effect that the threefold orders of *Levites*, *priests*, and *high priest*, which we find existing in the time of the second temple, was established by Moses, and afterwards preserved without any change down to the time of Christ. According to Professor Baudissin this order came about as the result of a historical process of evolution. In the earliest times there was no special priesthood at all. The head of every household was its priest. Gradually, however, a distinction began to be made in favor of certain individuals to whom preference was given in the performance of sacred rites, and they were designated by the official title of *Levites*. These gradually formed a guild which enlarged into a tribe; and in the time of the predominance of the Deuteronomic law all Levites were priests. Subsequent to the time of Ezechiel and the legislation of Ezra we find the later relations established. The article on *Prophecy*, consisting of twenty-one pages, was contributed by the veteran scholar, A. B. Davidson, who, though having many titles to his name, in fact needs no title to declare his greatness. He says of prophetic inspiration, "perhaps the best idea of the mental state of the prophet in the purest stage of prophecy would be got by considering the condition of the religious mind in earnest devotion or rapt spiritual communion with God." The prophets are considered mainly as *teachers* of their time and for their people. A prophet is not mainly a *foreteller*, but a *forthteller*—one who speaks for God; a distinction now generally received, but for which modern English theology at least is indebted largely to Dr. Davidson. On the subject of Messianic prophecy Dr. David-

son says this: "The Messiah is not an independent figure, unlike all other figures or personages, and higher than they; on the contrary, he is always some actual historical figure idealized." The highest prophetic conceptions are thoughts suggested by God's providential guidance of Israel. The *Servant of the Lord* in Isaiah is an illustration. "The phrase expresses the highest generalization on the meaning of Israel in the religious life of mankind—Israel is the servant of Jahveh to the nations, to bring to them the knowledge of God. Scholars agree that the ideas expressed by the prophet in regard to the servant have been more than verified in Christ." This is Dr. Davidson's interpretation. And as he was one of the assistant editors of this Dictionary, it may be presumed that his mind had much to do with the shaping of its character.

Dr. W. T. Davison, of Handsworth Theological College, Birmingham, is the author of the article on *The Psalter*. The article is exhaustive, extending through eighteen pages, and treating of all questions relating to the authorship, age, style, and teaching of this important book of the Bible. On the matter of David's relation to the Psalter, the author says that it is not proven that David wrote any psalms, that the probability is that he wrote many, and that it is not likely that all are lost. Some of the psalms in our collection may be from the hand of David. On the question whether there are any Maccabean psalms the author speaks cautiously, but leans decidedly to the affirmative side. The article on *Sacrifices*, of twenty pages, is furnished by Dr. W. P. Parterson, of the University of Aberdeen. The author gives up the old idea of a divine appointment of the institution of sacrifice, and holds that it was originally devised by man himself as a means of satisfying the demands of his own spiritual nature. He presents the various theories of the significance of the sacrificial ceremony that have been entertained, and concludes this part of the subject by saying that "Amid this mass of speculation the most certain conclusion seems to be that sacrifice originated in childlike ideas of God, and that the fundamental motive was to gratify Him by giving or sharing with Him a meal." Those theologians who have been dreaming wonderful things about the Talmudic notion of the *Shekinah* should read the article on this subject by J. T. Marshall. "The two most remarkable features of Judaistic theology," he says, "were its development of the doctrine of Divine 'aloofness,' and the way in which it then sought to bridge the chasm which it had created between God and man. * * * The transcendence of God, and His exemption from all limitations, was insisted on with increasing vigor, until it reached the *ne plus ultra* in Philo, who maintains that to assign any quality to God would be to limit Him. * * * Having thus

undeified God in their effort to dehumanize Him, the object of philosophic Jews was to posit some one or more intermediary Hypostases, who might occupy the place which had previously been assigned to God in the world of matter and of mind. Of these the most prominent were the Metatron, the Word, the Spirit, and the *Shekinah*." The philosophic theologian will not fail to perceive an analogy between this and a well known circumstance in Latin theology. Latin theology has so emphasized the *transcendence* of God that it has in fact sundered His connection with the world. And how does it reimburse itself for its loss? By giving God a substitute in the pope and hierarchy, and in the sacraments of the church.

The article on *Son of God* by Dr. W. Sanday, of Oxford, and the one on *Son of Man* by Dr. S. R. Driver, likewise of Oxford, are especially interesting in view of present discussions going on in Christian theology. Dr. Sanday examines the use of the term *Son of God* in the Old and New Testaments; and from this examination it appears that from the application of this term to any one no inference can be drawn as to the origin and metaphysical constitution of his person. That Christ is called the *Son of God*, accordingly, does not prove His eternal pre-existence and deity. Dr. Sanday himself, on this last part of the subject, seems to favor the views of Marcellus of Ancyra, of the fourth century, who held that "the title 'Son' had no reference to origin or to the pre-existent relation of Christ to the Father. The proper term to denote this relation was in his view not 'Son' but 'Logos'." Dr. Sanday expresses his own view in the following sentences: "The Son is so called primarily as incarnate. But that which is the essence of the incarnation must needs be also larger than the incarnation. It must needs have its roots in the eternity of Godhead." We refer to but one more article as being valuable in view of present discussions, namely the article on *Writing* by Dr. F. G. Kenyon, of the British Museum. The article covers eighteen pages, and is an exhaustive study of the subject. We have a full discussion of the antiquity of the art of writing, the materials used, etc. Paper, we are told, was first manufactured in China and became known to the Arabs about the middle of the eighth century. Writing was known and practiced in Palestine in the century of the Exodus. The fair inference is that Moses, and perhaps some others of the Israelites, may have been able to write; though this, Dr. Kenyon holds, proves nothing as to his having written the books which have been attributed to him.

But this must suffice for exemplification of the character and contents of this Dictionary of the Bible. From this, and the notices of previous volumes, our readers may get some idea of

the nature and value of this work. Some good Bible Dictionary, for the modern student, is a necessity. And the older works, like Calmet's and Smith's, are no longer adequate. They are behind the time, and breathe an atmosphere that belonged to an earlier age of theological thought; and those ministers and students now who know nothing but the dictionaries, commentaries, etc., of half a century ago, cannot but be uncomfortable in the atmosphere of the present. This is doubtless the cause of much of the uneasiness and suspicion which may be witnessed at the present time. This Dictionary of Hastings well studied would bring peace and confidence to many now anxious theological souls. It would help them to articulate their theology with the reigning theology of the present time. Of course, this will not be the last Dictionary of the Bible that will be written; for our knowledge of the Bible is not yet perfect. It represents, however, in general the state of our knowledge at the present time; and those who buy it will probably not need to buy another in the period of their life time. Students of theology, especially, should not be satisfied with anything less modern and less complete.

THE TEMPLE BIBLE.

NUMBERS. Editor, G. Buchanan Gray, M.A. Pages, 158.

JEREMIAH AND LAMENTATIONS. Editor, E. Tyrell Green, M.A. Pages, 256.

DANIEL AND THE MINOR PROPHETS. Editor R. Sinker, D.D. Pages, 242.

EZEKIEL. Editor, O. C. Whitehouse, D.D. Pages, 187.

THE GOSPEL ACCORDING TO ST. LUKE. Editor, M. R. Vincent, D.D. Pages, 150.

The Earlier Epistles of St. Paul, CORINTHIANS, GALATIANS, and THES- SALONIANS. Editor, Vernon Bartlet. Pages, 142.

Publishers, J. B. Lippincott Company, Philadelphia, Pa. 1902. Price, per volume, 40 cents, net. Limp Cloth Binding; and paste grain roan, 60 cts.

The above seven volumes of the *Temple Bible* were received during the last quarter. They are in style and character similar to those which have preceded them and have been noticed in previous numbers of the *REVIEW*. Each volume is under the care of a separate editor, who furnishes an *Introduction* dealing with the authorship, history, characteristics, scope, and style of the books; and also *Notes*, elucidating geographical, ethnological, and textual difficulties. The Text is that of the Authorized Version. Serious mistranslations are corrected in the *Notes*. Nothing is allowed to appear either in the *Introduction* or *Notes* in the remotest degree approximating to dogmatic teaching, or to the expression of either sectarian or controversial opinions. Each volume contains a suitable *frontispiece*, or photographic reproduction of some famous painting. Each volume also contains

synchronistic tables of ancient history, maps of the world as known in the time to which the contents of the book or books refer, tables of references to Biblical passages in English literature, and tables of weights and measures. The publishers desire to make the "Temple Bible" a *Vade Mecum* for Scripture students of all shades of belief, but at the same time to prevent it from becoming the special mouthpiece of any school of thought in particular. The editors have been chosen from the body of eminent Biblical scholars, on both sides of the Atlantic, without regard to denominational or sectarian affiliations. They are supposed to represent the highest state of modern theological and Biblical learning, without, however, being all of the same tendency of thought. As to the matter of Biblical criticism, which cannot be avoided in a work of this kind, it may be said that the editors are all *higher critics*, but they do not all press their critical inquiries to the same extent, and arrive at different conclusions.

In the way of illustration of the last statement reference may be made to some differences in the *Isagogic* work of the volumes noticed above. Professor Gray, the editor of the Book of Numbers, says that this book "contains some of the most significant evidence against the traditional views that the Pentateuch was written by Moses, or is a work of the Mosaic age." He refers to "two or three illustrations of the great variety of this evidence." The first is the laudation of the character of Moses in Num. 12:3: "Now the man Moses was very weak, above all the men who were upon the face of the earth." The second illustration is the fact that "some of the events recorded in this book occurred at a later age than that of Moses." Compare Num. 32:41 with Judg. 10: 3, 4. The third illustration is thus stated by Professor Gray: "Most conclusive of all, when understood, is the incredibility and impossibility of the various numbers given in the book. It was the great and enduring service of Bishop Colenso to bring these numbers to the test of reality and thus to show that those parts of the Pentateuch which contain them or presuppose them are completely unhistorical—the work of the writer who lacked all knowledge or sense of the actual conditions of the life and times of which he wrote." The author then goes on to show that, in the language of Professor Sayce, a population of 2,000,000, or more, in the land of Goshen, and afterwards in the desert of Sinai, and in Canaan, is inconceivable. The editor concludes, therefore, that the Book of Numbers is not the work of Moses. "It is the book of men, rather than a single man, whose names are, and are likely ever to remain, unknown." The editor adopts the documentary theory which is familiar to us from Wellhausen and Driver. An interesting portion of this Introduction to the

Book of Numbers deals with "The Poetry of the Book." But we must refrain from entering into details.

The Book of Jeremiah and the Book of Lamentations have been edited by E. Tyrell Green, Professor of Hebrew, St. David's College, Lampeter. The text of Jeremiah is known to be in much confusion; and the English version being based upon the Hebrew text, differs much, both in extent and content, from the Septuagint version, which most scholars, and among them Professor Green, suppose to be based upon a Hebrew manuscript a thousand years older than that which we have in our present Hebrew Bibles. Professor Green in this introduction does what can be done, without resort to Hebrew, and a detailed comparison with the Septuagint, to put the English reader in the right position for understanding the Book of Jeremiah. The Book of Lamentation this editor does not regard as a work of Jeremiah, but supposes it to belong to the time of the destruction of Jerusalem. *Daniel* and the *Minor Prophets* was edited by Dr. R. Sinker, of Trinity College, Cambridge. Dr. Sinker is conservative, and holds on to the traditional views of the origin of Daniel and of the Minor Prophets generally. He thinks that what has been said against the early composition of the Book of Daniel is not conclusive in favor of its composition in the time of Antiochus Epiphanes, as most critics now hold. He makes a concession, however, to the modern interpretation of the images of the world-empires, as over against the earlier interpretation, which implies much. He agrees with Bishop Westcott "who took the four empires to be those of Babylonians, Medes, Persians, and Greeks, to all of whom Babylon seemed in a sense the world's capital." If the Roman Empire be excluded as having not yet come into the horizon of the prophet, then it is natural to conclude that the prophet must have lived in the Greek period after Alexander, which, in our opinion, is in view of other considerations an irresistible conclusion. As to *Amos* and *Hosea* there is but little difference generally among critics and commentators. We mention, however, that Dr. Sinker takes literally the story of Hosea's marriage with Gomer, in this agreeing with such a critic as W. Robertson Smith. The editor is in doubt, however, as to the historical character of the Book of Jonah, but says: "Still, whatever view we hold as to the historical character of the book, its main purpose is plain. It is to teach that Jehovah is no mere tribal deity, not the God of Israel only, but of all nations, and that they are embraced in the scheme of His mercy." That certainly is correct. The Book of Ezekiel, because of its visionary character, is perhaps not read as much as some other portions of the Old Testament. It is, however, worthy of the most serious attention of the Christian theologian: because of its bearing upon

the cultus and theological thought of Israel in the time of the Second Temple; and by the help of the Introduction and Notes furnished by the editor of this volume, Dr. A. C. Whitehouse, the English reader is put into a position to read the book with better understanding.

The editor of the *Gospel of St. Luke*, Dr. M. R. Vincent, of Union Theological Seminary, New York, treats, in the Introduction, of the following topics: The Third Gospel the Work of Luke; the Gospel of Luke and the Acts of the Apostles; Luke the Author of Acts; the Date of Composition; the Personality of the Writer; the Matter of the Third Gospel; Political References; Literary and Historical Characteristics; Luke and Paul; the Aim of the Third Gospel; Professional Traces in His Work; the Gospel of the Poor; and Other Characteristics. As to the date Dr. Vincent says: "There is good reason for placing the composition between A. D. 75 and 80. The editor of the earlier *Pauline Epistles*, Prof. Vernon Bartlet, Mansfield College, Oxford, agrees closely with Dr. McGiffert, *The Apostolic Age*, as to the time of composition of these Epistles. He dates the Galatian Epistle early in A. D. 49 or 50, and regards it as the first of St. Paul's extant letters. The Epistles to the Thessalonians are dated in A. D. 50-51, and those to the Corinthians in A. D. 54-55. On the mind and style of St. Paul in general this editor remarks: 'Even an Apostle's mental equipment was 'in part' and conditioned by his special training. But once we learn to read these letters as letters, we are able to feel the life behind as the real moving force and message of each: and we should strive to place ourselves beside the writer, to see and feel through his eyes and heart.'" And, we would add, it is the aim of the editor to put the readers of these Epistles into the position in which they may be able to do so.

We cordially commend this *Temple Bible* to all English students of the Bible, who want helps going beyond those of the ordinary "teachers' Bibles"; and to all Christian families who are willing to pay ten dollars for a complete Bible that *can be used* with comfort and profit.

THE NATURALNESS OF CHRISTIAN LIFE. By Edward Everett Keedy, Minister of the First Church, Hadley, Massachusetts. Pages, 204. G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York. 1902. Price, \$1.25.

The fundamental thought illustrated in this book is the idea that Christianity is essential to humanity, and that the future of human life is essentially the same as the present. This thought is illustrated in eight chapters with the following headings, respectively: *Man's Kinship with God; Christianity the Realization of Nature; Jesus the Revealer of Man: Jesus the Power of*

God; Character by Inspiration; Manhood an Achievement of Tomorrow; Who Has Manhood Has Heaven; The Experiment of Religion; The Instinct of Church-Membership. The character and interest of the volume, and its value to the Christian believer, and especially to the Christian minister, may be inferred from the above table of contents.

In the first chapter it is shown that God and man belong together—that the divine and the human are separated by no wide gulf. The Biblical doctrine that man was made in the *image of God* is inconsistent with what has been called the *worm theory* in theology. Man is the child of God. "Sonship," says Dr. Keedy, "is the essence of humanity, as paternity of God." "Man's glory and greatness are evidenced in the fact of his capacity to share God's thought. The postulate of all thinking is the likeness of mind in God and man: Without that assumption we cannot know anything," p. 5. Because of the natural kinship between God and man, God's essential attributes must be reflected in man. "Holiness is not one thing for God and another thing for man," as has often been imagined. Hence the law of God for human conduct is the law of man's own nature. "Man has the sense of sin and guilt. When he breaks the law of God he breaks also the law of his own nature and being, and the God within cries out against the trespass: his heart condemns him." Religion, accordingly, is nothing foreign to man. "It is nothing other than the attempt to reproduce in man the life of God." "The yearning of the soul is but the struggle of man's divine nature." "Man's nature is keyed to God. * * * Life according to nature and according to God must be the same thing," p. 8. "The first truth of the Incarnation—the fact that the Son of God became man—is the essential divineness of humanity." Christianity, therefore, is not an abrogation of nature; nor is it an addition to nature; but it is the realization of nature. "Jesus did not come to set man's nature aside, but to fulfil it, to restore it to its normal operation," p. 39. "Regeneration," says the author of this volume, "is not a change of nature, it is a glorification of it. * * * We still cling to the custom of infant baptism, a very significant rite, but we deny what it implies," p. 45. It implies the essential Christianness of the infant's soul; but how little that fact is recognized. It is ignored by Baptist and Pedobaptist alike; for both assume that the soul is not by nature Christian, but needs to be made Christian by some subsequent supernatural operation.

What man is in his essential nature is made manifest in Christ. Christ is the revealer of man, the patternman, the ideal man. But Christ is also the power of God for the realization of the ideal of manhood in the individual man. Christ is God's power

through whom the world is to be saved. "Salvation," says Dr. Keedy, "is the participation in the character of God, and comes by the grace of God." Other powers have been tried in order to the attainment of salvation. One of these is *law*; but law cannot accomplish it. Another is *truth*; but the knowledge of truth is not salvation. The third power is *love*. This is the power of God, manifested in its perfection in Jesus Christ." "It is the law of love that we become like those we love." God causes sinners to become like Him in character; in other words, He saves them by inspiring them with love. Hence the title of one of the chapters of this volume: *Character by Inspiration*. "The transformation from badness to goodness must be accomplished under the power of God. The gospel is the good news of the mediation of God—the story of divine helpfulness," 81. How does God help a man to be good? Not by magical, or immoral ways, but by *inspiration* and *influence*. It is the love of God as revealed in Christ that, being borne in upon the soul, quickens its moral energies, and makes it to be conformed to the image of God. This is the meaning of the atonement, and of the sacrificial suffering of Christ. The Christian manhood, resulting from the experience of the love of God in Christ, is not an absolute gift, but an achievement, and an achievement, not all at once, but accomplished gradually. Hence the title of one of the chapters: *Manhood an Achievement of To-morrow*. Under this head the author refers to the doctrine of justification by faith. Faith lays hold of and realizes the promise of divine forgiveness. This is justification; but this is not salvation. Salvation is not by imputation; nor is it by translation into heaven. Salvation is character, disposition, state of mind corresponding to the mind of heaven. And this is a state of mind which is not foreign but natural to man. Hence the absence of it is misery, is hell; and the presence of it is blessedness, is heaven: who has manhood has heaven.

From what has now been said of the contents of this book the reader may convince himself that the work is one that is well worth studying. It is not a theological treatise in the ordinary sense. The author says in the preface: "This little book is more the inspiration of religious experience than an offering of the reason or an interpretation of Scripture. In accord with the book's own view of man, these three—experience, reason, and Scripture, agree in one." This account of its origin will explain its character and style. There is but little argument in the book, or formal labored reasoning. What we find is more in the nature of confession, a simple statement of the facts of religious experience, as the unsophisticated soul, forgetting the learning and the tradition of the schools, would be apt to apprehend and

express them. And in such souls it will strike a sympathetic chord. The simple, honest reader, who has some knowledge of the history of dogmas, will probably, as he reads, find himself saying more than once: Why, this is all contrary to the teaching of the text-books—it is not Calvinism, nor Arminianism, nor Lutheranism—but then it sounds as if it must be true—my heart agrees with it, my experience harmonizes with it, and my reason approves it. We commend this book to preachers; and we are sure that if they saturate themselves well with its contents, they will preach more directly to men's hearts, and will find that the gospel has a power of whose existence they have heretofore seldom dreamed. The perusal of pages 70–80 on the power of love as a principle of moral assimilation and transformation, we are quite sure, will be like the opening of a new light from heaven to many a soul perplexed by the old philosophies of salvation.

LUX CHRISTI, An Outline Study of India, a Twilight Land. By Caroline Atwater Mason. Pages, 267. The Macmillan Company, New York, 66 Fifth Avenue. 1902. Price, 30 cents, flexible paper cover.

This little volume has been prepared and published in the interest of the cause of foreign missions. It is intended for study by missionary societies and by individuals interested in the spread of the gospel. The best way in which the cause of missions can be promoted in the home churches is to spread intelligent information concerning the life and character of unchristian nations. And no land could be chosen for study so full of interest, and presenting so much information as India—the land of twilight and mystery. The very land, with its sacred rivers and mountains, its wide plains and populous cities, its strange animals and birds, is full of interest to the American reader. Then, India has been the home of a mixture of races. The real Hindus have not been aborigines of the Indian peninsula. They were originally immigrants and conquerors, coming from beyond the great chain of the Himalaya mountains, usually called the roof of the world. They originally belonged to the same great Aryan race to which we ourselves belong. And the Hindus are, therefore, in a sense our cousins; and though dark skinned they present the same features which occur in Europe and America. They are the high cast Hindus. The original inhabitants who were subdued by the Aryan invaders, are the low-cast people, who have endured untold wrongs at the hands of their conquerors. India, moreover, has been the soil on which a number of religions have sprung up and have flourished. The original religion of the Hindus may be called *Vedism*, because it has a literature older than that of the Bible, deposited in a series of sacred books called *Vedas*. Modern Brahmanism, with its pantheism, and its intel-

lectual subtleties, and Buddhism also, have grown from the soil of Vedism. There is no country in the world in which the growth and decay of religion can be studied to better advantage than India. We recommend this volume to all students of religion and to all who are interested in the sacred cause of missions.

